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Duchamp Meets Turing: Art, Modernism, Posthuman 
Gabriela Galati 
In her book How We Became Posthuman (1999), Katherine Hayles analysed 
the process through which the conception of the liberal humanist subject led the 
way to the posthuman subject, a subject who lives in complete entwinement 
with the digital. This process, however, was not innocuous: it made the 
(fallacious) perception that information could do without material instantiation 
pervasive within many fields of knowledge, a process that Hayles contends 
originates in the Macy Conferences and the evolution of cybernetic theory. 
This research identifies an analogous process within the artistic realm:  when 
Clement Greenberg delineated the concepts of opticality and colour field as the 
main characteristics that “defined” Modernist painting, he conceived of these in 
a purely disembodied subject (Krauss 1993). In this context, this work proposes 
to consider that the actual overcoming of modernism comes along with the 
advent of the posthuman, tracing its origin to Marcel Duchamp and his 
invention of the readymade, and not with postmodernism, the theoretical 
consistency of which, at least in the artistic field, this research will question. A 
first aim of this work will be to unify the main concepts and theories of the 
artistic field with those of cybernetics, to bring together ‘Turing land’ and 
‘Duchamp land’ (Manovich 1996).  
For achieving this, digitalisation processes are not to be understood as 
representations of some material reality, but rather as ontological repetitions 
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through which difference is conveyed. This is why the consideration of the 
temporal dimension of the archive as event is fundamental for understanding 
that the archive can only exist in its change, in its movement, in its action, in 
its metamorphosis, and thus the relevance of digitalisation processes in this 
regard becomes evident. Therefore, the archive is not only an issue of memory, 
but also a question yet to come, of conformation both of the future and 
subjectivities (Derrida 1967b, 1995).  
In this context, the present work advances the emergence of a digital subject 
with the emergence of new media, and theorises that the constitution of this 
subject happens by assuming a ‘point of view’ (Deleuze 1988) in the 
technological unconscious (Vaccari 1979). Reflecting upon the effects of 
digitalisation and actualisation (Deleuze 1968) on the subject, on how the 
digitised artwork and event affects, and changes, the subject observing and 
interacting with it, the present research will demonstrate that it is pertinent to 
talk about a subject who is embodied in the digital. In this sense, if the 
digitised artwork in the archive needs a subject to be actualised, this process 
also has its consequences for the subject. Therefore, the digital subject is the 
possibility of actualisation of the archive, and at the same time changes with it: 
she assumes an always-different ‘point of view’ constituted for her by the 
floating signifier in the technological unconscious.  
All these theories, which are part of the posthuman, are presented as the actual 
overcoming of modernism to show that the readymade as medium is, at the 
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same time, both one of the points of rupture and the key link to bring back new 
media and art theory as art at large. 
 
Keywords: difference-repetition-digitalisation-archive-event-
embodiment-technological unconscious-subjectivities-modernism-
readymade-posthuman 
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Introduction	
 
The present research is about new media and art theory and practice. It 
pursues the possibility of bringing these practices together to reconstruct, 
or propose a way to reconstruct, the (broken) feedback loop between both 
worlds, which has left many loose ends in both realms. As it will be 
explained below, ‘Turing land and Duchamp land’ (Manovich 1996) 
should actually be one land.  
Lev Manovich wrote a short, provocative article on the web platform 
Rhizome in 1996—dramatically entitled ‘The Death of Computer Art’—
stating that a convergence between Turing land and Duchamp land would 
never happen. As can be easily intuited, Duchamp land refers to the 
mainstream, object-oriented world of contemporary art, whilst Turing 
land refers to all new media, art made with computers, the characteristics 
of which the author describes as: 
1) Oriented towards the "content." [...] 
2) "Complicated." [...] 
3) Ironic, self-referential, and often literally destructive 
attitude towards its material, i.e., its technology, be it canvas, 
glass, motors, electronics, etc. [...] 
Let us now look at Turing-land. As we will see, Turing-land 
is characterized by directly opposing characteristics: 
1) Orientation towards new, state-of-the-art computer 
technology, rather than "content." [...] 
2) "Simple" and usually lacking irony. See below. 
3) Most important, objects in Turing-land take technology 
which they use always seriously. 
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      (Manovich 1996) 
 
Manovich’s article is obviously provocative. It has many accurate 
observations, but it is not, and doesn’t intend to be, exhaustive. Instead, 
the text functions more like an avant-gardist manifesto, aimed at creating 
some kind of response from the public, and even a bit of scandal. 
That said, Manovich’s claim that the mainstream art world does not pay 
attention to what he calls ‘computer art’ because it is process-oriented 
rather than object-oriented doesn’t suffice—nor does the assumption that 
the art market ignores computer art because there is nothing clear to sell. 
The market and art institutions have absorbed and virtually deactivated 
the subversive power and the intention of de-commoditising the artistic 
object of all conceptual art and institutional critique art—as becomes 
evident through the presence of artworks by such authors as Joseph 
Kosuth, Lawrence Weiner, Robert Barry, Art & Language, Daniel Buren, 
Marcel Broodthaers, or Hans Haacke, just to name the most famous, in 
the collections of the main museums, and main auctions houses and 
commercial galleries of the world. Part of Manovich’s provocation 
regarding computer art lies in his contention that it takes itself too 
seriously and doesn’t convey the element of irony that anyone worth 
calling themselves a follower of Duchamp would instil in a work. 
Although this claim is not entirely accurate—one need only think of Jodi, 
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or Olia Lialina, or Eva and Franco Mattes—it hints at part of the 
problem. Much computer or new media art is still fascinated with the 
medium in itself, as if using technology, chiefly state-of-the-art 
technology, would be enough to make a high quality artwork. This is of 
course not the case with the aforementioned authors, and it is not by 
chance that the Mattes couple are among the ones to have actually had 
success in both ‘lands’. Yet it cannot be underlined enough that new 
media art has to develop a coherent and ambitious aesthetic canon by 
overcoming this sort of ‘Narcissus Narcosis Syndrome’ (McLuhan1964: 
41), which in his famous Playboy interview in 1969, McLuhan defined as 
follows:  
It's a process rather like that which occurs to the body under shock 
or stress conditions, or to the mind in line with the Freudian 
concept of repression. I call this peculiar form of self-hypnosis 
Narcissus narcosis, a syndrome whereby man remains as unaware 
of the psychic and social effects of his new technology as a fish of 
the water it swims in. As a result, precisely at the point where a 
new media-induced environment becomes all pervasive and 
transmogrifies our sensory balance, it also becomes invisible. 
(1969) 
 
Otherwise it cannot, and will not, be considered art. As Armin Medosch 
mentioned in his keynote at the Renewable Futures Conference in Riga, 
this kind of use of technology for art-making often results in a ‘one trick 
pony’ (Medosch 2015), a kind of sideshow curiosity that will soon lose 
its currentness, and of course interest. 
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Still, this is not enough to explain the almost impenetrable divide 
between both fields. The sixth chapter will explain, as Magda Bijvoet has 
suggested (1996), how by 1975 almost everyone in the field at the time 
seemed to have lost interest and moved forward in other directions 
following a brief moment in which the collaborations and contaminations 
between art and technology seemed possible. Leaving aside the 
particular, practical and personal problems in the collaborations 
themselves, from the point of view of the critique and theory on the field, 
Bijvoet identified a critical issue: theorists and critics with a classical art 
historical formation did not have the tools to understand the more 
experimental and processual approach that was taking place at the 
moment. She was especially referring to the critical fortune of the 9 
Evenings event. In short, these critics couldn’t see the interest in these 
kind of experiences and were focused exclusively on the results, 
expecting a finished artwork—if object-based, even better. Yet other 
theorists with a more “cybernetic” background, such as Jack Burnham1, 
could appreciate the effort and interest of bringing together the 
endeavours and research of artists and technologists, despite the technical 
problems that arose at the time (Bijvoet 1996). 
                                                
1
 Jack Wesley Burnham Jr., born in New York in 1931, is the author of Beyond Modern 
Sculpture: The Effects of Science and Technology on the Sculpture of Our Time, 1968, 
and curator of Software-Information technology: Its New Meaning for Art at the Jewish 
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However, these hypotheses still do not explain why forty years after the 
moment identified by Bijvoet as the definitive split in two lands2, the 
issue is still being discussed3. More importantly, these theories do not 
address why the situation has not changed very much. In this context, this 
research proposes an exhaustive analysis of some key concepts on digital 
and art theory to be able to identify some breaking points and propose, in 
some cases, an alternative theory and point of view that can, hopefully, 
not only allow a suitable explanation of the aforementioned split, but also 
work to bring both ‘lands’ back together.  
With this aim, this text examines digitalisation processes in relation to the 
artistic field and culture at large, and how these affect and are affected by 
the archive and complex subjectivities. In this sense, this research 
proposes to consider digitalisation in terms of difference and repetition 
(Deleuze 1968) to avoid any risk of considering it in terms of 
representation, so that digitalisation and memory, and thus the (digital) 
archive can all be considered as kinds of repetition. Moreover, it 
proposes Jacques Derrida’s conception of signification as constant 
deferral as a complementary model to further explain the continual 
feedback loops between material and non-material dimensions and 
                                                
2
 This date is aproximate: For instance, Jean-Francois Lyotard’s notorious exhibition 
Les Immatériaux at the Centre Pompidou in Paris took place in 1985. 
3
 An outstanding compendium of this on-going discussion is the recent publication 
Mass Effect. Art and the Internet in the Twenty-First Century (Cornell, L. and Halter, E. 
eds. 2015)  
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digitalisation processes as a web, a fabric in constant construction and 
modification.  
This line of reasoning leads this research to conceptualise all so-called 
reality, following Deleuze (1967, 1968), in terms of simulacra: simulacra 
that do not have any positive or negative connotation, but are the logical 
consequence of the elimination of any conception of thought in terms of 
representation. If original and copy do not exist anymore, all that remains 
is simulacra, repetition with no original. 
Furthermore, in this context, to think of the archive is unavoidable, not 
considered only in the pedestrian sense of “the Web as virtual archive”—
although it certainly is one—but also in its constant and inseparable 
intertwining of digital and material. If the archive is to be kept alive and 
not become some kind of fossilised and dead dimension, it has to be 
defined as an event (Deleuze 1988), and memory as repetition, as well as 
a projection to the future (Derrida 1967b, 1995). The archive is not only 
the apparatus (Foucault 1977; Agamben 2006) that saves the past, but it 
also constructs its own conditions of possibility and reading. 
All of these processes are actualised (Deleuze 1968, 1988; Lévy 1995) in 
the subjects, who, assuming a point of view in the plane of immanence of 
the technological unconscious, also change (Foucault 1969), and are thus 
constituted as digital subjects. More specifically, the conception of 
embodiment will be defined in the digital as a collective dimension that 
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enables the subject to constitute itself through assuming a point of view. 
The conceptualisation of a technological unconscious, as well as Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch’s (1991) conception of embodied cognition and 
enactment, open the possibility of thinking of an embodiment in the 
digital. Reintroducing the phenomenological perspective, particularly that 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945), the authors argue that organisms and 
cognitive agents build their image and perception of the world by 
interacting and acting in it as situated living bodies (1991: 35, 165-7). 
Thus, evidently, cognition does not unfold only through neural activity 
but also through and in the body.  
However, this process of the constitution of the posthuman that seems 
exclusive to digital technologies began some time ago. In the artistic field 
at least it can be identified in the work of Marcel Duchamp, particularly 
in his invention of the readymade. Key elements from Duchamp’s artistic 
practice have been singled out as the missing links that rebuilds the 
feedback loop between digital and non-digital artistic theories: the 
readymade, the inclusion of mechanised processes and the conception of 
intertwined machinic and organic subjectivities. These same elements 
help understand the actual overcoming of modernism—not in 
postmodernism, which is only its continuation and which has not 
developed any theoretical tools that would define it as a different theory 
or approach, but in the posthuman. The conceptualisation and 
understanding of a posthumanist subject identifies a new kind of 
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subjectivity that accepts the trespassing of its own boundaries, both 
bodily and psychological—continuously intertwining with both human 
and non-human entities and digital and analog environments. This 
posthumanist subject is what I will call complex subjectivities, digital 
subjects, or subjects embodied in the digital. And for the understanding 
of its constitution the conceptual development of the role of the floating 
signifier in the technological unconscious as a plane of immanence is 
fundamental. Its aim is to broaden the aforementioned definition of the 
posthuman, not only to expand its explicative power, but also to 
introduce the collective dimension that technologies allow in the 
conformation of new subjectivities. Moreover, it completes the 
reconstruction of the feedback loop between cybernetics and art theories.  
This text consists in six chapters, all of which have a first part that 
examines the selected theoretical framework to explain and discuss the 
main concepts that the chapter will deal with. The primary concept, or 
concepts, is most often the title of each respective chapter, while the 
second part uses the tools introduced by the first part to discuss a certain 
topic and/or to propose a new reading. In general, case studies are 
intercalated in the second part of each chapter or at the end.  
Given that one of the main aims of this research is to identify the critical 
points in which the chasm between new media art and traditional art—or 
in other words between cybernetics and art theory—came about (in order 
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to overcome it), the case studies are indistinctly drawn from one or the 
other ‘land’. Moreover, many examples are not strictly artistic but rather 
drawn from culture more broadly. Therefore, the text also analyses 
certain apps, video games, and projects. Some of the artistic examples are 
contemporary, generally by artists I have worked and spoken with 
directly, while others are art historical examples. In following this logic, 
the intention is not only to avoid dichotomies such as digital/material or 
fragmented/continuous, but also to foster the understanding of the 
overlap and continuity between them. 
The first chapter, ‘Repetition,’ follows Gilles Deleuze’s 
conceptualisation of difference and repetition (1968) and Jacques 
Derrida’s theorisation of différance (1967a, 1967b) in order to avoid 
considering digitalisation processes in terms of representation. This 
chapter proposes considering digitalisation as ontological repetition 
(Deleuze 1968: 293). It then extends this argument to relate digitalisation 
to différance, that is to say, to think of it as a completely differential 
process—and never in terms of representing a material referent, reality, 
or origin. In doing so, the chapter purposively analyses three significant 
case studies, the first being Elaine Sturtevant’s oeuvre. Sturtevant is 
known for methodologically putting Deleuze’s theory of difference and 
repetition into practice in her work by famously reproducing (and not 
copying) other artist’s works. In Leo Castelli’s words, Sturtevant was 
‘the first appropriationist’ (1988). However, in this context, the present 
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text proposes to read her work in terms of différance, and not only of 
difference and repetition. One reading does not exclude the other, but are 
on the contrary complementary in their shared pursuit of an 
understanding of certain processes that intend to avoid representation and 
therefore dichotomist oppositions of original and copy. The second case 
study is LONELY LOS ANGELES (2005) by Guthrie Lonergan, in which 
the artist presents screenshots of areas of Los Angeles with very low 
population density that often look quite abstract. For example, an area 
where there is only grass will be shown as just a green square. The work 
evidences how a frame of reference is necessary to read a map, otherwise 
it becomes completely abstract. But more importantly, it underlines the 
absurdity of considering such a dimension in terms of representation. The 
third case study is Eva and Franco Mattes (a.k.a 00011100111.org) 
Reenactments (2007-2010) in which, as the title suggests, the couple of 
artists re-enacted on Second Life a series of performances from the 
seventies by Gilbert & George, Chris Burden, Marina Abramovic & 
Ulay, among others. Analysing specifically Imponderabilia (1977), the 
text contends that the Mattes’ work is not simply a digital version, which 
would imply that considering Abramovic & Ulay’s to be an original (in 
the sense of an origin), but instead approaches the works in terms of 
constant deferral, of a dialogue between both texts. 
The second chapter, almost as a logical consequence of the first, is 
entitled ‘Simulacra.’  In this chapter, Jean Baudrillard’s quasi neo-
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Platonic conceptualisation of simulacra is analysed and criticised. The 
text proposes to consider Deleuze’s conception of simulacra as in his 
estimation everything is simulacra (1968, 1969): we live in a world of 
difference and repetition in which considering originals and copies no 
longer makes sense. In this way, simulacra are stripped from the negative 
charge that the concept has carried since Plato, and are considered as 
repetitions in which interstitial differences can be found, art and 
digitalisation processes included, of course. As a complementary model 
that can help to overcome dichotomies, Charles S. Peirce’s semiotic 
triadic model is then presented. Peirce’s model has many advantages in 
this sense, especially when considering digitalisation: the first and most 
evident being that it is triadic, and not binary like Saussure’s; secondly, 
and perhaps most importantly, it considers the production of sense by 
placing material, non-material, human and non-human signs on the same 
plane. Following this model, Gabriele Di Matteo’s work is analysed 
because he actively and consciously utilises different kinds of simulacra. 
Like Duchamp and Sturtevant, he brilliantly plays with the intertwining 
of mechanical repetition and human agency, primarily in painting. 
Finally, following Eugenio Trias’ (1982) theorisation on the expansion of 
the possibilities of aesthetic pleasure and the effect of the uncanny as 
theorised by Sigmund Freud, it is then proposed to consider a further 
expansion of the aesthetic effect, as suggested by Hal Foster in The 
Return of the Real (1997). At this point, I advance the theory of the 
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simulacrum as the current aesthetic limit, considering the active use of 
the possibilities of the simulacra, especially within the digital, as a further 
aesthetic frontier. In this context, two different artistic projects are 
compared, both of which use Instagram:  Richard Prince’s New Portraits 
(2014) and Amalia Ulman’s Excellences & Perfections (2014). I argue 
that while the first project simply uses the app as a source of raw material 
without much understanding of it as a (possible) medium, the second 
fully exploits, and explodes, its possibilities—putting into evidence many 
of the problematics conveyed, while also intertwining different levels of 
reading and using the conscious enacting of simulacra with an ethical and 
aesthetic impact. In fact, Prince’s and Ulman’s case studies will be 
brought back in different chapters because they superbly exemplify field 
several of the issues addressed by this text, especially the conformation 
of new subjectivities. 
The third chapter is entitled ‘Archive.’ It deals with the archive’s 
conditions of possibility today and its relation to memory, as well as its 
projection to the future. For this, Michel Foucault’s (1969), and Jacques 
Derrida’s (1967b, 1995) definitions of archive are compared to 
understand the archive as event (Deleuze 1988) and memory as 
digitalisation, which is to say, as repetition and différance (as defined in 
chapter 1). But also, following Derrida and Foucault, the archive is 
understood as a projection to the future, in the sense that it creates the 
conditions of possibility for its own reading, as well as of what is 
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archived. In this sense, the archive is understood as a Wunderblock 
(Freud 1925, Derrida 1995), which is a complementary notion to 
Foucault’s hypomnesic memory. Therefore, it is proposed to consider 
two examples that are chronologically quite distant from current times 
and digital ubiquity: Giulio Camillo’s Theatre of Memory (ca.1554) and 
Aby Warburg’s Mnemosyne Atlas (1924-unfinished). Both projects are 
models of archives that, even if separated by centuries, share many points 
in common with the logic of the Internet and of informatics in general: a 
spatial, non-linear logic that is closer to “linking” in the hyperlink sense 
than to the written, linear, causal logic described in McLuhan’s The 
Gutenberg Galaxy (1962). Three contemporary examples are analysed in 
this chapter—two apps  (Memoir and Facebook) and a complex artistic 
project entitled Future Library (2014-2114) by Katie Paterson. With 
these case studies I seek to question what kinds of archives, both of 
memory and the future, we create with current technologies. What are the 
existing alternatives? What kinds of new alternatives can we propose?  
The fourth chapter delineates the fundamental relationship between 
technological unconscious and floating signifier to advance the 
conceptualisation of the technological unconscious as the plane of 
immanence in which meaning is generated and circulates in the 
articulation of digital and non-digital environments.  
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The chapter begins by identifying the floating signifier, as conceptualised 
by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1950), as the tool that aims to cover the 
unfitness, the overspill between concepts and the world, or better in this 
context, between the digital and the analog. Thus these concepts avoid 
any assimilation of the digital as a transcription or representation of the 
physical, but they reveal their intrinsic difference. Moreover, the floating 
signifier will have the fundamental role of constituting the ‘point of 
view’ (Deleuze 1988 [1993]) in the digital for the emergence of the 
digital subject, a subject who is embodied in the digital. Through the 
assumption of a point of view the subject is constituted and is able to 
operate, navigate the digital and to generate meaning. 
Then, the chapter traces the genealogy of the technological unconscious 
from Sigmund Freud’s definition of technology as prosthetic limbs aimed 
at expanding human capacities throughout the world to Walter 
Benjamin’s definition of an optical unconscious. It then extends to Vilém 
Flusser’s critique of the program of the photographic apparatus to 
Rosalind Krauss Lacanian conceptualisation of the optical unconscious. 
In Franco Vaccari’s analysis of the technological unconscious, the 
chapter identifies the most useful and significant theory on the topic: the 
technological unconscious implies a partially inaccessible dimension in 
the photographic device—one that can obviously be extended to any 
technological apparatus—that has however been symbolically and 
collectively structured. In all of the analysed authors there can be 
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detected not only the idea that psychic processes are somehow traversed 
by a machinic logic, but that any technology has an inaccessible layer 
that in one way or another generates meaning and concrete effects in the 
world. Thus bringing together these ideas with the concept of floating 
signifier as defined above appears to be a suitable methodology for 
further explaining the generation of meaning and subjectivities in the 
interactions and overlappings of complex environments. 
It is then necessary to define in which kind of space the ‘point of view’ 
can be assumed. Consequently, different definitions and theorisations of 
space, place and cyberspace (Gibson 1984, Hillis 1999, Manovich 2001) 
are explored in order to define the discussed space as ‘electronic space’ 
(Hillis 1999: 67). The point of view is thus not necessarily constituted in 
a representational space, but rather in a place: a symbolically structured 
dimension in which exchanges among actors generate social and 
relational meaning. Therefore, I prefer to follow Hillis and call this 
dimension ‘electronic space’. Different examples from the history of art 
are analysed as case studies to illustrate perspectivism and the point of 
view in Deleuze’s theorisation, followed by an analysis of the app 
Periscope as an example of the assumption of one or different points of 
view in a non representational space. This last example makes evident 
how the constitution of the point of view and the conceptualisation of an 
electronic space are independent of any iconic reference to a supposed 
material reality—in short, to any idea of representation. Microsoft 
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HoloLens provides an example of both representational and non-
representational space projected onto physical space, a sophisticated 
augmented reality, or a new complex environment. In synthesis, this 
chapter provides the tools to broaden the conception of the posthuman by 
further analysing the process of constitution of new subjectivities in the 
interaction with digital technologies. 
The fifth chapter, ‘Embodiment in the Digital’, explores the conditions of 
possibility for conceptualising the emergence of the digital subject and 
the consequent conceptualisation of its embodiment in the digital. The 
digital subject is not just a cyborg, or a digital entity, but is the result of 
the setting of feedback loops between human and non-human entities in 
digital and non-digital environments. In this sense, I am following 
Foucault’s theorisation of a pre-Cartesian active subject and a static 
object. This conception of the subject can be defined as subject-as-
process, who to attain truth has to change, and thus also changes as the 
object changes. Considering Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s 
developments on embodied cognition and enaction (1991), this chapter 
intends to propose the reading of embodiment not only to definitively 
leave behind the already overcome conception of cognition as 
computation (as simple processing of information located in the brain), 
but also to propose the idea that enaction in the digital is also embodied. 
In close connection with the aforementioned idea, this research also seeks 
to tackle the issue of a separation between subject and object, which in 
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this context no longer makes sense, considering Derrida’s texts on 
writing and différance, especially his writing on the figure of the poet or 
writer as a process of complete intertwining with her work: if the writer 
thinks, shapes, constructs her book, she is also built, determined, 
influenced, changed by the book at the same time (Derrida 1967a; 1967b; 
Fusaro n/d). 
These ideas imply a further step in finally erasing the separation between 
subject and object, and in the understanding of their mutual 
modification—of a subject as process and an object as event. On the 
other hand, the constitution of the digital subject is enabled by the 
constitution in the technological unconscious of the point of view through 
the floating signifier. The technological unconscious is the collective and 
partially inaccessible dimension that allows for meaning to be generated 
and to circulate through the different constitutions of the point of view in 
the floating signifier. Ultimately, this conceptualisation is the possibility 
of thinking the ways in which the feedback loops between humans and 
machines generate sense; it is, in other words, admitting that the 
generation of sense is not exclusively human, even though machines, 
until today at least, cannot understand meaning—and this point cannot be 
underscored enough. This model allows us to consider its production as 
the result of the interactions between complex subjectivities, which are at 
the same time created and modified by these same processes.  
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In the sixth and final chapter, ‘Medium,’ all the previous concepts and 
theories are put in the context of art theory and new media theory, and 
thus the intention is to locate them in a conceptual-historical perspective. 
At a certain point, a chasm occurred that divided mainstream art theory 
from cybernetics and its related artistic production, which is generally 
labelled ‘new media’ and relates to digital technologies—specifically 
informatics and the Internet. This chasm can be identified in the 
invention of the readymade; one of the key concepts that this research 
identified as a tool to bring both fields back together is to understand the 
readymade as medium. Moreover, in this chapter it is definitively 
explained how the true overcoming of modernism, at least in the context 
of art theory, comes along with the ‘posthuman’, which has its origin in 
Marcel Duchamp and his invention of the readymade, and not with 
postmodernism. In How We Became Posthuman. Virtual Bodies in 
Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics (1999)—an instrumental book 
for this research—Hayles intends to elaborate on a new conception of 
what it means to be posthuman, ‘to show the complex interplays between 
embodied forms of subjectivity and arguments for disembodiment 
throughout the cybernetic tradition’ (7). With this aim, the author 
conceptualises the posthuman as the trespassing of the limits of 
subjectivity of what was defined as the ‘liberal humanist subject’ (3). 
Consequently, the posthuman does not only imply the invasion of the 
body by electronic or mechanical prosthesis, but especially the 
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subjectivities resulting from the constant feedback loops between humans 
and machines (3-5). This is why Amalia Ulman’s work Excellences & 
Perfections is so relevant in this context: because it not only points out at 
what being posthuman actually means, but more importantly reinstalls 
the main question Hayles posed in 1999: ‘Increasingly the question is not 
whether we will become posthuman, for posthumanity is already here. 
Rather, the question is what kind of posthumans we will be’ (246). 
Thus, analysing the developments of the main theorists and critiques of 
modernism through the concept of medium (Greenberg 1961, Danto 
1981, de Duve 1984, 1991, Krauss 1996, Foster 1998), this research 
individuated in Clement Greenberg’s conception of opticality as a purely 
disembodied medium an analogous and approximately contemporary 
phenomenon in the definition of information as a pattern with no 
necessity of any material instantiation, as described by Hayles (1999). 
Hayles identifies along the book the key moments in which ‘information 
lost its body’ and ‘how the cyborg was created as a technological 
artifact and cultural icon’ (2), in both processes the elaboration of 
cybernetics as a discipline, and thus also the Macy Conferences in which 
they were initially delineated was defining:  
During the foundational era of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, John 
von Neumann, Claude Shannon, Warren McCulloch, and dozens of 
other distinguished researchers met at annual conferences 
sponsored by the Josiah Macy Foundation to formulate the central 
concepts that, in their high expectations, would coalesce into a 
theory of communication and control applying equally to animals, 
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humans, and machines. Retrospectively called the Macy 
Conferences on Cybernetics, these meetings, held from 1943 to 
1954, were instrumental in forging a new paradigm. To succeed, 
they needed a theory of information (Shannon's bailiwick), a model 
of neural functioning that showed how neurons worked as 
information-processing systems (McCulloch's lifework), computers 
that processed binary code and that could conceivably reproduce 
themselves, thus reinforcing the analogy with biological systems 
(von Neumann's specialty), and a visionary who could articulate 
the larger implications of the cybernetic paradigm and make clear 
its cosmic significance (Wiener's contribution). The result of this 
breathtaking enterprise was nothing less than a new way of looking 
at human beings. Henceforth, humans were to be seen primarily as 
information-processing entities who are essentially similar to 
intelligent machines (7).  
 
Paradoxically, the readymade as a fully embodied medium is the origin 
of the separation between both ‘lands’, and at the same time the missing, 
or better, forgotten, element that can help reconstruct the feedback loop 
between them. Complementary to the identification of this forgotten 
element is the acknowledgment that this sort of blind spot in art theory 
has also to do with a misalignment in the processes of construction of 
new subjectivities. 
In presenting the aforementioned theories in the context of art theory, 
cybernetics and new media theory, it is my intention to identify the 
breaking points of both theories, as well as the possible continuities, in 
order to open paths that can bring them together; even if, of course, one 
cannot hope for this change to take effect immediately, as pointed out 
above. Deconstructing dichotomist narratives like original and copy, real 
and virtual, and so on—while following Hayles’ model—can bring to 
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light possible illusory ruptures that will help to better understand the 
current pervasiveness of complex environments and complex, always 
embodied, subjectivities: which is of course a theory of the posthuman. 4 
 
                                                
4
 Some of these ruptures include the impossibility of conceptualising the readymade as 
medium, or the complete snubbing of cybernetic theory by the main art critics and 
historians at the moment. 
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1.	Repetition	
 
When dealing with digitalisation processes, the issue of representation is 
crucial. Especially within the artistic field and its related digital archives, 
there is a tendency to consider digitised artworks as “representations” of 
the physical object or event (Bolter and Grusin 1999, Manovich 2001).5 
Instead, the present work intends to understand digitalisation processes in 
a very different fashion: not as forms of representation, but as forms of 
repetition in which difference is conveyed (Deleuze 1968: 289, 293). In 
this sense, there is no ‘original’ and no ‘copy’. This holds true whether 
considering mental images or memories, digitised objects or digital 
objects with no material referent in the physical world. Instead these 
different iterations should be understood as ‘ontological repetitions’ 
(ibid). With this aim, the definitions of the concept of representation in 
the context of Western philosophy will be considered in the oeuvre of 
Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and Jacques Derrida (1930-2004), to finally 
establish that Deleuze’s conceptualisation of difference and repetition 
and Derrida’s différance are the most suitable models to think about the 
current state of affairs and to leave the old dichotomies that have haunted 
most media theories aside. 
                                                
5
 The digital archive has become increasingly common in the contemporary artistic field 
and is used by museums, galleries, artist websites, and databases, to name only a few 
examples. Such archives contain various formats of digitised artworks—whether 
paintings, photographs, installations, performances, videos or complete exhibitions.   
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At this point, it is important to explicit the choice of mainly two authors, 
namely Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida, and in slightly lesser 
measure also Michel Foucault (1926-1984), as the preferred theoretical 
frameworks to analyse the present issues. There are certainly other 
theoretical developments regarding these topics of undeniable relevance, 
but as one assumes a point of view for proposing certain ideas it is 
inevitable to also make certain choices. In this case, for example, some of 
Paul Virilio’s writings (1998 [2006]) can be considered as a punctual 
critique on technology and information in current times, while the 
interest of the writings of Foucault, Deleuze and Derrida in the context of 
this research consists in their being conceptual tools useful to develop 
one’s own critique. In the case of both phenomenology and Edmund 
Husserl’s oeuvre, and Henri Bergson’s conception of the virtual (1930 
[2014]; 1959 [1996]), I considered that in the same measure in which 
both were fundamental for Derrida’s and Deleuze’s oeuvres 
respectively—as becomes evident in several of their works (Deleuze 
1966; Derrida 1962, 1967c)—both were at the same time included, 
expanded and often overcome by these authors. As this work is not aimed 
at analysing and proposing purely philosophical theories, the choice of 
the authors was decided considering who provided for the most pertinent 
theoretical tools for its aims. 
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1.1 Difference & Repetition 
 
In his book Différence et répétition (1968) Gilles Deleuze proposes to 
understand difference and repetition independently from representation, 
marking a clear departure from the idea of an original and a copy that has 
been pervasive in Western culture since Plato. 
Deleuze explains how Plato had to give in to the concept of 
representation, and thus to subordinate difference to it, in order to be able 
to exorcise the simulacrum from the couple model-copy (1968 [1994]: 
265). Plato opposes the model to the copy and then the copy itself to the 
phantasm in order to distinguish the copy from the simulacrum. In so 
doing, he subordinates difference to representation. In fact, whilst the 
model is defined by a position of identity with the Same, the copy 
maintains an ‘internal resemblance’ (265) with the model. In this way, 
Plato tries to legitimate the relationships between Ideas and models, and 
then between models and copies, while leaving aside the simulacra as 
second order illusion that does not participate in any way in the truth of 
ideas, and not even of models (ibid). Thus for Plato in this understanding 
of representation ‘the analogy of being implies both of these two aspects 
at once: one by which being is distributed in determinable forms that 
necessarily distinguish and vary the sense; the other by which being so 
distributed is necessarily repartitioned among well-determined beings, 
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each endowed with a unique sense’ (303). In this way, the distribution of 
being among the different copies generates a sort of downgrading of their 
ontological value and a variation in sense. The problem with this 
subsumption of difference and repetition to representation is that it 
implies a sort of ‘sedentary distribution’, as Deleuze calls it, in which the 
Same, or Idea, would be distributed in the models, through identity, and 
the model in turn in the copies, as resemblance. In this sense 
‘[R]epresentation essentially implies an analogy of being. However, the 
only realised Ontology—in other words, the univocity of being—is 
repetition’ (303). In this context, the relevance of leaving representation 
aside to be able to think digitalisation in terms of difference and 
repetition, and successive passage as a realised ontology in itself will be 
further explained, together with its close link to the concept of 
simulacrum, in the second chapter. 
The idea of representation weakens the ontological entity of 
the supposed “copies”, thus implying a transcendent 
existence, which would be of higher ontological value in the 
originals, ‘representation is the site of transcendental illusion’ 
(265).  
 
What Deleuze tries to exorcise in turn is the submission of difference and 
repetition to the concepts of representation, copy and resemblance. It is 
precisely in the exact repetition of the same that difference can be found, 
the imperceptible dis-placement produced in each copy is the place for 
difference to appear, the more identical a repetition is, the more 
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difference is to be found there, as in ‘Pierre Menard, Author of the 
Quixote’ (1939) by Borges: 
It is always in one and the same movement that repetition 
includes difference (not as an accidental and extrinsic variant 
but at its heart, as the essential variant of which it is 
composed, the displacement and disguise which constitute it 
as a difference that is itself divergent and displaced) and that 
it must receive a positive principle which gives rise to 
material and indifferent repetition [...]. (Deleuze 1968 [1994]: 
289) 
 
The transcendental illusion that subordinated difference to representation 
has four forms that correspond ‘to thought, the sensibility, the Idea and 
being’ (265). The first two are of interest for this research:  ‘In effect, 
thought is covered over by an “image” made up of postulates, which 
distort both its operation and its genesis’ (265). In this sense, to think 
means to create an image of certain things and concepts, including 
abstract concepts. Consequently, Deleuze explains how a ‘slippage’ in 
Platonic thought from the ‘Same’ of the Platonic Idea led its way to the 
world of representation by recognising the identity of the original 
concept with its ‘representation’ in the thinking subject (265-66). This is 
how Western thought identified the world of ideas, memories and 
imagination in a thinking subject as a case of representation; therefore, 
when remembering an event, a feeling is generally conceptualised as the 
representation, with more or less fidelity, of a past event. In the same 
way, imagining a certain situation, object or possibility means, since 
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Plato, to represent it: to recreate it in one’s mind, or on a canvas, in 
words, and so on. Thus, even something that does not “materially” exist, 
that does not have a referent, so to speak, is thought in terms of 
representation, of model and copy, or even more precisely in terms of 
simulacra, as will be explained in the following chapter. 
In the second case, sensibility, the slippage to representation is even more 
obvious, because in this case difference has been subordinated to 
resemblance according to perception. In this sense if representation is 
perceived as similar it will be considered to convey less difference, in the 
opposite case, obviously more. This is another illusion because difference 
is not to be expressed according to diverse levels of similitude according 
to model and copies, precisely, as representation, but on the contrary: 
To restore difference within intensity as the being of the 
sensible is to untie the second knot, one which subordinates 
difference to the similar within perception, allowing it to be 
experienced only on condition that there is an assimilation of 
diversity taken as raw material for the identical concept. 
(266) 
 
In this sense, difference is not external anymore, there is no first time, 
followed by a second and a third time in which difference is disclosed; 
every time is already a repetition, and it includes difference. Repetition 
can no longer be negatively defined, it must be conceived for its own 
value, which in the first place, contains difference: 
 49 
 
Now, each determination (the first, second and third; the 
before, during and after) is already repetition in itself, in the 
pure form of time and in relation to the image of the action. 
The before or the first time is no less repetition than the 
second or the third time. [...] Repetition no longer bears 
(hypothetically) upon a first time which escapes it, and in any 
case remains external to it: repetition bears upon repetitions, 
upon modes and types of repetition, in an imperative manner 
[…]. (294) 
 
The turn proposed by Deleuze is fundamental to leave behind a 
hierarchisation of different ontological statuses, which exist, but in which 
no hierarchy is to be justified: the original, or model, is not more 
valuable, and does not have a higher ontological status, a higher value of 
existence than a copy. It is already repetition. In fact, as explained above, 
to make this distinction does not make much sense anymore.  
The frontier or ‘difference’ is therefore singularly displaced: 
it is no longer between the first time and the others, between 
the repeated and the repetition, but between these types of 
repetition. It is repetition itself that is repeated. Furthermore, 
'once and for all’ no longer qualifies a first time which would 
escape repetition, but on the contrary a type of repetition 
which opposes another type operating an infinity of times 
[...]. (294) 
 
All of Deleuze’s work is dedicated to contest transcendence, to a 
philosophy of immanence that intends to avoid, and possibly eradicate, 
these opposed dichotomies: a position that is especially fruitful in the 
context of this text. Trying to think digitalisation processes (and the 
digital in general, even when there is no material referent to digitise) in 
terms of difference and repetition and not in terms of representation is the 
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tool that allows to avoid further dichotomies, and especially, as it will be 
further developed in the following chapters, the separation between 
subject and object within the context of the intertwining and constant 
feedback loops between physical and digital environments. The physical 
realm cannot be considered as an “original” to be “represented” in the 
digital. Even things like virtual reality environments, video games or any 
“representative” configuration—representative in the sense that it hints at 
a physical, usually spatially recognisable reality—should not be 
considered as a representation: resemblance, familiarity and 
recognisability shouldn’t be misleading in this sense. It is instead a 
question of considering them as multiplicities that can be grouped under 
the same concept or idea, and not as representations of this idea, or 
materiality.  
 
1.2 Digitalisation & Différance 
 
A complementary approach that enables deepening the understanding of 
digitalisation processes while avoiding any idea of representation is 
Jacques Derrida’s concept of différance. If in his attempt to move away 
from Platonism, Deleuze’s work sought to leave behind any form of 
dualistic dialectic and to think difference in itself could in fact be 
considered as a radical exercise, Derrida’s concept of différance is even 
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more radical: Deleuze proposes ontological repetition to leave 
representation behind, Derrida proposes to go beyond ontological 
difference to avoid any metaphysical search of an ‘origin’ (Sini 2011). 
Derrida proposes to open thought to a kind of difference that is not 
anchored, at least in Western language, as a difference between being and 
beings (Heidegger 1927 [1996]), so what he called différance is a 
difference that goes beyond ontological difference. It is a neologism that 
tries to explain sense as a dimension of constant deferral. This 
ontological difference attempts to avoid—which Derrida later admits is 
in fact impossible—an idea that has grounded metaphysical thought in 
the Western tradition since Aristotle: a metaphysics understood as the 
search for the principle of the cause (Sini 2011). In avoiding the search 
for an origin, Derrida tries to guide thought without thinking about the 
origin of sense, because there is no origin, or better, because there is only 
its endless deferral, there are only traces, arche-traces, and this is the 
différance, as Derrida defines it in Writing and Difference  (1967b 
[2005]: 75). 
In order to achieve this, he proposes that the Western phonocentrism that 
considers sound, spoken language and the voice as the origin of language 
(which Ferdinand de Saussure calls ‘la langue’ (1916)), and writing as its 
simple transcription, is mistaken. This dualistic way of conceiving 
language as voice and writing—the phonè being the signified, while 
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written language functions as the signifier—has marked Western 
culture’s perception and conceptualisation of reality. The result of this 
kind of binary conception of the relationship between signs and the world 
is the conception of reality as a series of binary oppositions like mind-
body, natural-cultural or virtual-material (Sini 2011).  
Every time one tries to express an ‘essence’ through a word, this essence 
is expressed, but the expression is not the essence in itself, as it is 
evident: saying “red” conveys the essence of the colour, but it is not the 
essence in itself and it is not the colour. In this sense, there is never an 
identity between the essence and its expression,6 and this difference is 
born from the necessity of communication: the need one feels to 
communicate an essence that is perceived, felt in one’s inner being that 
needs an expression to transmit it to the other’s inner being. This 
phenomenon is due to empirical contingencies, because when one is 
talking with oneself, so to speak, this mediation is not necessary. One 
does not need to explain to oneself that “red” is “red”. If one is directly in 
contact with one’s intention of speech, there is no need for mediation 
between one interiority and another one (Sini 2011). 
Derrida focuses his critique on the “difference” between signified and 
expression. To do this, he goes back to Saussure and then extends his 
                                                
6
 This unfitness is what Claude Lévi-Strauss had called the ‘overspill’ (surabondance) 
of the signifier, of the world over concepts, and for which he would propose the concept 
of mana in his ‘Introduction à l’oeuvre de Marcel Mauss’ (1950). This topic will be 
extensively analysed and developed in Chapter 4. 
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claim, stating that there is not only a difference between expression and 
signified, between what one intends to say with the word “red” and “the 
red”, but also between both sides of the linguistic sense. Signified and 
expression are nothing but phenomena of deferral, because it is not 
possible to understand any signified, any meaning without taking into 
account all the other meanings—there is no meaning that can be isolated 
from all the others. In this sense, meaning requires a network of other 
meanings with which to be compared. In short, meaning can be 
understood only in contrast and by comparison with all other meanings. 
Furthermore, one speaks in time, in history, at a certain moment. 
Therefore, not only are all these meanings temporal, but the signifier is as 
well. The expression changes, langue changes in time. At the level of 
expression there is also a system of opposition between one signifier and 
all the others. For instance, a “p” sounds like a “p” and not like an “m”, 
and so on. If a concept has its essence only in contrast with all the others, 
this is also valid for its expression, which too is defined by differential 
relations with all the other expressions or signifiers.  
Moreover, both parts of the linguistic sign are not only differential in 
themselves, but also in their reciprocity. This is the paradox of the 
linguistic sign’s nature. It is impossible to communicate something 
without knowing and mastering the sounds that form that word, that 
concept. But how is it possible to articulate the sounds that correspond to 
a certain word without knowing its meaning, without knowing the 
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concept itself in the first place? Therefore, Derrida states, the signifier is 
essential to explain the signified, but the concept is essential to choose 
the right sounds that express that same concept. So how is it possible to 
determine where the story begins? This unsolvable problem is the 
différance: this is the non-origin, the impossibility of finding a beginning. 
Finding the principle of the cause is then a process of constant deferral.  
To be able to name things, there must be something that can’t be named, 
which is the différance: that “a”, which in French doesn’t sound, is the 
“a” of the constant deferral, and it cannot be named. It cannot be heard, 
but it is actually there, and it is the condition of everything that is said, of 
everything that is heard. Consequently, for Derrida there is no difference 
between signified and signifier, the intention of speech becomes 
corrupted from within by writing, and this is the reason why he calls it 
arche-writing:  It is a critique of Western phono-centrism, which has 
been privileging the voice, the concept for too long, and that has to begin 
to accept involving the body, the expression and the signifier. In this 
sense, the Western conception of writing as the simple register, the 
transcription of the voice, of the spoken language, needs to be thoroughly 
revised. Writing cannot be considered as pure transcription: spaces, 
punctuation and fonts cannot be considered a mere transcription of the 
voice. There is much more: there is an excess, an overspill. 
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Hence, it is a fallacy to consider the spoken language as that which 
comes first. What comes first is the différance: the non-origin, the 
impossible origin, the difference as pure deferral. It is that which doesn’t 
exist, but that allows all of the rest to exist. It is pure absence (Sini 2011). 
Therefore, sense is given, generated, or even more accurately, allowed to 
emerge through absence. This poses a counter argument to 
metaphysics—a philosophy of presence—because it cannot escape the 
presence of an origin. 
In this sense, différance, an absence, is the condition of the possibility of 
writing, but at the same time, it is writing that makes difference emerge 
(Vergani 2000: 50).7 This is also why, in Derrida’s conception, there is 
no ‘primum’. The text cannot be understood as a ‘primum 
interpretandum’, as the grounding of any interpretation, because the text 
is understood as an interwoven fabric of writing that is constantly 
overwritten, and in constant construction and de-construction: ‘The 
awaiting of sense is revived by the continuous undoing and reassembling 
of the fabric’ (ibid). Thus understood, the text is alive, the text is already 
event, it is not fixed, and is not completely present because ‘sense is 
constitutively differential’ (51). Its conditions of possibility are enabled 
                                                
7
 This and all successive translations of Mario Vergani from Italian are mine. 
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by an absence: the absence and continual deferral of the arche-trace, of 
différance.8 
 
 1.3 Digitalisation as Ontological Repetition  
 
A simple and straightforward definition of digitalisation, the one that Lev 
Manovich gives in The Principles of New Media (2001), can be 
considered to begin: ‘Converting continuous data into a numerical 
representation is called digitization’ (49). Digitisation has two steps: one 
is sampling at regular intervals—on the duration of these intervals will 
depend what is called ‘resolution’. The second step is quantification, 
according to a pre-determined scale. Even if older media does involve 
some kind of separation in discrete units (such as photograms in a film, 
for example), quantification is exclusive to digital media (ibid). 
This is a primarily technical definition of digitisation. However, it is 
evident that digitisation processes have further implications beyond the 
technical, and, as mentioned before, this has to do with the perception of 
digitalisation as a “representation” of a “material” object. In this sense, 
following Deleuze, the present work proposes to think of the 
                                                
8
 The useful relationship that has been easily established between the theory of 
différance and Psychoanalytic theory is also evident now. The idea of sense generated 
by an absence, by an origin that doesn’t exist, or that can be considered only as constant 
deferral is absolutely coherent with psychoanalytic theory. 
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digitalisation processes in general as ontological repetitions, or even, as 
will be further shown, in terms of différance. 
Ontological repetition does not imply a hierarchical difference among 
diverse ontological statuses, but it simply means that difference can be 
found between repetitions, which are ontologically equivalent: 
Beyond physical repetition and psychic or metaphysical 
repetition, an ontological repetition? The role of the latter 
would not be to suppress the other two but, [...] to distribute 
difference to them (in the form of difference drawn off or 
included)[...]. 
In a certain sense, the ultimate repetition, the ultimate theatre, 
therefore encompasses everything. (Deleuze 1968 [1994]: 
293) 
 
This seems to be a suitable model to think in a completely diverse 
fashion about the relationship generated by digitalisation processes 
between what can be called ‘a virtual archive’—for example, the Web, 
museum or gallery websites, certain applications and even social 
networks—and its referent, when it has one.  
Jay D. Bolter and Richard Grusin limit their explanation of this process 
to focus exclusively on media, thus defining ‘repurposing’ as the 
complete translation of one medium into another one (2000: 45). The 
typical, best-known example of this would be the repurposing of a novel 
into a film. In this case, the content of the first medium is completely, 
and often loosely, translated into the second. One could also understand 
in these terms an artwork that one can find, and perhaps even buy, on a 
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commercial gallery website. The materiality of a painting, a print, an 
installation, or any other medium has been “translated” into code, and 
then into pixels that are displayed on a screen so that the “translated” 
piece is recognisable and available online on a certain website. For 
example, this was the aim of one of the first gallery websites like Artnet 
(artnet.com) whose mantle has been taken up by newer sites like Artsy 
(artsy.com). The same element of translation could be said to be at work 
on almost any gallery or auction house site.   
In a second instance, the authors explain and differentiate from 
repurposing, the concept that lends the book its title, namely, 
Remediation. For this text, they further developed Marshall McLuhan’s 
famous statement in Understanding Media: The Extensions of Men 
(1964) that the content of a medium is always another medium. Bolter 
and Grusin thus define remediation as ‘the representation of one medium 
in another’ (23-24), identifying it as a defining characteristic of all new 
media, though not exclusive to them. In this sense, for example, one can 
single out different phenomena of repurposing if one considers each 
single digitised artwork on a platform like Google Art Project. However, 
when analysing the whole apparatus in more depth,9 the project can be 
                                                
9
 In this context, the concept of apparatus is understood in Giorgio Agamben’s 
formulation: ‘I wish to propose to you nothing less than a general and massive 
partitioning of beings into two large groups or classes: on the one hand, living beings 
(or substances), and on the other, apparatuses in which living beings are incessantly 
captured. […] Further expanding the already large class of Foucauldian apparatuses, I 
shall call an apparatus literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, 
orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, 
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better understood if considered in terms of remediation of the museum, 
or public collection. This would imply, evidently, accepting a very broad 
definition of medium, again following McLuhan, and to accept including 
the museum in it. Google Art Project10 permits its users to access often 
complete museum and public collections with many or most of the works 
digitised in high definition. It often offers the possibility of accessing a 
three-dimensional rendering of the museum building, thus allowing the 
user to take a virtual visit and see how the collection is actually installed. 
 
                                                                                                                   
or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, mad houses, the panopticon, 
schools, confession, factories, disciplines, juridical measures, and so forth (whose 
connection with power is in a certain sense evident), but also the pen, writing, literature, 
philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular telephones and—
why not—language itself, which is perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses—one in 
which thousands and thousands of years ago a primate inadvertently let himself be 
captured, probably without realizing the consequences that he was about to face’ 
(Agamben 2006 [2009]: 13-14). 
10
 Google Art Project and Google Cultural Institute: 
https://www.google.com/culturalinstitute/project/art-project?hl=it 
The difference consists in that Google Art Project is what users can actually find in 
online digitised collections. Many museums, though not all of them, have access to the 
‘Museum View,’ which uses the same logic of three-dimensional rendering as Google 
Street View, with the added possibility for users of navigating the virtual space. 
Recently Google Street View has included the possibility of entering certain museums, 
such as the Metropolitan Museum in New York, when navigating through the streets of 
certain cities. Whereas Google Art Project is the tool for digitalisation and uploading of 
collections and museum views that Google offers for free to institutions as 
crowdsourcing. https://www.google.com/intl/it/culturalinstitute/about/users/ 
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Fig. 1 Museo Bagatti Valsecchi on Google Art Project/Google Cultural Institute 
(screenshot).  
Available e from: https://www.google.com/culturalinstitute/u/0/collection/museo-
bagatti-valsecchi?projectId=art-project&hl=en-gb 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Museo Bagatti Valsecchi on Google Art Project/Google Cultural Institute, 
mode Museum View (screenshot).  
Available from: https://www.google.com/culturalinstitute/u/0/asset-viewer/bagatti-
valsecchi-museum/AgEbD-OZIn6mVA?hl=en-gb&projectId=art-project 
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Another good example is the Sistine Chapel virtual visit on the Vatican 
website,11 which allows the visitor not only to do a 360 degree loop 
around the space of the Chapel, but also to zoom in on details, like the 
ceiling or higher points of the Chapel that a “physical” visitor could not 
normally access.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Sistine Chapel 3-D rendering (Screenshot).  
Available from: http://www.vatican.va/various/cappelle/sistina_vr/index.html 
 
There are many further examples, but these two cases suffice to 
exemplify what can be understood in terms of remediation: the virtual 
version of the museum remediating the physical one, ‘representing’ the 
works and the physical space of the museum, and at the same time 
offering features that the physical experience can potentially allow but 
                                                
11
 http://www.vatican.va/various/cappelle/sistina_vr/index.html 
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which is in fact very difficult to provide, such as the functionality of 
zooming in for close-ups.  
Both processes, repurposing and remediation, are often read in terms of 
representation—which in fact, the same definition of remediation 
contemplates.  Representation, as advanced above, is often regarded as a 
diminished version of “the real thing”, whether it's a visit to the museum 
or the appreciation of a certain artwork. In short, it’s positioned as a 
weaker surrogate12 of the physical (represented) experience. This kind of 
reading13 is what further fosters Manichean dichotomies, a clear example 
being the opposition of the virtual experience—associated with negative 
qualities like escapism—to physical reality, which is associated with true, 
original experience.14 Following this line of reasoning, it is then possible 
to detect, in Deleuzian terms, the conceptualisation of reality as an 
original, and of digital reality—whether it has a physical referent or not, 
the reading is always the same—as its degraded copy. 
                                                
12
 This kind of consideration is also at the centre of the critiques of social networks and 
the weakening of face-to-face social relationships. In this respect, Sherry Turkle has 
developed an extended and deep reflection entitled Alone Together (2011). However, 
this is not the focus of this work. 
13
 By this I mean the interpretation of representation in these terms, and not of course 
the concepts of repurposing and remediation, which hold great explicative power 
regarding different processes within the new media landscape. 
14
 In the following chapters it will be shown how, depending on the context, this 
simplistic reading of the virtual as having a weaker ontological status than physical 
reality—typical in the context of “mainstream,” or so to speak, the traditional art 
world—is overturned in other contexts, such as that of cybernetic theory, as notoriously 
demonstrated by Katherine Hayles (1999, 2005). 
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It is not a question of downplaying the experience of actually being inside the 
Sistine Chapel or in front of any other artwork, thing or person. Nor is it a 
matter of degrading, or upgrading, an immersive experience in a virtual reality 
environment or the experience of playing some first-person shooter video game 
with an Oculus Rift set—or any other (super immersive) device. The key point 
is to try to think in terms of ontological repetition, to not compare any of these 
experiences as more intense, truer or worse than the other, but to try to consider 
them as simply different. They are repetitions, iterations, and they repeat 
themselves as different ontologies.  Difference does not mean that one is of a 
higher ontological level than the other, that one has a more real experience, but 
to try to consider that difference is already present between one and the other 
repetition, as it seems to clearly stem from Deleuze’s words: ‘there is no doubt 
that we have the means to distinguish between repetition and simple 
resemblance, since things are said to repeat when they differ even though their 
concept is absolutely the same’ (1968 [1994]: 270). 
 
The importance of this intent consists, first of all, in the aforementioned 
avoidance of a conceptualisation of the world in terms of binary oppositions. 
Secondly, and in close relationship with the previous point, it has the advantage 
of fostering the overcoming of the separation between subject and object: we 
are already immersed in an intertwined reality of artificial, digital, organic and 
physical environments. There is no sense in thinking about these environments 
in terms of oppositions, but it is worth searching for models that can help us 
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understand the intricacy of these complex environments. In this sense, 
Derrida’s différance can be of use to be able to further embrace this complex 
terrain. 
 
1.4 Digitalisation & Différance in Art 
 
It is not easy to think of digitalisation in terms différance, as it was 
possible to do above with Deleuze’s conceptualisation of ontological 
repetition, but undoubtedly it helps to clear the terrain of further 
oppositions and add a necessary level of complexity to the model.  
Mario Vergani15 proposes that différance can be thought as a non-
oppositional but only differential response to dialectics (79), a response 
that is of course of constant deferral, otherwise it would be a dialectics in 
itself. Would it thus be possible to think of digitalisation processes and, 
more broadly, of complex environments in terms of différance, of a 
constant deferral? The concept of différance intends to go beyond 
ontological difference. In this sense, I propose that the conception of 
différance, as quoted above as the condition of possibility of writing, but 
                                                
15
  Mario Vergani (1968) is an Italian Researcher and Professor of Philosophy at the 
Università di Milano-Bicocca. He wrote several books on theorethical philosophy and 
phenomenology, among which: Vergani, M. (2012) Separazione e relazione. 
Prospettive etiche nell'epoca dell'indifferenza. Pisa : ETS; (2011) Levinas 
fenomenologo. Umano senza condizioni. Brescia : Morcelliana.; (2007) Dal soggetto al 
nome proprio. Fenomenologia della condizione umana tra etica e politica. Milano : 
Bruno Mondadori; (2000) Jacques Derrida. Milano : Bruno Mondadori. 
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also of writing as the dimension in which différance emerges (50), can be 
of use to think about the digital not in terms of a (degraded) version of 
material reality, but as always deferred. Reality can no longer be 
considered as a ‘primum interpretandum’ (the grounding of all 
interpretations), regarding which digital (or other) realities are compared, 
or considered to derive from—it is a ‘differential game’ in permanent 
construction and deconstruction which generates meaning, but upon 
which meaning emerges elsewhere too. 
It is important not to consider material reality as the origin of the digital, 
as its original, but to consider their relationship, when one exists, in terms 
of a permanent deferral that generates sense, in the same way that it is 
generated in other texts. In this sense, digitalisation can be considered as 
an archi-trace; in the same sense that Derrida’s writing is a writing of 
writing. This means that the trace exists in the extent to which it is 
repeatable, iterative, and does not have an origin (in reality, or 
otherwise), but is re-written constantly in the uncountable (if not infinite) 
feedback loops with all actors and environments with which it is 
interwoven. 
Three interesting cases are now proposed to begin to consider these 
issues from the proposed perspective. While the first implies 
reproduction and repetition performed by a human agent, namely artist 
Elaine Sturtevant, the second and third examples involve, and evolve, in 
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the context of digital technologies. One is LONELY LOS ANGELES 
(2005) by Guthrie Lonergan and the other is a piece by the Italian duo 
Eva and Franco Mattes (a.k.a. 0100101110101101.org) from the series 
Re-Enactments (2007-2010). 
Sturtevant (1924-2014) was an American artist, and it could be said that 
her oeuvre remained under-recognised for approximately twenty years 
(until the 1980’s).  As Leo Castelli claims in an interview with Dan 
Cameron and Sturtevant for Flash Art International in 1988, she was 
possibly the first appropriationist. No other artist was doing what she did 
at the time when she started (in the Sixties), and it was incredibly original 
(Cameron 1988 [2014]: 63). Sturtevant’s work opens up avenues to think 
about a human (artistic) activity or performance that, even when manual 
and unique, conveys the flavour of mechanical reproduction. This 
direction was of course first hinted at by the work of Marcel Duchamp, 
but Sturtevant seems to have extended this logic further. While Warhol 
repeated his own works—and he purposely repeated them imperfectly so 
that they could be unique—Sturtevant repeated the works of others. 
Deleuze exemplifies his theories with the work of Andy Warhol in 
Difference and Repetition. He dedicates a whole page to art when 
speaking about ontological repetitions and a distinction between 
repetition as habit and repetition as memory that will be further 
 67 
 
commented on chapters 2 and 3,which is worth considering here, 
especially his comment on Andy Warhol:  
Perhaps the highest object of art is to bring into play 
simultaneously all these repetitions, with their differences in kind 
and rhythm, their respective displacements and disguises, their 
divergences and decentrings; to embed them in one another and to 
envelop one or the other in illusions the 'effect' of which varies in 
each case. Art does not imitate, above all because it repeats; it 
repeats all the repetitions, by virtue of an internal power (an 
imitation is a copy, but art is simulation, it reverses copies into 
simulacra). Even the most mechanical, the most banal, the most 
habitual and the most stereotyped repetition finds a place in works 
of art, it is always displaced in relation to other repetitions, and it is 
subject to the condition that a difference may be extracted from it 
for these other repetitions. For there is no other aesthetic problem 
than that of the insertion of art into everyday life. The more our 
daily life appears standardised, stereotyped and subject to an 
accelerated reproduction of objects of consumption, the more art 
must be injected into it in order to extract from it that little 
difference which plays simultaneously between other levels of 
repetition, and even in order to make the two extremes resonate - 
namely, the habitual series of consumption and the instinctual 
series of destruction and death. […] Each art has its interrelated 
techniques or repetitions, the critical and revolutionary power of 
which may attain the highest degree and lead us from the sad 
repetitions of habit to the profound repetitions of memory, and then 
to the ultimate repetitions of death in which our freedom is played 
out. We simply wish to offer three examples, however diverse and 
disparate these may be: first, the manner in which all the repetitions 
coexist in modern music (such as the development of the leitmotiv 
in Berg's Wozzeck); second, the manner in which, within painting, 
Pop Art pushed the copy, copy of the copy, etc., to that extreme 
point at which it reverses and becomes a simulacrum (such as 
Warhol's remarkable 'serial' series, in which all the repetitions of 
habit, memory and death are conjugated); and finally the novelistic 
manner in which little modifications are torn from the brute and 
mechanical repetitions of habit, which in turn nourish repetitions of 
memory and ultimately lead to repetitions in which life and death 
are in play, and risk reacting upon the whole and introducing into it 
a new selection, all these repetitions coexisting and yet being 
displaced in relation to one another. (293-294) 
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Yet Sturtevant is the artist who systematically tried to apply what she 
read in this book to her own work, as she declared in an interview with 
Bruce Hainley and Michale Lobel (Eleey 2014). Sturtevant learned the 
necessary techniques to carefully reproduce the work of other artists, 
almost exactly, but not quite. As she explained (Cameron 1988 [2014]: 
62-67), many artists knew what she was doing, although she wouldn’t 
ask for permission to copy their work. Sturtevant declared that even if 
Claes Oldenburg was a huge supporter of her work from the beginning 
and that he deeply understood the concept behind it, evidently the 
emotions that seeing his work “appropriated” elicited were too strong to 
be able to intellectualise them (65). Similar were cases repeated over her 
career. In a posthumous exhibition at the Staatliche Museen zu Berlin 
entitled Sturtevant: Double Drawing Reversal (2015) it was possible to 
appreciate all of the trial and error proofs in her work process, until she 
arrived at the almost-perfect repetition. Famously, Andy Warhol allowed 
her to reproduce his works, but he wouldn’t tell her how to do them. 
Later, when someone asked Warhol how a certain work had been done, 
his answer would be ‘I don’t know. Ask Elaine’ (Obrist 2014). 
In the same Flash Art interview, Castelli tells her that he owns one of her 
works, the eggs and frying pan that she realised for an exhibition with 
Oldenburg, that in fact he could perceive a difference, and states ‘I 
recognized it. So anyway, you did what you did and you tried to 
reproduce the thing as best as you could.’ Sturtevant’s answer is 
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significant: ‘Not as best as I could because that implies something 
different—as closely as I could without copying it. When you copy 
something it becomes something else’ (Cameron 1988 [2014]: 64). 
 
 
 
 
Fig.4. Elaine Sturtevant, Warhol Flowers, 1969. Synthetic polymer and silkscreen ink 
on canvas, 27.94 x 27.94 cm. 
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Although it is not difficult to recognise the reading of Difference and 
Repetition in her words, a valid question could be whether it’s not more 
of a question of Derridean différance, and not simply difference and 
repetition. Is this way of working, consciously reproducing but with 
slight differences so that ‘difference will be conveyed’ in the infinite 
repetitions, more of a question of deferral? If one stops thinking of the 
“original” work as an original, as the ‘primum interpretandum’ that 
grounds the later interpretation of the successive works as “copies”, it is 
possible to understand both as texts, as interwoven texts in which one 
deconstructs the other, keeping both in dialogue. Between these 
successions of works, the absence of an origin generates meaning—those 
iterations, are the ‘writings on writings.’ In this sense, Vergani states that 
the consequence of these writings on writings is that there is no ‘primum 
signatum’ either, so the original is no original but it can be considered 
only in terms of difference (Vergani 2000: 51). 
This reading of Sturtevant’s oeuvre does not invalidate her own reading 
of her work in Deleuzian terms, but it seems less forced. The fact that she 
purposely included a certain difference in her work suggests that she may 
not have completely grasped the strength and radicalism of Deleuze’s 
work in its entirety, because the example that he gives of the perfect 
repetition conveying difference in full is Pierre Menard’s Quixote, in 
which he reproduced Cervantes’s Quixote word-by-word without 
copying it, but was infinitely better; in short, there was no need to make 
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imperfect reproductions. Moreover, the reproduction has to be perfect to 
convey the maximum of difference, because difference locates itself 
among displacements, between one repetition and the other, and by 
differences in repetitions themselves. In this sense, each repetition is an 
event:   
Borges, we know, excelled in recounting imaginary books. 
But he goes further when he considers a real book, such as 
Don Quixote, as though it were an imaginary book, itself 
reproduced by an imaginary author, Pierre Menard, who in 
turn he considers to be real. In this case, the most exact, the 
most strict repetition has as its correlate the maximum of 
difference (The text of Cervantes and that of Menard are 
verbally identical, but the second is almost infinitely 
richer…) (Deleuze 1968 [1994]: xxii)  
 
Consequently, to consider her works in terms of difference between 
‘writings of writings’, as a writing on other’s artists works, in which 
there is no primum signatum and no primum interpretatum, in which the 
deferral between one and the other generate meaning in the form of an 
absence, and not necessarily as a readable mark seems appropriate.  
Guthrie Lonergan’s project LONELY LOS ANGELES is one of the 
earliest works that can be found in the artist and programmer’s website, 
theageofmammals.com. Clicking on the link one can see screenshots of 
MapQuest 2004, the first one is from the busy centre of Los Angeles, 
below that there is an animated GIF of a small car, and below it sixteen 
maps of parts of the City of Los Angeles that either have a very low 
population density or are uninhabited. These maps are almost abstract, if 
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not completely abstract, as is the case with maps no.9 and no.12, which 
have no roads or geographical references. One map is completely grey 
and the other entirely green, with the exception of the scale graphic on 
the upper right hand corner. 
 
 
  
 
 Fig. 5, 6. Gunthrie Lonergan, LONENY LOS ANGELES, 2005.  
 Available from: http://theageofmammals.com/blogmedia/lonelylosangeles/ 
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All of the works, but especially these two maps, allude to Lewis Caroll’s 
poem The Hunting of the Snark (1876), in which the character of the 
Captain employs a map of solely the sea, with no hint of land (Halter 
2014: 245).  
 
Fig.7. Henry Holiday, illustration for Lewis Carroll’s poem The Hunting of the Snark 
(1876). Available from: http://publicdomainreview.org/2011/02/22/lewis-carroll-and-
the-hunting-of-the-snark/ 
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The first observation that comes to mind is that in the same way that 
language and meaning are produced by differential and oppositional 
relationships, these maps become just squares of colour, and are thus 
completely illegible without a frame of references, differences or 
contrasts within which to read them. There is something deeply absurd 
and ironic about a map of just the sea, or in this case of empty land. 
Would it therefore make any sense to consider LONELY LOS ANGELES 
in terms of representation? It would also be completely absurd to 
consider a green rectangle on a screen to be the representation of grass, 
or to consider that a supposedly precise part of Los Angeles is the 
primum interpretatum of the green square.  More likely, a work like this 
one points towards the constant dialogues and constant loops between 
one and the other. Lonergan illustrates this point in his claim that he 
made the project before he had learned to drive, thus he was using 
MapQuest to navigate the city (ibid). 
Finally, it is worth revisiting Reenactments (2007-2010) by Eva and 
Franco Mattes (a.k.a. 01010010101.org), the couple’s re-make of 
canonical performances from the 1970’s on Second Life, including 
Marina Abramovic and Ulay’s piece Imponderabilia.16 The original 
performance (1977) consisted of Abramovic and Ulay standing naked 
                                                
16
 http://0100101110101101.org/reenactments/ 
http://0100101110101101.org/reenactment-of-marina-abramovic-and-ulays-
imponderabilia/ 
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one in front of the other inside the doorframe of the entrance to the 
museum on the opening evening, so that visitors wanting to enter the 
space would have to pass between them.  
 
 
   Fig.8. Marina Ambramovic & Ulay, Imponderabilia, 1977. 
 
In the artists’ words: ‘Naked we stand opposite each other in the museum 
entrance. The public entering the museum has to turn sideways to move 
through the limited space between us. Everyone wanting to get past has 
to choose one of us’ (Abramovic, Marina-Ulay 1977)17. At the time, the 
potentially shocking aspect of the performance was not only the choice of 
                                                
17
 http://www.medienkunstnetz.de/works/imponderabilia/ 
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which person to face, but also the possibility of physical contact with 
both. 
What happens then in Imponderabilia’s re-enactment on a virtual 
environment like Second Life? Eva and Franco Mattes’ avatars replace 
Abramovic and Ulay and visitors wishing to take part in the performance 
need to connect at precise time. The evident comparison ends here, 
because it doesn’t make sense to state what is evident: that the physical 
contact with the performers gets completely lost. Interaction and 
comments are mediated through the chat room.  Participants range from 
stylish, sexy avatars to a kind of Hello Kitty character enactment (minute 
2:24 on the artists’ website video). The possibilities to have contact with 
Eva and Franco Mattes do not include the tactile dimension, but allow for 
the trespassing of “bodies” (minutes 1: 11; 2:36), as when one of the 
participants “trespasses” through Eva—a trespassing that is evidently not 
of matter, but simply of computer graphics. In this context, if it is 
possible to talk about a digital/virtual environment re-enactment of 
analog performances of the past, so to speak, it makes no sense to take 
the comparison further to complain about what gets lost, and celebrate 
what is possible to achieve that physics doesn’t allow, on planet earth at 
least. 
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Fig. 9. Eva and Franco Mattes (a.k.a. 01010010101.org), Reenactments, 2007-2010. 
(Screenshot). Available from: http://0100101110101101.org/reenactment-of-marina-
abramovic-and-ulays-imponderabilia/ 
 
It is more desirable to consider this type of event as a kind of ontological 
repetition in which the main conditions (the same concept, in Deleuze’s 
terms) are to be kept constant but many others are completely different. 
In the case of the Mattes couple, this is not only the materiality of the 
performance, but also the ways in which the participants interact amongst 
themselves and with the performers—mainly through chat and not with 
the voice. As Pierre Lévy clearly explained, texts are already virtual, they 
are the virtualisation of memory (1995 [1997]: 27). They imply exiting 
the ‘here and now’ (9) of the oral transmission of memory, at the same 
time enabling its projection (the content of the text) to the future, to a 
possible future in which it can be read. Thus virtualisation in the 
digital—the departure from the here and now of the digitised object—
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does not mean in any way “dematerialisation”, in the sense that things, 
texts, events and people become just zeroes and ones, or pixels on a 
screen, but a deterritorialisation: there is the possibility of accessing these 
texts, in this case a performance. It is unique in the first as well as in any 
other possible re-enactments, and independent of any fixed connection 
with a concrete place and precise moment, although it happens each time 
at a certain moment. 
However, here again, there is the consideration of an origin, the point of 
departure would be the performance that physically took place in 1977, 
and Eva and Franco Mattes’ version on Second Life would be its 
deterritorialisation, its version; thus the link to the origin is still there. 
Manovich named the fact that new media objects, as he calls them, have 
only ‘versions’ and no original, or negative, and no copies, ‘variability’, 
and defined it as one of the five principles that distinguish analog or 
modern media from digital technologies (2001). Of course Manovich was 
referring to the version of a certain file, like an image for example, which 
could be saved applying different filters, or by modifying colours, quality 
or dimensions. However, none of these ‘versions’ have the value of a 
negative from which copies are derived. This quite technical observation 
would also be an interesting way to understand repetition in this case. 
Again, it makes no sense to consider the re-enacted performance as the 
original that has been “copied” in a “virtual” version, but rather to think 
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of these re-enactments as versions, as a kind of variation, as repetitions in 
complex environments that differ from one another but in which 
difference does not imply hierarchisation. 
Moreover, it can also be considered in terms of différance, as two texts 
that are related to each other through deferral, not only deferral of space 
and time, but also by the traces left behind. Discussing books and 
electronic texts, Katherine Hayles considers that ‘the ontology card is not 
worth playing. There is no Platonic reality of texts. There are only 
physical objects such as books and computers, foci of attention, and 
codes that entrain attention and organize material operations’ (2005: 97). 
As there is no possibility of encoding the whole materiality of a book in a 
digital version, she prefers to talk about ‘correspondences’ between 
books, texts and electronic texts. However, artistic objects, or events, 
which in the cases analysed above also include people, are not texts. 
Even if the performance has a certain script to follow, a kind of algorithm 
that states, more or less, that in the Imponderabilia performance a couple 
should be standing naked one in front of the other at the entrance of the 
gallery space or museum and people wanting to enter should pass 
between them, thus choosing who to face and entering in contact with the 
nude bodies, the general conditions would be completely unique each 
time. Actors, the gallery, the public, the weather conditions, everything 
would be different, and each event would be unique, precisely because it 
is an event.  
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This means that successive repetitions, virtual, online and digital 
repetitions can be considered in terms of différance, of a slippage, the 
deferral that generates a dialogue between texts, namely, between 
material and digital versions of the same performance, of the same 
concept, and in doing so generates meaning. It is not easy to leave the 
search for an origin aside, nor is it easy not to consider the origin of the 
other. However, it is worth making an effort because it offers the 
invaluable advantage of, possibly, being able to navigate our time with 
fewer dichotomies, and thus be able to embrace complexity. 
 81 
 
2.	Simulacra	
 
The previous chapter argued that the concept of representation is 
misleading.  The text instead followed a line of thinking that sought to 
understand the analytical intricacy required to navigate complex 
environments today: environments engaged in constant feedback loops 
between artificial and non-artificial entities, digital and analog 
technologies and domains. 
This second chapter proposes considering the concept of simulacrum as a 
further exit strategy from representation and the corresponding 
dichotomies that originated in transcendent thought. 
With this aim, and thus not following a strict chronological order, it 
seems necessary to first signal a departure from negative and critical 
conceptualisations of the simulacrum—which are obviously linked to the 
Platonic residue of representation—as famously developed by Jean 
Baudrillard.  
In a second moment, the vision of the simulacrum as the only possible 
way to conceptualise reality without further Platonic dichotomies will be 
presented in Gilles Deleuze’s thought. A complementary model, Charles 
Sanders Peirce’s triadic semiotic model, will then be proposed, which 
 82 
 
further avoids binary oppositions and can be useful to elicit thinking in 
more complex terms. 
 
2.1 The Overcoming of Baudrillard’s Conception of Simulacra 
 
In Symbolic Exchange and Death (1976) Jean Baudrillard extensively 
analyses an ongoing process of reality’s dematerialisation in capitalist 
societies, which he argues is due to the overabundance and dominium of 
signs over reality. Baudrillard explains different aspects of this process, 
notoriously defining three different orders of simulacra, which 
correspond to the three levels of the process of dematerialisation and 
ascendancy of signs over the world. 
Baudrillard’s defines the real as ‘that of which it is possible to provide an 
equivalent reproduction’ (Baudrillard 1976: 114). Therefore, in his 
thought, the real is a kind of original on which fallacious copies are 
produced and spread. Baudrillard argues further that, in our present 
condition, the concept that we need to define our relationship with the 
world is not the real, but the hyperreal. This condition has been enabled 
by the loss of the referent and the continuous circulation and arbitrariness 
of the sign, in which the correspondences between sign and referent, or to 
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put it another way, of words and world, is completely lost. The real then 
gets “trapped” in an infinite repetition of itself:  
The end of the spectacle brings with it the collapse of reality 
into hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, 
preferably through another reproductive medium such as 
advertising or photography. Through reproduction from one 
medium into another the real becomes volatile […] but it also 
draws strength from its own destruction, becoming the real 
for its own sake, a fetishism of the lost object which is no 
longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of 
denegation and its own ritual extermination: the hyperreal.  
(Baudrillard 1976: 116) 
 
One of the first and most simple objections that come to mind in this 
respect is the impossibility, so far at least, of eradicating the material 
substrate of physicality in a radical sense (if one agrees that there is a 
material substrate, such as Baudrillard does). In more concrete words, 
and as already advanced by Tomas Maldonado (1992), even if one 
spends eighteen hours a day in a virtual reality environment, playing 
video games or watching TV immersed in advertising and photographic 
reproductions, as Baudrillard mentions in the quote above, one still 
cannot avoid basic physical and physiological necessities such sleeping, 
eating and so on. Despite the fact that Baudrillard’s warning about the 
dematerialisation of reality may have been, and hopefully was, a 
metaphoric exploration of this idea, when understood in a literal sense, it 
generated a significant deal of confusion in theory and criticism on 
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digital media.18 
The hyperreal is the consequence of simulacra. As noted above, 
Baudrillard defines three orders of simulacra. In first-order simulacrum 
there is a counterfeiting of an original. First-order simulacra are 
characteristic of the historical period that extends from the Renaissance 
up until the Industrial Revolution. The author identifies in this stage ‘the 
end of the obligatory sign’ and the successive ‘reign of the emancipated 
sign’ (85) wherein there is a passage from an order in which the 
proliferation of signs was limited and subject to strict rules and 
prohibitions—generally by religious institutions—to a stage in which 
signs are dominated by the law of demand. This proliferation of multiple 
signs according to the corresponding demand is not controlled by the law 
that obliged them anymore, but they are instead a counterfeit of the 
original obligatory sign. Baudrillard identifies a necessary and obligatory 
relation between the sign and the natural referent that it “should” and 
used to have. He exemplifies the stage of first-order simulacrum with the 
‘stucco angel’, which he identifies as a symbol of baroque opulence and 
‘forgery’—of nature and the ‘natural referent’… And this will get still 
more Platonic. 
                                                
18
 To this confusion, that Maldonado had briefly discussed in some of the essays 
published in Italian under the title Reale e virtuale (Real and virtual), Katherine Hayles 
has dedicated a whole book, How We Became Posthuman, published in 1999. This topic 
will be further discussed throughout the text, but especially on Chapters 5 and 6. 
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Baudrillard compares the automaton and the robot to explain second-
order simulacra: the automaton is a technical artifact that counterfeits 
humans ‘by analogy’ (88), and in which the link with the ‘natural 
referent’ is therefore preserved and evident. In the robot and the machine 
a relationship of (false) equivalence is established: 
The automaton is the analogon of man and remains 
responsive to him (even playing draughts with him!). The 
machine is the equivalent of man, appropriating him to itself 
as an equal in the unity of a functional process. This sums up 
the difference between first and second-order simulacra. (88) 
 
The issue in second-order simulacra is no longer a problem of 
resemblance, but rather how all differences and similitudes have been 
absorbed to let way to ‘the principle of operativity’ (90): ‘such is the 
machine, such is the entire system of industrial production’ (89). 
According to this logic, all originals have thus been lost. Only pure series 
remain, which are copies that have the logic of serial production. In terms 
of the sign, it entails circulation—the reproduction of a sign without a 
referent. 
Finally, Baudrillard defines the third-order simulacrum as the moment in 
which ‘there are models from which all forms proceed according to 
modulated differences’ (1976: 92). In this last form of simulacra, which 
coincides with hyperreality, there is no longer mechanical reproduction, 
but instead ‘everything is conceived according with their very 
reproducibility, their diffraction from a generative core called a “model”’ 
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(92). If first-order simulacra corresponded to a pre-industrial era, and 
second-order simulacra corresponded to mechanisation and industrial 
reproduction, third-order simulacra correspond to the era of binary code 
and cybernetics (94-96). Third-order simulacra correspond to the era of 
simulation, not only is there no ‘natural’ or ‘obliged’ referent for the 
sign, but it is a time of ‘generative models’ (97). Through codes, pure 
simulacra, pure signs can be generated. What is worse, they can 
definitively replace reality ‘according to modulated differences’.  
This kind of understanding of simulacra has several problems, which are 
largely considered already overcome. However, it is still important to 
clarify Baudrillard’s conception of simulacra because Baudrillard is in 
part responsible for its negative acceptation, which was engendered by 
Plato, but the concept nonetheless had its followers. In the first place, 
Baudrillard’s conceptualisation of the simulacrum through the idea of the 
dominance of signs reveals a semiotic substrate that implies the axiom 
that there is a perfect correspondence between signs and the world. This 
idea will be better discussed and challenged in chapter 4 through Lévi-
Strauss’ concept of mana and the floating signifier, which considers the 
fact that signs and the world do not completely fit, there is an evident 
overspill of the world over signs, and conversely, language can build 
worlds that do not have a material referent. 
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Secondly, this implied axiom leads to the supposition that there actually 
is a material substrate that is good, or at least better, as opposed to the 
‘dematerialised’ hyperreal, which is quite negative. 
 
2.2 Deleuze and the Simulacrum as the Actual Overcoming of 
Representation 
 
In the context of this research, the simulacrum is understood as a 
conceptualisation used to project one’s actions: there is no faith in matter 
anymore, so simulacra serve as models to better understand the world. 
Therefore, Deleuze’s development of the idea of simulacrum as advanced 
(eight years earlier) in Différence et répétition (1968) has proven to be 
more coherent and useful than Baudrillard’s model, and is congruous 
with the overcoming of representation. Deleuze eliminates the opposition 
between world and symbols, between an original or model and its 
reproduction. As he explains at the very beginning of the book, the world 
of representation was the world of identity—Plato’s world—but modern 
thought was born amidst the loss of identities and the failure of 
representation. It is thus a world of simulacra; all identities are only 
simulated, ‘produced as an optical “effect” by the more profound game 
of difference and repetition’ (xix). 
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Examining how Plato had to ‘surrender to representation’ in order to 
liberate the relation between model and copy from the simulacrum, 
Deleuze makes evident how Plato abhorred the idea of simulacrum. The 
copy still maintains an internal spiritual and ontological relationship—
and thus not one of pure resemblance—with the Idea through the model, 
because the model takes part of the essence of the Same. The 
simulacrum, on the other hand, is a phantom that has no link with the 
model, nor with the copy. In this sense, the copy has a direct relation with 
truth, while the simulacrum is, precisely, pure simulation with no 
relationship to being or truth whatsoever (265). This is also part of the 
reason why Plato despised poetry and art, and especially painting: 
because art, mimetic art, has two grades of separation with the Same—
namely, with truth. In short, it is pure simulacrum.19 
                                                
19
 Erick Havelock, 1963, has extensively and brilliantly explained the relationship between 
simulacrum, poetry and mimesis in Plato: ‘This is precisely the turn given to the term as the 
argument of Book Ten unfolds itself. True, poetry to be banned is at first qualified as “poetry in 
so far as it is mimetic”, but this qualification then appears to be dropped. Plato as he says 
himself has now sharpened his vision of what poetry really is. He has transcended the critique 
of Book Three, which confined itself to dram as its target. Now, not only the dramatist, but 
Homer and Hesiod come into question. Nor is the issue any longer confined to protecting the 
moral character. The danger is one of crippling the intellect. Why is this? The answer, he 
replies, will require a complete and exhaustive definition of what mimesis really amounts to. 
This answer depends on whether we accept the Platonic doctrine, established in the intervening 
books, that absolute knowledge, or true science if we so choose to call it, is of the Forms and of 
the Forms alone, and that applied science or skilled technique depends on copying the Forms in 
artefacts. The painter and the poet achieve neither. Poetry is not so much non-functional as 
anti-functional. It totally lacks the precise knowledge that a craftsman for example can apply to 
his trade, still less can it employ the precise aims and goals which side the skilled educator in 
his training of the intellect, For this training depends on the skill of calculation and 
measurement; the illusions of sensible experience are critically corrected by the controlling 
reason. Poetry per contra indulges in constant illusionism, confusion and irrationality. This is 
what mimesis ultimately is, shadow-show of phantoms, like those images seen in the darkness 
of the wall of the cave. 
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Instead, for Deleuze, the modern world is one of simulacra (xix), a world 
in which all identities have been lost. It makes no sense to think in terms 
of representation, models or copies. It is instead necessary to embrace 
simulacra. Unlike Baudrillard, Deleuze refrains from expressing any kind 
of positive or negative judgement in relation to this situation. For him, 
representation simply does not suffice any more to understand and 
explain the current state of complexity. Clearly in this conception there is 
no connection to any supposed material, or idealistic foundation. The 
simulacrum and the symbol are one and the same thing, the simulacrum 
is a sign that has interiorised ‘the conditions of its own repetition’ (66-
67): 
Everything has become simulacrum, for by simulacrum we 
should not understand a simple imitation but rather the act by 
which the very idea of a model or privileged position is 
challenged and overturned. The simulacrum is the instance 
which includes a difference within itself, such as (at least) 
two divergent series on which it plays, all resemblance 
abolished so that one can no longer point to the existence of 
an original and a copy. (69) 
 
The simulacrum, thus expressed, is the only possibility of setting up the 
conditions of ‘real experience’, thus conceiving of the simulacrum in this 
way helps us to understand, navigate, and actively inhabit complex 
                                                                                                                   
[…] But is now obvious that mimesis has become the word par excellence for the over-
all linguistic medium of the poet and his peculiar power through the use of this medium 
(meter and imagery are included in the attack) to render account of reality. For Plato, 
reality is rational, scientific and logical, or is nothing’ (24). 
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environments that can result, as it will be further argued, in complex 
subjectivities.  
It is important to underscore that the simulacrum is not understood in this 
sense as an uncritical and passive accomplice to industrial serialisation, 
or even code-based simulation—as was Baudrillard’s argument—but on 
the contrary, thus considered, it can be a tool to avoid this trap. The 
simulacrum is to be thought in terms of difference and repetition and not 
of representation. Every simulacrum is differential and carries difference 
in itself. 
 
2.3 Peirce’s Triadic Model as a Complementary Exit Strategy 
 
An interesting and complementary model to overcome dualistic thought 
and steer the discussion towards the terrain of simulacra can be found in 
Charles S. Peirce’s triadic model in the field of semiotics. In the previous 
chapter, it was mentioned that Derrida’s critique of Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s dyadic theory of the sign through his introduction of the 
concept of différance pointed at avoiding, among other issues, binary 
thought. Derrida finds in the opposition of signifier and signified another 
way of conceiving the world in terms of pairs of opposites—of binary 
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oppositions. Examining a triadic model like Peirce’s20 and placing it in 
relation to simulacra can also contribute to the ‘deconstruction’ of this 
fallacy. 
Peirce’s triadic model is important within the context of this research 
because, for him, any mode of thinking and cognition depends on its use 
of signs. Thus, thought and objects are signs in themselves. Peirce 
considers both the mental image of a table as well as the table itself to be 
signs, depending on the position each of these terms occupies in turn in 
the process of infinite semiosis.  
It is then important to explain how Peirce defines semiosis and signs:  
By semiosis I mean an action, an influence, which is, or 
involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its 
object and an interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being 
in any way resolvable into actions between pairs (1931: 
5.484).  
 
As Umberto Eco explains, when Peirce talks about ‘subjects’, these are 
not necessarily human. The process of semiosis does not imply any 
communicative intention (1976: 15), and the object can be, but is not 
necessarily, an object, because Peirce defines the object as anything that 
can be thought.  
                                                
20
 A hint at this process can be provided by the fact that Peirce’s model had not had the 
success (in Europe) that Saussure’s had, in spite of the fact that an influential theorist 
like Umberto Eco did so much to explain his oeuvre. In this regard, see Eco 1968, 1975 
[1976], 1983.  
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A sign is then ‘something which stands to21 somebody for something in 
some respect or capacity’ (1931: 2.228), it denotes a certain object, and 
the understanding of this something that ‘stands for’ is mediated and only 
possible through the third element, the interpretant; the interpretant is the 
effect of a sign, the signification or interpretation of a certain sign. 
Although Eco does not deny that in order to imply some kind of 
interpretation through the interpretant there can be a certain  
‘psychological event in the mind of a possible interpreter’, he states that 
it is also possible to think about semiosis processes ‘in a non-
anthropomorphic way’ (Eco 1976: 15). The process of infinite semiosis is 
produced when the interpretant becomes a sign in itself with its own 
object and interpretant, a chain that can be indefinitely repeated (2.303). 
Therefore, one of the main advantages of this model when compared 
with Saussure’s is that ‘it does not demand, as part of a sign’s definition, 
the qualities of being intentionally emitted and artificially produced’ (15-
16).22 The model introduces several issues that hold great interest for the 
present work. First of all, it does not differentiate between human and 
non-human production of sense—although, as a semiotic theory, it does 
consider sense, unlike information theory (Shannon-Weaver 1948; Eco 
                                                
21
 Even though Peirce uses the word ‘representation’, and also ‘representamen’ to name 
the part of the sign that holds a relation of determination with its object, he does never 
use the word ‘representation’ in his definition of the sign. The sign is not “representing” 
its object, but it ‘stands for’ it. 
22
 In the context of this research, semiosis should imply a theory of 
communication, and therefore of intentionality. To deepen this topic please 
see Eco 1976, and other authors quoted by him. 
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1968, 1975 [1976]; Volli 2000). Furthermore, Peirce does not distinguish 
between material and non-material signs. In this theory there is no 
preponderance of material or conceptual hierarchies regarding thoughts 
and signs—virtuality and materiality in this sense are at the same level 
and potentially interwoven together. Moreover, for Peirce a subject (this 
time in the sense of human being) can also work as a sign, as well as 
thought: 
Now the representative function of a sign lies neither in its 
material quality nor in its pure demonstrative application; 
because it is something which the sign is, not in itself or in a 
real relation to its object; but which it is to a thought, while 
both of the characters just defined belong to the sign 
independently of its addressing to any thought. And yet if I 
take all the things which have certain qualities and physically 
connect them with another series of things, each to each, they 
become fit to be signs. (5.287)  
 
Furthermore, not every part of a sign ‘signifies’ according to Peirce. The 
sign has a necessary relation with its object but not every part of the sign 
is equally significant in the semiosis process. In this sense, and unlike 
Saussure’s model, this conception of the sign and of the process of 
signification already contemplates the idea of overspill, of surabondance 
of signification of objects over the signs that stand for them, but also of 
the signs over their objects: there are parts of the sign that do not have a 
correspondence in the object. In this model there is no illusion of a 
perfect correspondence between signs and their objects, which is another 
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reason why it proves to be especially useful in this context.23  
Finally, in his famous ‘Letter to Lady Welby’ (1902) Peirce defines the 
three categories, or ‘modes of being’, which he calls ‘cenopythagorean 
categories’, that classify and give meaning to every phenomena and 
object of thought: 
Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
positively and without reference to anything else. 
Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
with respect to a second but regardless of any third. 
Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
in bringing a second and third into relation to each other. 
(8.328) 
 
Peirce exemplifies firstness with feelings, appearances or impressions 
(and not with experience). Secondness can be exemplified by action, by 
‘one thing acting upon another’. Finally, when law or reason comes in, 
there is thirdness: thirdness implies mediation, it is a third element that 
puts the first two into relation. The fact that Peirce explains thirdness in 
terms of thought (when law or reason come in, there is thirdness) 
underlines the fact that he considered thought as a kind of sign, and 
therefore not in terms of representation. Thirdness indicates a triadic 
relationship: ‘thirdness is the triadic relation existing between a sign, its 
object, and the interpreting thought, itself a sign, considered as 
constituting the mode of being a sign. A sign mediates between the 
                                                
23
 As it was already advanced, this topic will be fully developed on chapter 4. 
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interpretant sign and its object’ (8.329). Through avoiding a dyadic 
identification between an essence and its expression or a materiality and 
its meaning, this triadic relationship proposes that the generation of 
meaning necessarily emerges from a relationship of thirdness: of three 
terms interacting in a limitless chain, the infinite semiosis which shows 
another path to think of significant processes that avoid the trap of 
representation. Consequently, it is possible to use this model to further 
think about complex environments in a way that actually accounts for 
this complexity without dividing each instance into virtual/material, 
digital/analog or simulacrum/original. 
In the triadic relationship between the elements that comprise the 
semiotic process, from a phenomenological point of view, Peirce defines 
the ways in which the sign denotes its object as icon, index or symbol: 
the icon by a quality of similitude, the index by real connection to its 
object, and the symbol by a convention or rule for its interpretant. 
Considering, for example, digital environments that have a similitude 
with non-digital realities in the sense of an iconic relationship precisely 
avoids misunderstanding it as a representation. Ultimately, this research 
intends to think of the ways in which the feedback loops between humans 
and machines generate sense and new subjectivities, and this model is 
coherent with a complex semiosis process in which its terms can 
alternately be human, non-human, material and virtual: if comprehension 
of sense has been, so far at least, exclusively human, this model allows to 
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better account for the complexities in its production.  
 
2.4 Images, Screens, Icons & Simulacra 
 
A useful view, as already developed elsewhere (Galati and Bianchi 
2014), is considering the (digital device) screen in terms of icon and 
simulacra, and not as a simple image. Peirce’s definition of the sign and 
its triadic relationship has already been explained, thus how can the 
concept of simulacrum—considered as defined above—be of use to 
better understand images in general and digitised images in particular? 
The key point is the continuity between the world and the world of 
simulacra, and in a second stage, the consideration of the digitised object 
or image as ontological repetition, as extensively developed in the 
previous chapter.  
There is continuity between images, the digital and the world. This 
comprises the ‘univocity of being’ (Deleuze 1968: 303) from which any 
dualistic separation between virtual and real, images and the world, 
images and digital images is definitely removed.  
The confusion of the screen with an image can have its origin—in the 
case of computers, tablets and smart phones—first in the desktop 
metaphor of different operating systems and then in the progressive 
 97 
 
elimination of interfaces thanks to touch-screen technology. The screen is 
not just an image. It displays images, usually through an interface, and 
these interfaces can, like the Renaissance paintings described by Leon 
Battista Alberti, be considered ‘windows to other worlds’ (1431).24 In 
this sense, Peirce’s semiotic theory can be of use to clear the path to 
understanding how interfaces and operating systems can work as icons or 
symbols in relationship to the signs, specifically, the referents and 
concepts that they loosely allude to. 
Computer, tablet and cell phone screens display an interface that the user 
interacts with to navigate the device. This interface is part of an operating 
system that conveys a certain metaphor, namely, the desktop metaphor 
that makes it more user-friendly. As the operating systems were updated, 
and eventually improved, the will of “illusionism” began to grow. For 
instance, while previous versions were more ‘modernist”, according to 
Manovich, the Mac OS8 that launched in 1997 included a colour display, 
the trash icon had some volume and the calculator buttons had a shadow. 
Although the display was still fairly synthetic, its design conveyed a clear 
intention to represent three-dimensional objects. In Peirce’s terms, it 
could be said that there was a passage from a symbolic to an iconic 
representation in the interface. In the first versions of the operating 
systems—at least in Apple’s—the relationship between the represented 
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 In his Tratatto sulla pittura (1431) Alberti codified the linear perspective that Filippo 
Brunelleschi had “invented” a few years before, calling the pictorial surface in which 
space was represented ‘a window to another world’. 
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objects (dustbins, folders and buttons) and the referent maintained some 
salient traits, but were not necessarily similar. Therefore, the represented 
objects and referent kept a conventional, and thus symbolic, relationship. 
Later versions of the operating system significantly increased the realism 
of their interface by ascribing similar traits to the represented object so as 
to allow a direct recognition, thus maintaining an iconic relationship. It is 
only then that a desktop icon coincided with the semiotic one.  
In this sense, considering the world in general and the digital at large, 
including the screen and digitised images in terms of different types of 
simulacra is coherent with the avoidance of representation and the 
conception of digitalisation processes in general and digitised/digital 
artworks in particular in terms of ontological repetition. 
Peirce’s model, on the other hand, cannot only be applied to digitised 
images, digital screens or other related events in terms of an iconic 
relationship that evades representation and its corresponding dichotomies 
and ontological hierarchies, but it more importantly introduces a triadic 
model. This model places ‘human and non-human cognisers’ (Hayles 
2005: 212)—namely natural, artificial, analog and digital 
environments—in a process of infinite semiosis (which would be no 
stretch to describe as a feedback loop) in which any instance can work as 
sign, object or interpretant of the others without making any ontological 
hierarchisations. In this sense, Peirce’s model proves to have been quite 
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ahead of its time, considering we are still embroiled in discussions and 
explanations of the importance of avoiding these hierarchisations today. 
 
 2.5 Art & Simulacra 
 
Deleuze talks about art particularly in terms of simulacra, in this sense all 
art is simulacrum. In the same way that every digitisation process, 
digitised image or digitally created thing is also simulacrum—yet in the 
sense of repetition, not in the notion of simulacra having a degraded 
ontology. There are of course, differences in all these repetitions, but not 
hierarchical differences at the level of the ontological status.  
Perhaps the highest object of art is to bring into play 
simultaneously all these repetitions, with their differences in 
kind and rhythm, their respective displacements and 
disguises, their divergences and decentrings; to embed them 
in one another and to envelop one or the other in illusions the 
'effect’ of which varies in each case. 
Art does not imitate, above all because it repeats; it repeats 
all the repetitions, by virtue of an internal power (an imitation 
is a copy, but art is simulation, it reverses copies into 
simulacra). (Deleuze 1968 [1994]: 293) 
 
The previous chapter mentioned how Deleuze exemplified the 
development of difference and repetition with Andy Warhol’s oeuvre. 
Warhol’s series of silkscreens were mechanically reproduced, and, as is 
well known, he purposely left behind any “mistakes” like paint stains, 
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displacements that took place in the work’s reproduction process, which 
of course made every version unique.  
 
Within this context, it is worthwhile to expand the analysis to include the 
work of Italian artist Gabriele Di Matteo (born in Torre del Greco, 
Naples, in 1957) who can be said to have dedicated (almost) his whole 
oeuvre to exploring the impossibility of the copy in art, particularly to 
how this might relate to the limits of painting.  
Di Matteo started exploring the subject of copying and reproducing in the 
early Nineties. In fact, it was around this time that his interest shifted 
towards the mechanism of image reproduction rather than on images 
themselves (Verzotti 2002). In the early project Biografie (1991) at 
Galleria Fac-Simile in Milan he reproduced a series of covers from a 
collection of Spanish books form the Fifties on a large-scale canvases, 
each of which was dedicated to a relevant character in the history of 
universal culture. Each character was depicted on the cover in an 
illustrated portrait, significantly, the first portrayed was Johannes 
Gutenberg. Di Matteo first enlarged a photograph of the covers to the 
desired size (250 x 174 cm) through the scanachrome25 technique, then 
painted on some of them while others were simply left as scanachromes. 
The operation performed in this project still remains within the terrain of 
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 Inkjet print on big dimension surfaces. 
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repurposing defined by Bolter and Grusin. In other words, the work 
functions as a translation from one medium into another and not its 
‘remediation.’ Even if the reproduction is quite exact, the measures, 
technique and context vary considerably, obviously when translating a 
paper magazine to oil on canvas or scanachrome to canvas.  
The project Marcel Duchamp, a life in pictures: Illustrations by André 
Raffray (1993-2002) adopts a similar spirit. In this case, Di Matteo 
realised two series of canvases and two series of cameos based on a book 
on the life of Marcel Duchamp for children illustrated by André Raffray 
(1977). The first version was realised in 1993 and based on the original 
French version, while the second was made in 2002 when the artist found 
the English version by chance. This work actually has three versions, 
because when he saw the English version, although the illustrations were 
the same, he noticed the slight differences in the colours of the different 
prints. Thus, Di Matteo decided to print the second book as a 
scanachrome and then painted on it—which technically made the second 
scanachrome version disappear under the painting. 
The artist hadn’t started strictly “reproducing” yet, but this series 
provides another clear example of repurposing. This was enough to make 
the illustrator, André Raffray, very angry. Raffray eventually understood 
and accepted the project, which was the point when Di Matteo started to 
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question the absolute impossibility of actually copying art. These 
reflections would get much more specific and practical very soon.  
In the Nineties, the artist also started realising large-scale portraits of 
cultural and political figures that again transposed photographs found in 
journals to paintings.  
This is the case of Arafat (1996), which consists of five portraits and one 
scanachrome of Yaser Arafat and The Blind Man (1998),26 which 
comprises five portraits of writer Jorge Luis Borges. However, he 
realised each series slightly differently. In the first series Arafat, which is 
based on a photograph of the Palestinian leader, Di Matteo painted the 
five canvases one after the other, trying to repeat exactly the same 
gesture in each one. In doing so, not only were the portraits repeated, but 
also the movement, action and necessary performance required for their 
realisation. The gesture itself thus becomes some kind of abstraction of 
painting. The procedure changed slightly for The Blind Man. Each time 
that the portrait was repeated, Di Matteo tried to make it as identical as 
possible to the preceding work, making an effort to remember and repeat 
the exact gestures performed to paint it. What’s key here is not only 
repetition, but the role that memory played in creating the work, 
encountering in this task the evidence that it is impossible to copy art, 
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 Collection Musée d’art moderne et contemporain, Geneva. 
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and especially to copy painting. Painting is an act, an event, which 
implies that it can only be unique. 
 
Fig. 10. Gabriele Di Matteo, The Blind Man, 1998. Installation view at Collection Musée 
d’art moderne et contemporain, Geneva. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Gabriele Di Matteo, Arafat, 1996. Installation view. 
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Di Matteo could remember each gesture, but that gesture was produced 
in a certain moment in time—and that moment is impossible to repeat. 
No matter the level of perfection a certain “copy” can reach, it will 
always be unique. Even if the brief text explaining the work on the 
museum MAMCO’s website27 quotes the Quixote by Pierre Menard, and 
talks about the higher perfection of the copy, as was previously 
explained, talking about the copy in this context is to consider the 
Quixote by Cervantes as ‘an original’ of which copies can be drawn. 
Instead, as already explained, it would be more accurate to consider each 
one of these reproductions, whether they are paintings or scanachromes, 
as repetitions in which there is no identifiable first time, but only 
potentially infinite repetitions, and, the more perfect the repetition, the 
more difference it contains. 
This was also the last time that Di Matteo painted one of his paintings 
himself; from then on, he began to collaborate with the school of the so-
called Commercial Painters in Naples—named due to the fact that they 
can paint up to ten canvases a day using a technique that recalls industrial 
techniques of serialisation, automatisation and standardisation—who 
would execute all of his following projects under his direction. 
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 http://www.mamco.ch/artistes_fichiers/D/dimatteo.html 
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In 2009 he had the opportunity to realise two massive projects. The first 
one, Jackson Pollock: Une vie, éléments et documents, was based on the 
catalogue realised by the Centre Georges Pompidou for the artist’s 1982 
retrospective. The project consists of an artist book—which is almost 
indistinguishable from the original catalogue of the retrospective at first 
glance—a book and a series of paintings based on the photographs that 
illustrated Pollock’s life in the original catalogue.  
 
 
Fig.12. Gabriele Di Matteo, Jackson Pollock. Une vie, éléments et documents, 2009. 
Installation view at SpazioBorgogno, Milan. 
 
Di Matteo completely ignored Pollock’s paintings in this project and 
focused on the documentary aspects of the catalogue, again repurposing 
black and white photographs in black and white paintings, which 
maintained the same proportions, but obviously not the size. The whole 
set of paintings is projected as three editions, so Di Matteo translates a 
 106 
 
mechanically reproducible medium like photography—which usually 
depends on limiting the editions to be able to reach a certain value in the 
market—in a non-reproducible medium like painting. He additionally 
introduces the criteria of the edition, clearly knowing that it doesn’t make 
any sense because the series all have slight differences among them, to 
say the least, and have also been painted by different, more or less 
anonymous, painters. It’s impossible not to feel Duchamp’s influence in 
this case. 
The second project, China: Made in Italy, also presents many different 
layers of possible readings. The project was conceived after Di Matteo 
started working with the group of Commercial Painters.  
 
Fig.13. Gabriele Di Matteo, China: Made in Italy, 2009. Installation view at the Musée 
d’art moderne de la Ville de Paris. 
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The paintings made by the group would generally repeat such themes as 
landscapes, marinas and still life, which would be sold en masse as 
decoration. This school of commercial painters used to be very prolific 
up until the Eighties when Chinese painters displaced them by 
developing the same technique and offering their work for half the price. 
This phenomenon gave Di Matteo the idea to hire a team of these 
virtually unemployed painters to reproduce the most well-known 
paintings from famous contemporary Chinese artists like Ma Liuming, 
Zhang Xiaogang, Yang Shaobin and Zhou Tiehai, to name only a few. 
Such a gesture was a kind of ironic, and hopeless, payback operation. 
The works were reproduced in exactly the same format only in black and 
white, or more precisely, in different tonalities of grey. In this case, the 
series is unlimited and every work has the same price (5.000 euro), 
regardless of its size. The prices begin to rise when a certain work from 
the series is sold and then reproduced. The justification for this pricing 
schema is, according to the artist, ‘due to the mental difficulty of 
reproducing’ (Private conversation with the artist, April 2015). The 
whole project is evidently a kind of joke for the market. Di Matteo 
playfully subverts all of the “rules” that aim to assign a value to an 
artwork and eventually raise it: the uniqueness of the art work, its aura 
(which generates the rise of its value in the market), and the coefficient 
that helps calculate the value of a work according to its size.  On top of 
this, the more an artwork is repeated, therefore losing its uniqueness and 
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value of scarcity, the more it costs. In fact, China: Made in Italy brings 
together two of Marcel Duchamp’s central topics: painting as cosa 
mentale, as opposed to ‘retinal painting’, and the abandonment of 
craftsmanship, because in a certain sense painting is readymade in this 
project, as it was for Duchamp.28 Furthermore, although the work is 
realised by human beings it is made with an industrial technique. The 
project thus performs a mechanisation of craftsmanship, and ultimately 
of human activity. The notion of repetition plays a central role in this 
project because the works Di Matteo decided to reproduce were made in 
an unlimited series, thus enacting a repetition without a real original, and 
of course without copies, as each repetition is a repetition of the 
impossibility of the copy. 
In this sense, it can not only be said that Di Matteo’s painting is in the 
order of simulacra, because all art is, but that as an artist he can be 
considered to be the simulacrum of the painter himself. He reproduced 
not only paintings, but the figure of the painter and his actions. Di Matteo 
detached the cosa mentale, abandoning craftsmanship and distributing it 
in the “painting machines” who work for him. What is this if not the most 
perfect Duchampian operation? 
 
                                                
28
 These topics will be extensively developed in chapter 6. 
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2.6 Hypothesis: The Simulacrum as Aesthetic Limit 
 
If it is accepted that everything is in the order of simulacra nowadays, but 
that this conceptualisation has become of particular interest since the 
advent of digital technologies, it is worth examining what the aesthetic 
possibilities of the simulacrum might be. 
To better explain the slippage of the limit of aesthetic fruition in different 
historical contexts (Trias 1982), the threshold will be defined as the 
boundary between identitary apparatuses, or subjectivities, and otherness 
(Bianchi and Galati 2014). Thus it becomes a viable concept to think 
about extending the possibilities of contemplation in Western art and 
culture beyond certain thresholds as the gradual acceptance of otherness, 
usually theorised as philosophical concepts prevailing at a given time.  
Eugenio Trias observed that in Greco-Roman art the category of the 
beautiful was completely conditioned by ideas of harmony, perfection 
and perfect measure. Anything that could be considered as conveying 
excess, whether formally or conceptually, would not be considered 
beautiful (1982: 19). Therefore, in this ‘constellation’—understood by 
Trias as a historic and aesthetic coherent ensemble (161)—the limit of 
the possibility of obtaining an aesthetic effect was conditioned by what 
could be called an Apollonian measure and perfection.  
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However, the idea of infinitude began to slowly erode the threshold of 
perfection as early as the Renaissance when it could already be detected 
as a kind of limited infinitude, if this oxymoron can be allowed, in linear 
perspective and the vanishing point. A work like the La città ideale (The 
Ideal City)29 (1480-1490), which encapsulates all of the Renaissance 
ideals and can moreover be viewed as a reflexive work in which the 
Renaissance thinks of itself, is the perfect example: a contained, 
measured, perfect city conformed by perfect architecture, yet featuring a 
central vanishing point that can be followed through a potentially infinite 
space. The infinite is already there, contained but clearly present.  
The infinite will, however, be fully accepted and exploited in art during 
the Baroque period (166). The Baroque exceeded the limits of the frame 
in both a literal and figurative sense of representation. Clear examples of 
this tendency are Pietro da Cortona’s ceiling fresco at Palazzo Barberini 
in Rome, Il trionfo della Divina Providenza (1633-1639), in which all the 
representation that has clearly a view from below seems to explode and 
almost fall on the viewer:  framed by a trompe-l’oeil monochrome 
cornice, at the centre the main topic of the Devine Providence is depicted 
on a view to the sky, and from this central representation to the angles 
different figures corresponding to the sub-topics of the work overlap 
apparently exceeding not only the fake architectural limits of the vault, 
                                                
29
 The work is at the Galleria Nazionale delle Marche, in Urbino, it was attributed for a 
long time to Piero della Francesca, now is considered by the Galleria as a work by 
Luciano Laurana. 
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but from the whole ceiling. Such kind of excesses—of shapes, movement 
and space—would have been unthinkable only hundred and fifty years 
beforehand.  
 
 
 
Fig.14. Pietro da Cortona, Il trionfo della Divina Providenza, 1633-1639. Palazzo 
Barberini, Roma. 
 
In the terrain of sculpture it is impossible not to think of Gian Lorenzo 
Bernini and the Ratto di Proserpina (1621-1622) at Galleria Borghese, 
Rome. The figures’ sensuous surfaces, caught in the precise moment of 
the action—not a second before nor after—take the form of an ascendant 
infinite spiral movement: the perfect ideal of Baroque. 
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Fig. 15. Gian Lorenzo Bernini, Ratto di Proserpina,1621-1622. Galleria Borghese, 
Roma. 
 
The Baroque’s focus on the infinite as a ruling concept eventually leads 
the way to Romanticism, which introduces the category of the sublime—
a new aesthetic category and limit whose acceptance was facilitated by 
its forebear.  The category of the sublime, as it is well know, implies the 
acceptance of natural forces that extend far beyond human power. As 
Immanuel Kant conceptualised it in the Critique of Judgement (1790), 
the possibility of fruition in the sublime is enabled by the relatively safe 
position of the subject. According to Kant, the limits of perfection and 
measure have been pushed further and the subject is able to feel aesthetic 
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pleasure at accepting her own limits before the unlimited forces of 
Nature, and in a last instance, the power of God. This is completely new 
compared to the first constellation. All the art considered as belonging to 
Romanticism conveys in one way or another an aesthetic effect derived 
from the sublime. In painting, the perfect and most canonical example is 
Caspar David Friedrich’s painting The Wanderer above the Mists (1818), 
in which a lonely man contemplates from a safe rock a misty, terribly 
inhospitable landscape that looks like a tempest on the sea. Of course, it’s 
a simplification to describe Romanticism only in terms of the sublime, as 
it was a complex movement that involved many other ideas and topoi, 
but for the aim of showing how the slippage of the threshold functions, 
this summary will suffice.30 
There is still a third constellation in Trias’ book that corresponds to the 
advent and diffusion of psychoanalytic theory: the theorisation by 
Sigmund Freud of the existence of an unconscious, and therefore, of a 
hidden cause that guides almost all of the subject’s conscious life. A 
subsequent extension of the aesthetic limit and condition of possibility of 
the aesthetic effect corresponds to this moment, which is delineated as 
the concept of the uncanny (das Unheimlich). In his 1919 essay by the 
same name, Freud defines the uncanny as a feeling that could be placed 
somewhere between fear and disgust, but is nonetheless neither. It’s a 
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 Eugenio Trias book, Lo bello y lo siniestro (1982) explores each constellation and 
passage from one to the other fully. 
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form of unsettledness that is produced when what is well known and 
familiar becomes threatening, more specifically, in the words of Friedrich 
Schelling ‘when something that should have remained hidden, comes to 
the light’ (quoted by Trias 1982: 17). Freud refers here to the effect 
produced by a thing, person or event that makes the subject remember, 
even if only metonymically and by very vague hints, some of what has 
been repressed during the Oedipus Complex. He then enumerates a list of 
“uncanny topics”, namely, topics that very often recreate the feeling of 
the uncanny in the subject that has contact with it/them. This is why 
Freud chose in his essay to use E.T.A. Hoffman’s short story The 
Sandman (der Sandman, 1816) to illustrate his theory because this short 
tale is the perfect compilation of most of these topoi: the amputation of 
one’s limbs, an amputee limb already separated from the body, not 
knowing whether a person is live or inanimate—in other words, if he or 
she is an automaton or a threatening doppelganger; and of course, there is 
the figure of the sandman himself: the evil character that throws sand in 
the eyes of children who don’t behave properly, which bears great 
resemblance to the metaphor of the castration threat during the Oedipus 
Complex.  
In this context, Trias’ theory is that in contemporary art (contemporary in 
1982) the uncanny is the limit and condition of the aesthetic effect: to be 
achieved the uncanny has to be embedded in the work in such a way that 
it can be perceived, but in which it is not completely unveiled (17). If it 
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were unveiled it would be unbearable, if it were completely hidden, the 
work would become dull. Given that he often presents super realist 
sculptures/installations of limbs, or parts of the body “emerging” from a 
wall, like Untitled Leg (1989-1990), most works by American sculptor 
Robert Gober would illustrate this theory. Kiki Smith’s Walking Puppet 
(2008) provides another strong example of Trias’ conception of the 
uncanny. 
 
 
Fig. 16  Kiki Smith, Walking Puppet (2008). Installation, Major Henry Trippe House, 
Chamber Staircase, Brooklyn Museum. 
 
 In cinema, which is the field in which Trias finds the most accurate 
realisation and profitable effect of the uncanny, David Lynch’s Lost 
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Highway (1997) is also a quite exhaustive compilation of uncanny topics: 
the evil sinister white-faced man, the double, and so on. 
 
 
 
Fig. 17. David Lynch, Lost Highway, 1997. 
 
Some years later Hal Foster published The Return of the Real (1996), a 
book that intended to review the state of the artistic field after 1960 while 
avoiding the canonical histories of art that narrate it in terms of 
“progress” or “evolution”, and therefore considered different currents as 
a return of the (repressed) avant-garde, and not as an evolution from it. 
The pages that follow will focus on the fifth chapter, also entitled ‘The 
Return of the Real’. Its analysis will be taken slightly out of context to try 
to consider the return of the real—which will be soon explained—and its 
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correlate in contemporary art, abject art, as a further extension of the 
aesthetic threshold, and therefore, not only of the possibilities of aesthetic 
effect but also of the inclusion of otherness; or to say it in another way, 
of the trespassing of the limits between inside/outside, me/other, 
subject/object. 
The ‘real’ refers to Jacques Lacan’s conceptualisation of the three 
registers that comprehend psychic life: namely, the real, the imaginary 
and the symbolic. In the pre-Oedipal phase the ‘primordial real’ 
corresponds with the subject’s psychic life. After the Oedipal phase and 
thus of the irruption of language, the real becomes completely detached 
from the symbolic order. It can occasionally break into the symbolic 
order as trauma, thus it can be approached only by metonymy, most often 
through psychoanalysis. Therefore, the real is that which can’t be said. It 
is the register that is estranged from language because it cannot be 
symbolised. Conformed by that which cannot be named, nor described, 
the real cannot be accessed by the subject if not in the form of disguised 
glimpses (Johnston 2014). 
According to Foster, there is a contingent of contemporary art that wants 
to make the real visible, at least insofar as this is possible. Foster’s text 
identifies certain contemporary artists who try to remove the veil that 
Trias discussed regarding the uncanny, and who aim at destroying the 
screen (écran) (142)—to update the vocabulary in Lacanian terms. 
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Following Julia Kristeva’s definition of the category of the abject: that 
which is neither object nor subject (149) and is located within the body— 
because the abject is the real manifested in the body, like bodily 
secretions, fluids, and excrements, Foster goes on to say that the abject is 
that which one must get rid of to become an ‘I’, a subject (153). It is a 
phantasmal substance that is not strange to the subject, but on the 
contrary, is too intimate, and thus repulsive at the same time. One can 
easily see the similitude with the category and mechanism of the 
uncanny, only that here the acceptance of otherness, of the rejected, 
seems to be pushed beyond its limits. The object moves towards erasing 
the boundaries of the subject’s body and presenting interior and exterior 
without further screens, or veils. While Foster’s examination of the 
different currents in abject art is exhaustive, for the aims of this research 
it will suffice to observe that his text presents slight differences between 
case studies of male or female artists. While the work of female artists 
such as Kiki Smith usually addresses a stage of non-differentiation from 
the mother’s body, and therefore include materials like human hair and 
bodily fluids, the works of male artists like Paul McCarthy and Mike 
Kelley often point to a regressive infantile stage. 
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 Fig. 18. Kiki Smith, Untitled (Bowed Woman), 1995. 
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Fig. 19. Mike Kelley, Nostalgic depiction of the innocence of childhood, 1990. 
  
 
In Trias’ terms, abject art can be considered as a further challenge to the 
limits of what can be considered aesthetic, of what can be considered to 
have an aesthetic effect, though it cannot be considered as its ‘condition’. 
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The threshold, the limit between one’s subjectivity and the acceptance of 
otherness has been extended again. It is, evidently, a part of 
contemporary art, however not all contemporary art can be said to be 
abject. The fact that most of the production that potentially falls within 
this category is already considered artistic proves the expansion of this 
aesthetic limit.  
 
Departing from this point, I’d like to propose that the advent of the 
digital and the proliferation of simulacra, as defined above, prompt a 
further expansion of this aesthetic frontier. According to Deleuze, as 
outlined earlier in this text, every form of art can be considered 
simulacra. It’s thus more accurate to say that the advent and proliferation 
of digital technologies forced the acknowledgement of reality, whether 
digital or analog, as simulacra. At the same time, it accelerated a certain 
kind of artistic production that actively plays with this concept and forces 
the acknowledgement of the ones that ignored it or neglected it so far. 
These kinds of artistic practices thus collaborate in the process of 
increasing the aforementioned awareness on the one hand, and posing 
further questions on the other. These questions mainly have to do with 
what has already been proposed in this research so far: how does it make 
sense to continue to separate digital and analog, or virtual and material 
realities? Or to put it in other way, can certain (artistic) simulacra place 
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actors in a feedback loop that erases the limits of digital and material? A 
further question connected with the general line of the thinking in this 
section would be: does the conscious exploitation of simulacra in certain 
artistic practices, most often developed within the limits of digital and 
analog, consist in a further extension of the aesthetic limits? And: Can 
there be an aesthetic effect in the use of simulacra as artistic apparatus?31 
In this sense, it can be of interest to analyse and compare two projects 
that utilise the social network Instagram in very different ways: Richard 
Prince’s New Portraits (2014) and Amalia Ulman’s Instagram32 
performance Excellences and Perfections (April-September 2014). While 
Ulman uses (and fully profits from) the platform as the medium of her 
piece, Prince employs Instagram as a source of images. He then utilises 
the images gleaned from this sharing platform to perform a similar kind 
of operation of appropriation that he used in the Eighties (up to 1992), 
perhaps most famously with the Cowboy series, in which he 
photographed the male protagonist of the Marlboro ads. Although Prince 
has been considered the paradigmatic example of appropriation and 
simulacrum (Foster 1996), he finds a place between the work of 
Sturtevant and Ulman. Yet his recent works have neither attained 
                                                
31
 The word apparatus is used here in the Foucauldian sense of dispositive. Although 
Agamben’s elaboration on the concept of apparatus can be considered to be broader 
than Foucault’s—given that Agamben considers to be an apparatus anything that is not 
a living being—, in this context I’d rather use Foucault’s definition to stress the idea of 
the apparatus as a set of relationships and forces, rather than one that includes also 
objects, or things. 
32
 https://instagram.com/amaliaulman/ 
 123 
 
Sturtevant’s level of sophistication in the manipulation of medium,33 nor 
Ulman’s understanding of it. One could instead compare Prince’s use of 
Instagram to using the computer as a writing machine. Following the 
previous observation, the manipulation that Prince performs on the social 
media platform still fosters—even if unintentionally—Baudrillard’s 
conception of the simulacrum as the falsification, appropriation and 
reproduction of an original, “stronger” reality, immersing the viewer in 
this “lie” possibly with the altruistic aim of waking her up. Ulman’s 
performance shows a thorough understanding of the possibilities of the 
chosen social network as medium, and she fully takes advantage of it.  
For his recent project New Portraits (2014), Prince harvested 
photographs on his Instagram feed and ink jet printed them on canvases 
of 165 x 121 cm. He selected the photos from the feeds of celebrities, 
models, actors and singers—mostly female. The prints include likes and 
comments, many of which closed with Prince’s own comments. Unlike 
the Cowboy series, in New Portraits Prince has almost exclusively 
focused on female images who are, for the most part, identifiable 
subjects.  
                                                
33
 In an interview with Steven Lafreiniere on Artforum in 2003, Prince stated: ‘I had 
limited technical skills regarding the camera. Actually I had no skills. I played the 
camera. I used a cheap commercial lab to blow up the pictures’ (72). 
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                  Figs. 20, 21. Richard Prince, New Portraits, 2014. 
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This decision drew harsh criticism in an article published on Artnet from 
writer Paddy Johnson, who described the artist as a sexist troll who keeps 
the last word for himself (2014).34 Perhaps Prince cannot tell the 
difference between appropriating an iconic archetype from corporate 
advertising and an image of an actual person.  The result is clearly not the 
same: the Instagram project generates a pornographic effect that leaves 
the (female) subject of the appropriated image in a passive, voiceless 
situation. This is precisely the kind of critique that the group of female 
artists gathered in an online exhibition like Body Anxiety (2014-ongoing) 
attempted to examine and subvert; significantly, the home page opens 
with a quote by Ann Hirsch stating ‘Whenever you put your body online, 
in some way you are in conversation with porn…’ .35  
Although not part of that exhibition, Amalia Ulman’s Excellences and 
Perfections evidences the kind of mechanisms that allow a project like 
Prince’s to exist, and fortunately to be harshly criticised. 
Ulman had been active on Instagram since 2012, yet suddenly in April 
2014, after posting a plate with the inscription “Part 1” and in a much 
smaller font in the left bottom angle “Excellences and Perfections”, the 
account began to change.  
                                                
34
 The article was published on October 2014 under the title ‘Richard Prince Sucks’. 
Although the poppy and polemic tone of the whole piece can be questionable, most of 
the critiques it contains are founded and well justified. https://news.artnet.com/art-
world/richard-prince-sucks-136358 
35
 http://bodyanxiety.com/gallery/landing/ 
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Figs, 22, 23. Amalia Ulman,  Excellences and Perfections, 2014. Instagram 
performance. Available from: https://www.instagram.com/amaliaulman 
 
Through multiple uploaded photos, captions and hashtags, Ulman began 
to tell the story of a small town girl who emigrated to Los Angeles to be 
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a model. A while after, she breaks up with her boyfriend, runs out of 
money and eventually starts dating a rich older man. During the 
“relationship” she undergoes plastic surgery, including breast 
augmentation, nose correction and Botox sessions, all of which she fully 
documents.36  
As Lucia Peters commented in her article about the work on Bustle 
(2014), Ulman’s first images convey the naïve luminosity of an 
ingenuous girl who seems ‘in love with life’. Yet things begin to get 
more sinister once she moves to Los Angeles, breaks up with her 
boyfriend and begins to insinuate the idea of surgery. Sexy selfies, in 
underwear, in bed, and the like—like the thousands and thousands of 
such images that can be found online taken by models, actresses, actors 
and anonymous teenagers—begin to proliferate. She also starts posting 
images of herself in fancy hotels and restaurants, and of the expensive 
shoes and clothes she is buying, allegedly with her new older boyfriend’s 
money. These photographs still maintain a pinkish filter, until the point 
when she starts taking drugs and abusing alcohol. The photos then get 
darker, and remain so until she reaches her breaking point and goes to 
rehab. After overcoming her addiction, she decides to go back home with 
                                                
36
 Ulman faked the breast operation during the performance, but she did 
undergo a non-invasive nose surgery and received actual botox applications. 
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her parents; and one of the last posts is of the kitchen she dreams of for 
her parents’ house; now she is back living there. 
There are many levels in this artistic simulacrum that are worth noticing. 
First of all, Ulman used her real account to perform the work, subtly 
taking on a new character without clearly announcing it, though offering 
a hint to the more observant. The project, thus far, cannot be found on her 
website, which maintains the possibility of “believing” the story for those 
who may encounter it, while also fully respecting the fact that the 
performance took place on Instagram. Unlike many performances in the 
history of Twentieth century and contemporary art, Excellences and 
Perfections doesn’t need special documentation to be known by the ones 
who were not present, it is already there because its medium is its 
documentation.  
There is an intertwinement between the artist and her character in 
Excellences and Perfections, which unfolds in things that Ulman actually 
did to her body—like undergoing real Botox sessions or learning to pole 
dance—and things that she faked, like the breast surgery. Though this 
can be compared to things that any actor or actress undergoes to prepare 
for a role—gaining and losing weight being among the most common 
avenues an actor pursues to take on the physical demeanour of their 
character—the difference here lies in the conscious use of what can be 
called a strategic use of simulacra. In a theatre, cinema or even in a 
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scheduled performance at a gallery or within any other artistic context, 
there is a tacit contract between the public and performers. In the theatre 
or in the cinema there is a fixed script and, in a performance, the results 
and involvement of the public range in their levels of spontaneity and 
unexpectedness. In the case of Excellences and Perfections, however, the 
artist purposefully played with the majority of the public’s unawareness 
of the simulation, which was fostered by the aforementioned 
interweaving of the real and fake experiences that the artist underwent. 
However, the limits between real and simulated experiences in this 
context may not be relevant. There are actually many people who 
undergo these kinds of experiences, constantly posting what they buy, 
where they go, what they eat—not to mention their bodies—in many 
different, more or less intimate situations. Does the fact that this was an 
invented character actually make a real difference then? This work 
exposes, among other things, just one of the ways in which analog reality 
builds upon the one constructed online, and vice versa. This process is in 
fact the continuity, the co-extensiveness between different planes of 
simulacra.  
Undoubtedly there is an aesthetic effect in the unveiling, and 
understanding, of the (artistic) simulacrum—in the same way that there is 
an aesthetic effect in discovering that a Sturtevant is not a Warhol—but 
this does not destroy it as simulacrum, and does not make the analog, real 
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life, more real or less intertwined with the digital one. It is also clear now 
why, in this context, Richard Prince’s use of Instagram does not only 
seem completely old-fashioned, but also sterile, to say the least. The 
aesthetic effect that one can find in Ulman’s project, in which its 
potentially subversive capacity also resides, is completely lost in Prince’s 
operation. 
Nonetheless, it is not only a question of aesthetic possibilities but also of 
the acceptance of otherness. In this sense, the separation between subject 
(as observer, as actor, as artist) and object (the work, the topic, the digital 
apparatus, Instagram) are broken in Ulman’s work. The limits between 
the subject and object are no longer clear. One builds upon the other, as 
well as the limits between artist, woman and character and the correlated 
images, comments, and responses. These elements have all already 
entered into a continuous feedback loop that results in a complex 
subjectivity, which some years ago Haraway (1991), Caronia (1996) and 
several other theorists named the cyborg. Today, this could be simply 
called the posthuman, a category that no longer distinguishes between 
analog and digital environments or human or non-human actors, but 
rather simultaneously inhabits both.  In this sense, I disagree with 
Johanna Fateman when she asserts that 
A purposely bleak experiment in the merging of brand 
development and gender production, the project offers little 
hope for the progressive potential of social media. While 
most of her feminist post-Internet peers embrace at least a 
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scrap of Donna Haraway’s cyborg dream—the figure of the 
cyborg seems somehow implicit in Schrager’s “fantasies, 
mutants, glitches, nightmares”—Ulman most clearly 
illustrates the pioneering theorist’s grave caveat: “The main 
trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that they are the 
illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal 
capitalism.” (2015: 221) 
 
It is not faith in social media that the work elicits, or needs to elicit, but 
hopefully it directs attention towards the possibilities of exploiting the 
aesthetic, and thus the ethical and potentially subversive possibilities of 
any medium; in this case through a strategic use of simulacra that helps 
reveal and reflect upon the complexity of scenarios and environments 
that can no longer be detached from the complex subjectivities that 
assemble them, and that thus contribute towards assembling in turn. 
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3.	Archive 
 
As already advanced in the previous chapters, the present work will 
consider both memory and digitalisation processes not as forms of 
representation, but as forms of repetition in which difference is 
conveyed. In this sense, there is no “original” and “copy”, whether 
considering mental images, memories or digitised objects, but rather 
‘ontological repetitions’, which ultimately can be considered as a 
question of différance. 
At the same time, the consideration of an (artistic) object’s temporal 
dimension, and not just its spatial one, is fundamental to understand that 
the object only exists in its change, movement, action and 
metamorphosis. Therefore, the digitalisation process can be understood 
as an event. This text proposes that in order for memory, especially in its 
(digital) archival form, to be kept alive—that is to say that to be 
actualised (in the Deleuzian sense), both as a mental image and as part of 
the archive—it needs a subject, the viewer is part of this process and, in 
participating, actualises the event.  Simultaneously this process does not 
only imply keeping events, memories and objects from the past in the 
archive, but it is a projection to the future. As it will be developed below, 
the archive creates the conditions of its own future possibilities of 
existence, and of reading. 
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3.1 Event & Memory 
 
If it is still necessary to re-think the ways in which digitalisation 
processes are conceptualised in order not to fall back into old, false 
dichotomies such as virtual/real, material/dematerialised, and so on 
(Galati and Bianchi 2014), as proposed above, it is also of utmost 
importance to simultaneously re-think what the archive means today, and 
to determine its importance and current validity, if it has one. This text 
argues that it does.  
To start from the beginning, it is worth examining Michel Foucault’s 
definition and conceptualisation of the archive. In the Archaeology of 
Knowledge (1969 [2004]) Foucault proposes archaeology as a 
methodology for studying how certain discursive formations had the 
possibility of emerging at a certain time and in certain conditions, rather 
than others. To achieve this he deconstructs a number of ideas that are 
taken for granted in Western culture, including not only notions like 
tradition and influence, but also the concept of the book, text, work and 
science— every notion that is so embedded in culture at a certain 
historical moment that one can no longer detect it and takes it for 
granted. According to Foucault, such notions have become almost 
transparent. He claims:  
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[…] we must rid ourselves of a whole mass of notions, each 
of which, in its own way, diversifies the theme of continuity. 
They may not have a very rigorous conceptual structure, but 
they have a very precise function. Take the notion of 
tradition: it is intended to give a special temporal status to a 
group of phenomena that are both successive and identical (or 
at least similar); it makes it possible to rethink the dispersion 
of history in the form of the same; it allows a reduction of the 
difference proper to every beginning, in order to pursue 
without discontinuity the endless search for the origin; 
tradition enables us to isolate the new against a back-ground 
of permanence, and to transfer its merit to originality, to 
genius, to the decisions proper to individuals. (23) 
 
To trace and put into practice the archaeological methodology, every one 
of these words needs a theory that can only be built by examining the 
field of statements (énoncés), written or spoken, taken as point of 
departure to build them. Foucault clearly distinguishes between the 
analysis of language and of discourses (discours), in which language is 
the set of rules with innumerous possible linguistic formulations, while 
statements are linguistic formulations that have effectively been realised. 
While the field of study of language tries to identify and set the rules for 
the proper construction of linguistic formulations, the study of the events 
of discourse explores why certain statements have emerged and not 
others (Foucault 1969 [2004]: 100, 101, 106, 156) 
In this sense, the object of an archaeology, as advanced by Foucault, 
consists in the ‘description of the archive, that is to say, of the complex 
of rules that, within a certain culture, determines the emergence and 
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disappearance of statements’ (énoncés) (Sorrentino 2005: xxii).37 
Foucault finds certain sequences of statements in which it is possible to 
identify particular modes of existence, and he focuses on the study of the 
possibilities of these modes of existence that he calls discursive 
formations (formations discursives). A discourse is an ensemble of 
statements that belong to the same system of discursive formation, for 
example, clinical, artistic or legal discourses. These discourses are 
considered as ‘practices that actually and systematically build the objects 
of which they talk about’ (Sorrentino 2005: xxiii).  
This idea is fundamental to later understand how in describing and 
working on a certain object of study, one actually creates and modifies it. 
In a very different theoretical context, it can be related to the second 
wave in cybernetic theory, as described by Hayles (1999), and 
characterised by the concept of reflexivity: There is no possibility of 
observing a system without modifying it, and not avoiding the inclusion 
of the observer within it:  
The second wave of cybernetics grew out of attempts to incorporate 
reflexivity into the cybernetic paradigm at a fundamental level. The 
key issue was how systems are constituted as such, and the key 
problem was how to redefine homeostatic systems so that the 
observer can be taken into account. The second wave was initiated 
by, among others, Heinz von Foerster, the Austrian emigre who 
became coeditor of the Macy transcripts. This phase can be dated 
from 1960, when von Foerster wrote the first of the essays that 
were later collected in his influential book Observing Systems. 19 
                                                
37
 I have translated all quotes from Sorrentino, Vicenzo, 2005, ‘Le ricerche di Michel 
Foucault’, introduction to Foucault, Michel, Antologia, Milano: Feltrinelli. 
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As von Foerster's punning title recognizes, the observer of systems 
can himself be constituted as a system to be observed. Von Foerster 
called the models he presented in these essays "second-order 
cybernetics" because they extended cybernetic principles to the 
cyberneticians themselves. The second wave reached its mature 
phase with the publication of Humberto Maturana and Francisco 
Varela's Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living’ 
(10). 
 
Returning to Foucault, even more importantly, discourses not only build 
the object of the discourse, but also subjectivities: ‘The speaking 
subjectivity, far from sovereignly dominating the enunciative field, 
derives from it the shape the subject assumes: it is the positivity of the 
discourse that constitutes the historical a priori within which both objects 
and subjects are constituted’ (Sorrentino 2005: xxiii).38  Foucault 
emphasises that it is not a question of downplaying the importance of the 
question of the subject, but it is only within a given discursive practice 
that subjectivities can emerge. In this sense, he insists, the idea of a 
‘subject-creator’ is completely outside the context of an archaeology 
because the rules for the emergence of subjectivities, of certain ideas and 
certain discourses, are already embedded in this same discursive field. 
This makes the idea of a creation ex-nihilo, even of original ideas, 
impossible (Sorrentino 2005: xxiii). Moreover, the field of discursive 
practices is intertwined with and partly determined by non-discursive 
                                                
38
 This point will also be fundamental to further explain and ground the theorisation of 
the emergence of a digital subject within the field. 
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practices, so in order to study discursive practices it is necessary to take 
into account, to confront them also with the non-discursive ones. 
In this sense, it is fundamental to remember the historical dimension—all 
the practices, fields and theories that evolve in a certain moment and 
under certain conditions—thus Foucault insists on the importance of 
remembering the instantiation of all these events in a certain moment and 
time. It is precisely this development of discursive practices within 
history that restores discourse’s conception as an event.  
A statement is, in fact, an event, unique and unrepeatable: 
A statement exists outside any possibility of reappearing; and 
the relation that it possesses with what it states is not 
identical with a group of rules of use. It is a very special 
relation: and if in these conditions an identical formulation 
reappears, with the same words, substantially the same 
names—in fact, exactly the same sentence—it is not 
necessarily the same statement. (Foucault 1969 [2004]: 101-
102) 
 
This uniqueness, this unrepeatability of the statement, the statement as 
event is conceptually close to the process of actualisation as it will be 
explained in the following chapter: actualisation can only happen in 
monads, in subjects, and this process is never the same. The same event 
cannot be actualised in the same way in two different monads, nor is it 
going to be actualised similarly in the same one, two, or n different times. 
The introduction of the temporal dimension and of the unrepeatability of 
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the event has been fundamental in the proposed explanation of 
digitalisation processes, and it will also apply to the present argument 
about considering the archive as event: this passage will link this 
research’s line of thought from digitalisation processes, through the 
archive as event, and then, via a discussion of the technological 
unconscious, it will arrive at the digital subject in chapter 5. In the 
Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault explains how a statement 
distinguishes itself from any other linguistic formation by the fact that it 
is always linked to a definite subject that enunciates it (actualises it), this 
subject of the enunciation can be different from the author of the 
statement, or she can be the same, but for an énoncé to emerge as such it 
has to be linked to a determinate subjectivity: 
A statement also differs from any series of linguistic 
elements by virtue of the fact that it possesses a particular 
relation with a subject. […] We must not, in fact, reduce the 
subject of the statement to the first-person grammatical 
elements that are present within the sentence. (103) 
 
To complete the framework within Foucault’s theory, it is important to 
remember that the statement is always interpenetrated by a material 
dimension that, at least in part, constitutes it. Even if it is not evident at 
first glance, or even if it disappears after a while, this materiality is 
constitutive of the énoncé: ‘the coordinates and the material status of the 
statement are part of its intrinsic characteristics’ (113), therefore, time, 
space and embodiment cannot be erased from the conception of the 
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statement without it ceasing to be so. 
In a kind of complementary, even if displaced,39 conceptual continuity 
with Foucault’s thought, it is possible to identify two key concepts in 
Deleuze’s writings that will be useful to develop a theorisation of the 
archive as event: the first is the conceptualisation of Memory as a special 
kind of repetition and in which it is possible to find difference (1968), 
while the other comprises Deleuze’s conceptualisation of the Event 
(1988). 
 As more deeply explained in previous chapters, according to the 
Deleuzian conception of repetition there is no ‘first time’ that is 
considered ‘the Same’ (294) that successively produces a series of 
‘copies’ or repetitions, but rather repetition is what is already repeated, 
and will be repeated: 
Repetition no longer bears (hypothetically) upon a first time 
which escapes it, and in any case remains external to it: 
repetition bears upon repetitions, upon modes and types of 
repetition, in an imperative manner. The frontier or 
'difference' is therefore singularly displaced: it is no longer 
between the first time and the others, between the repeated 
and the repetition, but between these types of repetition. It is 
repetition itself that is repeated. (295) 
 
In this sense, memory cannot be considered as ‘a first time’ or a ‘second 
time’, but instead as a kind of repetition in itself. In fact, memory is one 
                                                
39
 Displaced in the sense that they belong to different planes of immanence. 
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of the two aspects of time Deleuze identifies: Habitus comprises ‘the 
superficial repetition of the identical and instantaneous external 
elements’ (287) and Mnemosyne functions as an internal, deeper form of 
repetition. It is the one that bears the repetition of ‘the internal totalities 
of an always variable past’ (287), and between these two kinds of 
repetition, Difference can be found.  
In this sense, we can understand the archive as an event that keeps a 
second type of repetition alive—perhaps even a digitised memory. 
Mnemosyne, is understood as a kind of repetition that avoids any residue 
of representation. To better understand this aspect, it is necessary to 
explain the second concept, the Event. 
 In The Fold. Leibniz & the Baroque (1988 [1993]) Deleuze defines the 
event as an inflection in the line or point: it is the curvature, the change in 
the plane, the fold itself that constitutes an event (Deleuze 1988 [1993]: 
15). To be more precise, the event not only has to do with the formal but 
also with the temporal and the qualitative characteristics of the object—
in fact, what is most interesting for the purpose of this section is the 
introduction of a temporal dimension in what has already been 
conceptualised as the process of digitalisation. In this understanding of 
the event as inflection, the separation between subject and object also 
disappears: the object becomes an event that can be actualised only by 
the subject. 
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A few pages further, Deleuze elaborates on a very interesting definition 
of the ‘technological object’, stating that this new object is no longer the 
product of industrial standardisation—a possible allusion to Baudrillard 
without naming him— or just ‘the object produced by and for the 
masses’: the new technological object is the one that ‘assumes a place in 
a continuum by variation’ (19). Variation, movement and time are the 
variables embedded in the new technological object as event. 
Furthermore, form, time and matter are put into relationship, thus 
breaking the binary opposition form-matter, by ‘temporal modulation that 
implies as much the beginnings of a continuous variation of matter as a 
continuous development of form’, while moulding amounted for an 
invariable setting up of form; modulation, conveying time, implies 
continuity in perpetual variation (19).     
 The archive as event is then not the cliché of the “virtual archive” as a 
website, mere database or “dematerialised museum”. It is, in fact, the 
possibility of a collective memory, which is both digital and material, 
because it is memory— Mnemosyne, repetition—but it is also event, 
which changes constantly in each actualisation and monad because it is 
‘the Virtual, ideality par excellence’ (Deleuze 1988 [1993]: 15). The 
archive is the event that brings together subject and object, monads and 
the world, in an ever-changing. 
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 It is now possible to see how Foucault’s concepts of statement, discourse, 
discursive practices and archive are possibilities for the emergence of 
discursive practices, which are complementary and coherent with 
Deleuze’s memory and event. These practices are inevitably embodied 
independent of the kind of environment in which they take place, in great 
part due to the fact that the separation between subject and object has 
been overcome. 
 However, it seems necessary to further explore the concepts within this 
framework, which can help build a consistent theory of the archive as 
event. What follows will thus introduce some of the concepts developed 
by Jacques Derrida in two brief, but dense, articles about this topic: 
‘Freud et la scène de l’écriture’ in L’écriture et la différence (1967b), and 
more specifically Mal d’archive (1995)—in the English versions Writing 
and Difference (2005) and Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression 
(1996). 
 The main objective of ‘Freud et la scène de l’écriture’ is to understand 
what in Freud’s psychoanalytic theory exceeds the ‘logocentric closing’ 
(Vergani 2000: 106)40. In doing so, Derrida proposes to understand the 
‘unconscious text’ in Freud as a massive archive, an archive that 
preserves traces of traces, because the ‘unconscious text is already 
interwoven of traces of traces’ (1967b: 314). There is no original text, the 
                                                
40
 All translations from Italian of quotes from Vergani are mine. 
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texts do not have an original nor an origin. Thus in the same way that it is 
impossible to trace an origin in the unconscious, ‘everything begins with 
reproduction’ because these texts are ‘constituted by archives that are 
always already transcriptions’ (314). Derrida also identifies the idea in 
Freud that there is no original, and no representation, but only repetitions, 
traces of traces, in the archive of the unconscious. Even if Freud talks 
about ‘a first time’, this first time also doesn’t have a presence: it is a 
trace, an archi-trace.  
 There are two contradictory tendencies regarding the archive in Freudian 
theory. The first considers the archive as a prosthetic, technological and 
external memory. In this sense, there is a metaphysical return to the 
origin or original, which would be kept in this external prosthetic 
memory. This is exactly what Derrida intends to avoid. The second 
tendency has its root in the concept of  ‘original repetition’, which turns 
the archive into ‘the origin exposed to the outside’ (Vergani 2000: 109), 
it is thus ‘the non-origin that is original’ (Derrida 1967b: 303). This last 
conception indicates that the question of the archive is not only a 
question regarding memory and the past, but is more importantly about 
the future: The archive links past experiences and mourning with the 
possibilities of what is yet to come (110). Mourning in the sense that 
what is kept in the archive of the unconscious—which the subject would 
not be able to access if not by metonymic traces, through psychoanalysis 
or in the form of trauma—in the repressed Oedipus Complex, and thus 
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the mourning of the acceptance of castration, of the impossibility for the 
subject to blend with her object of desire, the father or the mother 
(Laplanche-Pontalis 1967). This intense love is the non-origin of a first 
time that will repeat in different, more or less neurotic forms through out 
the subject’s entire life, but that is not a real first time, it is already a 
trace, an absence, a repetition. The past experiences, sometimes 
traumatic, will create the future ones. In this sense, the archive is alive, it 
is neither fixed nor determined and it allows for creation and 
unpredictability. Its repetitions are not controllable, because they are 
traces, they are pure différance.  
Almost thirty years later, in Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, 
Derrida offers a slightly more literal reflection on the topic of the archive. 
The publication is based on a conference that he gave at the Freud 
Museum in London in 1994, and the issue that Derrida actually addresses 
in Archive Fever is the implication of Freudian theory for the 
conceptualisation of a new archive—and also of Freud’s Museum as an 
archive—of the unconscious as archive, and the archive fever (mal 
d’archive) in itself. The mal d’archive is described then as the 
(unconscious) double tendency, guided by the death drive inhabiting any 
subject in a greater or lesser measure to save, register, remember, keep 
everything—every trauma— in order to repeat it, in similar traumatic 
experiences, like unsuccessful relationships and the like. Somehow 
hidden in the desire to keep lies a second tendency towards erasing, 
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losing, forgetting, and destroying everything that was supposed to be 
kept safe. Thus, the mal d’archive menaces the archive from within, the 
same impulse to conserve is ultimately the drive that will try to knock 
down everything from within41. 
However, what is more interesting in the context of this research is that 
Derrida dedicates the first half of the conference to conceptualise the 
characteristics of the archive in detail. In the first place, he establishes 
that the only meaning of the word archive has to do with its 
‘domiciliation’:  
As is the case for the Latin archivum or archium (a word that 
is used in the singular, as was the French archive, formerly 
employed as a masculine singular: un archive), the meaning 
of “archive,” its only meaning, comes to it from the Greek 
arkheion: initially a house, a domicile, an address, the 
residence of the superior magistrates, the archons, those who 
commanded. (2) 
 
So in this sense, the archive takes place in a clear location, in a home, in 
a certain address. This permanent address is what signs the passage from 
private to public: The possibility of finding the archive, of acceding to it, 
of knowing that it is in that place and not in another, of its becoming 
public, it could be said also shared.  
                                                
41
 Freud names this double tendency reaction formation (in German: Reaktionsbildung). 
Typical of the obsessive neurotic, reaction formation is a defence mechanism, usually a 
certain behaviour, which the subject develops to mask a repressed desire that is 
considered as unacceptable by her (Laplanche-Pontalis 1967). The masking behaviour 
(in this case, to keep) will try to hide the unacceptable desire, typical of the death drive 
(to destroy), which will however find a weakness in the repressive barrier to enact the 
desire. 
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In the second place, Derrida stresses what he calls the ‘power of 
consignation’, not in the sense of depositing or consigning something, 
but in the sense of ‘gathering together signs’:  
Consignation aims to coordinate a single corpus, in a system 
or a synchrony in which all the elements articulate the unity 
of an ideal configuration. In an archive, there should not be 
any absolute dissociation, any heterogeneity or secret which 
could separate (secernere), or partition, in an absolute 
manner. The archontic principle of the archive is also a 
principle of consignation, that is, of gathering together. (3) 
 
Interestingly enough, this aspect of the archive implies that an archive 
should have a certain coherence, follow a certain taxonomy, as Foucault 
has also argued. Yet this suggested guideline to order and read the 
archive, is nonetheless not a call to complete it, as it should not dissociate 
(the user?) ‘in an absolute manner’, because the archive means also 
‘gathering together’. In this sense, and introducing what will be discussed 
in chapter 4 about spaces and places, the archive can be said to work as a 
place—an electronic space for ‘gathering together’. The relative thematic 
looseness of the archive must also leave room for a great deal of 
creativity in both its creation and its actualisation.  
Derrida questions the limit of this exteriorisation: if the archive, 
beginning with the print, is an externalisation of memory—a prosthetic 
memory in Freud’s terms—where does it begin?  The archive is never 
completely external, even if its exteriorisation is determinant: ‘This is the 
question of the archive. There are undoubtedly no others’ (8). 
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Furthermore, when and where does the external archive (as a prosthetic 
memory) begin?  He later remarks: ‘There is no archive without a place 
of consignation, without a technique of repetition, and without a certain 
exteriority. No archive without outside’ (11).  
Most importantly, Derrida asks if the structure of the psychic apparatus, 
of the mind, of the unconscious as well as the conscious and its 
relationship with memory and the perceived events or things, such as 
Freud had studied it and described it with the metaphor of der 
Wunderblock  (the Mystic Writing Pad) (Derrida 1967b, 1995), is 
different, better or worse represented, or influenced by the current 
techno-sciences of storage and reproduction (1995: 15).  
In part, the answer is yes; not in the sense of a better or worse influence, 
but in the sense of a definitive change in what the archive produces. As a 
prosthesis of memory, the archive is not only the place of its storage of 
the past, but it is also a projection to the future, there is no doubt that the 
archive gives shape to its object of storage, with its different structures, 
its different techniques and technologies: ‘The archivization produces as 
much as it records the event. This is also our political experience of the 
so-called news media’ (17). Derrida remarks that it is not so much that 
the archive determines what is conserved, ‘but rather the very institution 
of the archivable event’ (18). Here again, it is possible to think about the 
archive as a construction of the future: one lives a present event 
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according to how it is archived, and its meaning, its ‘archivable meaning’ 
is also structured, modified and determined by the archive’s logic, 
characteristics and structures (18). 
In a certain way, and of course with a very different vocabulary, Derrida 
already foresees what is going to be theorised as the advent of the 
posthuman:  
Neither of these hypotheses can be reduced to the other. 
Because if the upheavals in progress affected the very 
structures of the psychic apparatus, for example in their 
spatial architecture and in their economy of speed, in their 
processing of spacing and of temporalization, it would be a 
question no longer of simple continuous progress in 
representation, in the representative value of the model, but 
rather of an entirely different logic. (15) 
 
In fact, this ‘entire different logic’ entails the changes that most of the 
books quoted in this research, as well as many others, try to account for, 
and to which the present work is trying to contribute: the idea that the 
feedback loops generated between and by subjects and technologies—the 
archive included—produce new kinds of subjectivities as well as 
subjectivities modify the direction of “progress” and research of these 
technologies. 
 Even more interestingly, Derrida conceived the archive, briefly 
addressing the possibilities of a digital archive, in terms of a prosthetic 
memory—nothing new of course—but also as event. In which moment is 
the archive then created? For Derrida it has a hypomnesic sense, it is not 
 149 
 
just memory, an external and auxiliary memory, but it is creative: it 
implies reflection, comments on the margins and constant possibilities of 
modification—it works in fact as a notebook. Moreover, Freud’s 
Wunderblock seems also valid in this case, which even if “erased” on the 
surface, leaves traces in deeper layers: 
I asked myself what is the moment proper to the archive, if 
there is such a thing, the instant of archivization strictly 
speaking, which is not, […], so-called live or spontaneous 
memory (mneme or anamnesis), but rather a certain 
hypomnesic and prosthetic experience of the technical 
substrate. Was it not at this very instant that, having written 
something or other on the screen, the letters remaining as if 
suspended and floating yet at the surface of a liquid element, 
I pushed a certain key to “save” a text undamaged, in a hard 
and lasting way, to protect marks from being erased, so as 
thus to ensure salvation and indemnity, to stock, to 
accumulate, and, in what is at once the same thing and 
something else, to make the sentence thus available for 
printing and for reprinting, for reproduction? (22) 
 
 Obviously the archive is not only conceived in the evident sense of “the 
web as an infinite archive”, or even a library as an archive, but it is being 
conceptualised as a kind of apparatus that is being created and actualised 
every time one writes and presses “Save” on the computer. It is one’s 
modest collaboration with the archive—one’s private ways of avoiding 
destruction and oblivion, even for just a limited amount of time.   
 In this sense, the archive can only exist as an event, as a constant 
actualisation and modification, as a block of notes on which all can 
comment, contribute, alter and consult, but of which it is important not to 
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forget that it is continuously modifying our experience of it, and of its 
contents, as Derrida says, not only of its contents of events of the past, 
but also of the future. This is partly a risk, but also the only interest—of 
an archive as event, of an archive that is somehow alive. 
 
3.2 Memory as Digitalisation, Archive as Event 
 
If one tries to begin to explore more in detail the conditions of possibility 
of the (virtual) archive today, what would be the difference then between 
archive and database? It can be advanced that in the archive there is 
always a certain narrative, the archive tells some kind of story that 
follows a certain logic (or taxonomy)—even when this logic is not 
linear—that can be more or less evident, while the database doesn’t: ‘As 
a cultural form, the database represents the world as a list of items and it 
refuses to order this list’ (Manovich 2001: 199). A narrative then, as 
described in chapter 2, can be considered as a simulacrum, so the archive 
can be a special kind of simulacrum that excludes, of course, any kind of 
representation, even when alluding to other previously well known 
cultural forms, such as the library, for instance. 
In this sense, it is first important to understand that a spatial, non-linear 
conception of the archive is not only more suitable, but also not new. 
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Revising previous conceptual paradigms in this sense can prove useful to 
further developing a fruitful conceptualisation of the archive as event.  
The predominance of a temporal, linear, chronological paradigm that 
coincides with the rise of history as a discipline in the Nineteenth century 
has been, and is being partially undermined by the resurrection of a 
spatial, simultaneous, non-linear paradigm foregrounded by digital logic. 
The antecedents of this paradigm in the history of art can be traced back 
to different models, such as certain cycles of frescoes in churches, 
especially in chapels, and other immersive spatial models, some of which 
were never realised, like the Projet de Cénotaphe à Newton by Etienne-
Louis Boullée (1784).  
A sequential narrative turned out to be particularly 
incompatible with a spatial narrative which played a 
prominent role in European visual culture for centuries. From 
Giotto's fresco cycle at Capella degli Scrovegni in Padua to 
Courbet's A Burial at Ornans, artists presented a multitude of 
separate events within a single space, be it the fictional space 
of a painting or the physical space which can be taken by the 
viewer all in once. (Manovich 2001) 
 
As Manovich shows, some works typically present different events 
within the same pictorial space, even if these occurrences were quite 
removed from one another chronologically.  Sometimes each event has 
its own section of wall, for example in a chapel, in which all of the 
different events can be appreciated at once, and subsequently examined 
individually in greater detail. In some cases with a more immersive or 
 152 
 
coherent narrative logic, one single event or narrative might take up the 
entire space of a single chapel. This logic was not completely erased, 
Manovich says, but for a long time it was relegated to productions of 
popular culture, for example, comics. 
In this sense, a spatial and non-linear representation cannot be considered 
exactly in the same way as an immersive space in which the whole 
narrative is somehow embedded in the same space of its display. In one 
case, the different narratives and concepts expressed by the work are 
accessible simultaneously, but each depicted scene conserves an internal 
narrative logic, while the pretension of (virtual) immersion in a certain 
media entails the intention of ‘diminishing critical distance to what is 
shown and increasing emotional involvement in what is happening […] 
The intention is to install an artificial world that renders the image space 
a totality or at least fills the observer’s entire field of vision’  (Grau 
2003:13).   
The Sistine Chapel is a perfect example of the first case: The walls and 
ceiling of the Chapel are covered by a set of frescoes in which diverse 
scenes from the Old and New Testaments can be simultaneously 
appreciated. Even if each scene has an internal logic and narrative, its 
distribution in the space gives the viewer the possibility of choosing the 
order and the way in which these different narratives will be followed. 
Each single fresco has a narrative, but the whole story can also be 
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appreciated simultaneously and with no privileged order. The Vatican 
website currently offers the possibility of a virtual visit to the Chapel. 
The site is a three-dimensional rendering of the physical space through 
which one can make a 360-degree tour around the Chapel, with the 
possibility of zooming in for close-ups and accessing angles and details 
that would actually be difficult for a visitor to approach in the physical 
space. Hence, the online accessible 3D navigable space of the Sistine 
Chapel becomes a virtual immersive space that remotely offers a non-
linear set of images displayed in the physical space for a potential 
simultaneous reading and navigation.  
A notable example of the second case, an architecture of immersive 
space, presented as a single coherent and continuous narrative embedded 
in this space, is the Newton Cenotaph Project by Etienne-Louis Boullée, 
currently at the Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris. The project for the tomb 
for the mathematician, physicist and astronomer Isaac Newton 
reproduces Copernicus’ heliocentric system. 
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Fig. 24. Etienne-Louis Boullée, Newton Cenotaph Project, 1784. Bibliothèque 
Nationale de Paris. 
 
The building would contain a sphere, symbolic of both the earth and the 
infinite, and Newton’s tomb would be placed in its gravitational centre—
simultaneously alluding to the solar system and the position of mankind 
in the centre of nature. Inside the Cenotaph, the effects of day and night 
would be recreated: the day comprised a luminous glare generated by an 
astrolabe that would irradiate the entire spherical volume from the centre; 
small perforations on the sphere’s surface, simulated the night sky so that 
when the light penetrated, it would reproduce the effect of the stars in the 
firmament. A measured cosmos, an immersive space created in a 
geometrical fashion thanks to Newton’s axioms, and in his honour.  
In the new media landscape, the conception of represented space shifted 
from being a continuous and coherent set in which objects were 
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distributed within the canvas or fresco—such as perspectival 
representations of space since Renaissance42—to the representation of an 
aggregated and discontinuous virtual space of new media objects, which 
are presented as a collection of unrelated elements. This discontinuity of 
the Euclidean space is one of the characteristics of digital media, as will 
be further developed in the following chapter, and it implies a movement 
from the conception of a coherent, prospective and anthropocentric 
space, with a unique, fixed and privileged point of view to a fragmented, 
aggregated space with no privileged, dynamic, ever-changing points of 
view—as is the case, for instance, in virtual reality environments in 
which the point of view constantly changes along with the viewer. 
Therefore, in the spatial model, the privileged point of view of the 
traditional perspective is challenged by the possibility of several ever-
changing points of view. The coherence of this space is not univocal: 
different semantic levels of action and understanding can be intertwined 
and overlapped.  
In this sense, there are two models of archives that are worth revising 
because they seem both suitable conceptual models to understand the 
archive as simulacrum, and as event, considering digitalisation as a 
particular kind of memory, a hypomnesic memory, and its relation with a 
spatial and non-linear logic that is in no way representational.  
                                                
42
 As Derrick De Kerckhove has shown, the development of the linear perspective 
corresponds to the ‘alphabetic brainframe’: it is the translation of a linear and temporal 
logic to space, and it implies a sequential reading (1992). 
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The first one is the Theatro delle Memoria (the Theatre of Memory) as 
theorised by the Italian philosopher Giulio Camillo in the book L’Idea 
del theatro (1554), who, according to Frances Yates, ‘was one of the 
most famous men of the sixteenth century’ (Yates 1966). Yates quotes 
Viglius Zuichemus, who in 1532, wrote in a letter to Erasmus that 
everyone was talking about a certain Giulio Camillo: 
They say that this man has constructed a certain 
Amphitheatre, a work of wonderful skill, into which whoever 
is admitted as spectator will be able to discourse on any 
subject no less fluently than Cicero. [...] It is said that this 
Architect has drawn up in certain places whatever about 
anything is found in Cicero. (Quoted in Yates 1966: 131) 
 
 Camillo dedicated most of his life to the planning and construction of a 
theatre that would allow the people going into it to access all knowledge 
about the universe. The ‘idea of the Theatre’ was fundamentally a 
structure of conceptual relationships rather than an actual building that 
Camillo understood as a spatial representation of chronology. In his 
system, scholars (the “users” of the theatre) become spectators. Above 
all, he conceived of the Theatre as the ideal of pedagogy: the ideas and 
memories it would trigger would be for the education of the spirit above 
all. 
Camillo planned the Theatre organising it in seven sections that map the 
creation of the world. Seven pillars that are those of Solomon’s House of 
Wisdom, symbolise eternity:  
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The Theatre rises in seven grades or steps, which are divided 
by seven gangways representing the seven planets. The 
student of it is to be as it were a spectator before whom are 
placed the seven measures of the world ‘in spettaculo’, or in 
a theatre. And since in ancient theatres the most distinguished 
persons sat in the lowest seats, so in this Theatre the greatest 
and most important things will be in the lowest place. 
(Camillo 1554 quoted in Yates 1966: 136) 
 
 He adapted the model of the real Vitruvian classical theatre to mnemonic 
purposes. The Theatre is thus a vision of the world and of the nature of 
things seen from above, from the stars themselves and even from the 
super-celestial founts of wisdom beyond them. 
 
 
 
Fig. 25. Giulio Camillo, Theatro della memoria, 1554. 
 
 Yet this vision is deliberately cast within the framework of the classical 
art of memory, using the traditional mnemonic terminology. The theatre 
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is a system of memory places, though a ‘high and incomparable’ placing; 
it performs the office of a classical memory system for orators by 
‘conserving for us the things, words, and arts which we confide to it’. 
Ancient orators confided the parts of the speeches they wished to 
remember to ‘frail places’, whereas Camillo ‘wishing to store up 
eternally the eternal nature of all things which can be expressed in 
speech’ assigns to them ‘eternal places’ (Yates 1966: 144).  
 At this point it is necessary to briefly interrupt the analysis on the Theatre 
of Memory and introduce some concepts regarding the sense that it is 
given in this context to the word “memory”. This research will follow 
Jean-Jacques Wunenburger line of reasoning in his book Philosophie des 
images (1997) regarding mnesic images (43). From the moment in which 
the subject is no longer in the presence of the perceived image, this 
image becomes a memory, recalled only in the subject’s mind: ‘the 
principle of conservation of present images remains the classical 
grounding of the theory of memory’ (43). This classical theory of 
memory includes the mnemonic techniques as explained by Yates, that 
used “loci”, or “places”, physical places in actual architectures, most 
often in monasteries, in which to “place” concepts that in this way were 
easier to remember through their spatialisation. However, Wunenburger 
still identifies other modalities in the presentification of the image-
memory: The senso-motorial memory that is linked to habits, to the 
repetition of certain routines through which certain memories are fixed or 
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recalled (44). Then there is the social memory, which implies the 
identification of the past under the form of memory, and it entails a 
comparison between the individual’s present situation and a certain 
situation in the past. It is the kind of memory active, for example, in the 
autobiographical practice, and it includes a selection of the relevant data 
with the correspondent attribution of an emotional charge (44-45). 
Finally, he identifies an autistic memory, which would consist in the 
pathological flow of memories in the autistic subject, which usually 
cannot identify a chronological logic, and which is often painfully and 
emotionally charged (45).  
 Still, the most interesting conceptualisation of the memory of images 
comes from phenomenology and Edmund Husserl for whom 
remembering is the elaboration of present images, of which only the 
referent is located in a past moment. In the conscious activity of memory, 
the image is as present as in perceptual activity, with the possibility of 
arriving to the point in which there is an overlapping of both: the 
perceptual image and the memory of an image of the past (46). In this 
process, an event, a fact or a certain point in a present experience is made 
to coincide with a memory, thus enriching it and giving it a new intensity 
in a ‘retroactive dynamic’ (47). This (seemingly paradoxical) conception 
of the timelessness of memory is complementary with the conception of 
the archive as a projection to the future, considering that the actualisation 
of each past memory occurs when it makes contact with a present 
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impression or perception. In this sense, digitalisation processes, which 
can be of images, but not exclusively, are also memories. They have a 
retroactive dynamic, in fact they enter feedback loops, with other kind of 
memories and materialities, with which they work in a similar fashion: 
reactivating points of contact, overlapping and permitting for new 
intensities to arise. Equally as important, this conceptualisation of 
memory is also compatible with my conception of the archive as event—
as a living, creative, ever changing dimension of memory, which 
constantly moves back and forth between past, present and future. 
 Returning to Camillo and the Theatre of Memory, it can be said that the 
use of loci of classical mnemonic techniques was replaced in Camillo’s 
theatre by ‘eternal places’, which are the figures located in each level of 
it. This theatre was based on the principles of the classical art of memory, 
but Camillo wanted to reproduce the order of eternal truth in this 
building; ‘in it the universe will be remembered through organic 
association of all its parts with their underlying eternal order’ (Yates 
1966: 147). He thought that everything that the human mind could 
conceive, even if not necessarily in the field of physical perception, could 
be put together through serene mediation and then expressed ‘maybe [...] 
by certain corporeal signs in such a way that the beholder may at once 
perceive with his eyes everything that is otherwise hidden in the depths 
of the human mind. And it is because of this corporeal looking that he 
calls it a theatre’ (Yates 1966: 147). 
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Camillo’s project is not a narrative model that conveys representation, 
but one in which the access to knowledge, memory and even more 
importantly, the triggering of ideas in the user can be accessed from 
different angles without the obligation of following a linear and unilateral 
path. Camillo’s Theatre also implies the idea of spatialisation: The 
chronological and syntagmatic narrative logic of (art) history shifts in a 
simultaneous and paradigmatic spatial logic, in a similar fashion to 
computer logic as for instance described by Hayles, according to whom 
sequentiality is built and experimented by the user, but is not inherent to 
the computer logic: 
Sequence is constructed by accumulating a string of present 
moments as the user clicks on links, as if selecting beads to 
string for a necklace. In contrast to this sequence is the 
simultaneity of the computer program. Within the non-
Cartesian space of computer memory, all addresses are 
equidistant (within near and far memory, respectively), so all 
lexias are equally quick to respond to the click of the mouse 
(making allowance for those that load slower because they 
contain more data, usually images). (Hayles 2005: 162) 
 
In this sense, this model, and the one that follows, perfectly work as the 
place for ‘coming together’, but their possible readings retain the 
looseness that Derrida also talks about. They are precisely non-linear 
models, which are complementary with the idea of a living archive, an 
archive as event. 
The second model, perhaps better-known, is Aby Warburg’s Mnemosyne 
Atlas (1924-unfinished). In his conference ‘Aby Warburg (1866-1929). 
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The Survival of an Idea’, Mathias Bruhn talks about Warburg’s 
Mnemosyne Atlas, observing that 
 
Warburg was a technophile. He was interested in 
telecommunication, the press and traveling; all these new 
technologies enabled new forms of traveling, but also 
prolonged the old idea of migration that connected 
civilizations from the beginning. Technology, for example in 
the form of printing, was also the direct link between Dürer’s 
engravings and the 28 telephones in his avant-garde library 
building. He had already written an article entitled ‘Airship 
and submarine in medieval imagination’ that suggested that 
former societies had anticipated what he called ‘vehicles of 
thought’ and imagination that we dispose of today. Images 
were their vehicles. (Bruhn n.d.) 
 
Remarkably, in the same way Warburg interpreted some medieval 
images as predictive of the airplane and submarine, his whole library 
project, but especially his Mnemosyne Atlas, predicted somehow the 
logic of the hyperlink and of the Web. 
The Mnemosyne Atlas is centred on images: a figurative atlas composed 
of more than two thousand plates or screens; each plate is formed by 
photomontages on wooden boards that bring reproductions of different 
works, especially from the Renaissance, as well as an archaeological 
repertoire and visual material from daily life, such as newspapers.  
The project was born from Warburg’s own non-linear thinking and thus 
from his need of presenting simultaneously—almost three-dimensionally 
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distributed in space—all kinds of relations and multiple forms of 
classification of images during his conferences and while writing and 
studying.   
 
 
                                           
 
Figs. 26, 27. Aby Warburg, Mnemosyne Atlas, 1924-unfinished. 
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Thus, the Mnemosyne Atlas was aimed at creating relations and bringing 
memories in rapport with each other, not only in a linear, but also in a 
concomitant and transversal fashion. It was due to Warburg’s need of 
combining (linking) heterogeneous elements and categories, and desire to 
access these elements simultaneously. 
These models, as utopian as the projects might be considered, share 
incredible and almost predictive similarities with what today can be 
called virtual archives, where the possibility of accessing information has 
an analogous structure even if the materiality of the support is obviously 
different. Such archives are most notably found on the web, but are not 
exclusive to it.   
Considering more current examples of archives, both digital and not, may 
serve to show the relevance and interest of the aforementioned antique 
modes of archive, which nonetheless retain a certain currentness. These 
examples can be of use not to fall into the aforementioned ‘Narcissus 
Narcosis Syndrome’ (McLuhan1964: 41). 
That is to say, it is important to be aware that the different kind of 
archives that we deal with on a daily basis—for example, many of 
applications and social media—are therefore not only keeping some 
memories (and not others) alive, but they also help to build what is yet to 
come in some way or another. In fact, leaving aside issues of privacy, 
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control and excessive exposure—which have been, and are exhaustively 
discussed and analysed extensively elsewhere—a more pertinent question 
emerges within the context of this research: What kinds of archives does 
one interact with today? What kind of subjectivities do they build? What 
kind of future will they construct, at least partially? Do they contribute to 
multiplicity, to complexity and the diversity of thoughts?  Do they trigger 
creative associations, as their precedent models obviously did? Many of 
them certainly do, and of course some others do not, so it is worth 
analysing a few of them. 
An iPhone application like Memoir (figs. 30, 31), for instance, gathers 
together information from all other apps allowed by the user, such as 
Instagram, Facebook, Twitter and the cell phone’s own camera, to show 
her/him which are her/his memories from n years ago. Memoir thus 
features what the user had posted, or photographed that same day one, 
two, or n years ago, and then, scrolling down, around the present date, in 
different years. Even when certain photos have been erased from the 
camera, or from a certain related app, Memoir will feature them. It will 
also keep memories from an associated Facebook account even if the 
account has been closed. Therefore, it works as an archive of archives, in 
the sense that it gathers “memories” from other apps that can potentially 
also be considered as archives, while also allowing the “creation of 
memories” as one of its features, thus enabling the user to put memories 
(posted photos, phrases, links or videos) together as she desires. Even 
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when a certain photo or post wasn’t considered interesting or worth 
keeping and remembering, the app will nonetheless present it there. Thus, 
in a certain sense, this operation functions similarly to an individual’s 
memories: one is not always, or is rather seldom, able to forget or 
remember what one chooses.      
 
        
 
Figs. 28, 29. Memoir App, mobile screenshots. 
 
It seems valid to observe that, if following Foucault, the archive is 
considered as the set of rules that allows certain statements to emerge as 
opposed to others and to also determine how statements disappear, these 
apps are the set of rules that keep certain “memories” and not others, 
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because if not the archive, they are one kind of archive. In this respect, 
the analysis of the technological unconscious that will be formulated in 
the next chapter seems of utmost relevance. In the feedback loops 
established between what Manovich called ‘the computer layer’ and the 
‘cultural layer’ (2001: 63), or between algorithmic logic and 
subjectivities, a further expansion occurs in the level of complexity of 
what was previously “managed”, erased or remembered, in great part by 
human unconscious mechanisms.43  
A more intricate and controversial example can be found, of course, in 
Facebook. Facebook does work as a kind of archive, even if a highly 
problematic one: problematic from different points of view, the most 
obvious being that of the construction of subjectivities. Because 
Facebook’s algorithm is more arbitrary, from the user’s point of view, 
than the one of the previous example, which follows the sequence of 
memories according to a quite strict chronological logic. 
Considering it from the archival point of view, so to speak, and not 
strictly as a social network, Facebook keeps all the photographs archived 
in albums; however, what it chooses to keep visible in one’s “Timeline” 
follows the logic of its algorithm, which is kept more or less secret to its 
users. One can guess that it has to do with the number of “likes”, reposts, 
and so on, but actually, as a set of rules, they are not clear, nor, it could 
                                                
43
 This is also why the next chapter will propose to talk about complex subjectivities 
and environments. 
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be said, “historically” justified, not to mention that it doesn’t offer the 
user the slightest chance to customise it44. The same is valid for 
Facebook’s newsfeed: algorithms that choose certain images and posts 
rather than others set the rules of the archive. This functions 
independently of any logic that contemplates the user’s will or interest. In 
this sense, Hito Steyerl observed that as smart phone cameras are low-
quality there is an algorithm that corrects all the noise in the photos they 
take. What does it do precisely?  
Very simple. It scans all other pictures stored on the phone or 
on your social media networks and sifts through your 
contacts. It looks through the pictures you already made, or 
those that are networked to you and tries to match faces and 
shapes. In short: it creates the picture based on earlier 
pictures, on your/its memory. (Steyerl-Jordan 2014)45 
 
This mechanism is not letting the user register what she might be seeing 
but instead recreates what it “assumes” she might like to see, as Steyerl 
puts it: ‘it is a mixture of conservatism and fabulation’, the real problem 
with this is that ‘it makes seeing unforeseen things more difficult’. This 
has two main consequences. The first addresses how the potential power 
for (new) knowledge that the technological unconscious might possess is 
limited, and at times even blocked, which will be explored in more depth 
                                                
44
 What the user can do is to change the preferences settings to have a strictly 
chronological feed; however, the app will periodically insist to change to the news feed 
“selected” by the algorithm. 
45
 http://dismagazine.com/disillusioned-2/62143/hito-steyerl-politics-of-post-
representation/ 
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in the following chapter. The second point, again, concerns limiting the 
power of the archive to project towards the future, not in the sense that 
the archive “conditions” the future—which it does in part—but in the 
sense that it opens possibilities to create as already theorised.  
Going back to Facebook, its algorithm certainly works this way in part. 
What can be deduced from observation of the newsfeed, is that it tends to 
show information and posts about the contacts that the user interacts with 
most often. It tends to neither show anything new, nor fostering contact 
or knowledge about people with which the user does not already have 
some kind of fluent contact or interest. It also works in other questionable 
ways, such as the controversial case of the Facebook experiment that 
altered the algorithm to 689.000 users without their consent to research 
emotional contagion46. It also seems valid, if not urgent, to ask in this 
case what kind of archive Facebook is—moreover, what kind of future 
and archival object does this platform create? The hypomnesic function 
of the archive in this sense seems to be completely lost. Instead of 
functioning as a sort of notebook, in which subjects can record memories, 
but also re-work and create them, it doesn’t seem too far-fetched to 
advance that a similar interaction with these kind of apparatuses, from 
the side of the producers as well as from the users, helps constitute and 
                                                
46
 The experiment was part of research conducted with academics from Cornell and the 
University of California. The result was the paper “Experimental evidence of massive-
scale emotional contagion through social networks” by Kramer, Guillory and Hancock. 
The full paper is available from: http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788.full 
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project partial subjectivities that somehow get stacked in a loop that 
‘makes seeing unforeseen things more difficult’, as Steyerl mentioned 
about digital images, but that is not of course limited to those, as we have 
already shown.  
Nevertheless, the fact that other kinds of cultural productions working as 
archives exist, such as the Future Library, gives some hope. The Future 
Library47 is a complex artistic project by Scottish artist Katie Paterson. 
Paterson worked together with the New Public Deichmanske Library on 
the project, Norway’s largest library, for which she planted an entire 
forest near Oslo that will supply paper for the publication of a series of 
books in one hundred years. Each year, an internationally recognised 
writer will be commissioned to write a text for the library; in the 
meantime, the Deichmanske Library is responsible for keeping the texts 
until the date of publication in 2114. Margaret Atwood has written the 
first text; the second has been recently commissioned from David 
Mitchell; all of these texts, and the ones to follow in the coming years, 
will remain unknown and unpublished for a hundred years. A committee 
has been established, which will change every ten years, to be in charge 
of the nomination of the author each year, to maintain the forest, and to 
preserve the texts to come. Ironically enough, in a conversation with 
Margaret Atwood on Artforum, Paterson also used the word ‘fabulation’, 
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 http://www.katiepaterson.org/futurelibrary/ 
   http://www.futurelibrary.no/ 
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like Steyerl did when referring to the camera algorithm, but in this case it 
has a completely different resonance: 
Future Library is a speculative fiction. We have no idea if the 
forest is going to exist in one hundred years. What will be 
extinct? What will live there? The new Oslo Deichmanske 
Library is trying to project itself into the future and imagine 
what kind of institution it will be. Right now, we have trees 
growing and budding, the library room is being built—but the 
future is a fabulation. Its readers and writers don’t exist yet. 
Then there’s a point where I will die, of course. Somebody 
pointed out that Norway might not be a country by then. We 
really cannot predict. And Margaret has put it into my mind 
that maybe humanity won’t even exist! (Peterson-Atwood 
2014: 263) 
 
In this case, the ‘fabulation’ is not conservative and limiting, but it 
implies a complete projection to the future. In fact, the Future Library is 
the archive projected to a time yet to come, if it comes, as Atwood 
doubts. The archive consciously and laboriously creates its own content, 
not simply as memory, but literally as an unpredictable, in part, 
fabulation and creation of this future, leaving in this process a sort of 
mysterious legacy; mysterious in the sense that it is unknown to 
contemporary subjects at the moment of its production, and probably 
even for most of the “archive keepers”. At the same time, even if the 
artist has planned and implemented the conditions of the project’s 
conservation, creation and survival in every detail, a high level of 
indeterminacy and unpredictability is not only tolerated, but is a 
constituent part of the work. The context in which the project will 
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continue to develop in the near and not-so-distant future is impossible to 
predict and control. In this sense, the Future Library works in a similar 
fashion as, for example, the Theatre of Memory and the Atlas 
Mnemosyne: it seeds and triggers some ideas, images and basic 
guidelines, but leaves the rest to be developed and created without 
controlling or limiting its infinite possibilities. This is the true sense of 
the word virtual for these archives, of infinite possibilities of creation and 
actualisation.   
To conclude, the conception of the archive as proposed in the present 
chapter therefore conceives of it in terms of event. For the archive not to 
become a fossilised apparatus it must be conceived as a unique and 
unrepeatable event that is actualised by subjectivities in a different way, 
but which in turn not only structures the material—namely the memory 
that it is keeping, archiving, in the sense of a past memory—but also its 
own conditions of possibility in the future: it is an event projected to the 
time to come. And it is memory in the sense of hypomnesic memory: it 
works as a notebook, as the recording of thoughts, of knowledge, but not 
fixed, frozen thoughts or knowledge: it is re-created and revised each 
time. Because as the example of the Theatre of Memory intended to 
illustrate, the archive triggers and produces new possibilities with each 
actualisation in each individual subject. The archive has a certain 
coherence, it forecasts certain lines of reading, but these lines are never 
unique, absolute or closed. They work more like suggestions or excuses 
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to create—its non-linearity allows for creation and thus for uniqueness. 
In this sense, the archive, even when digital, is always instantiated and its 
materiality, even when not evident, is part of its structure. The archive is 
historical, its being an event that is precisely the dimension which 
instantiates it in a certain materiality and in a precise moment in time.  
Therefore, in the aforementioned examples, it was not a question of one 
archive being “good” and the other “bad”, but a question of which kind 
of future memories, and therefore subjectivities, these archive partially 
determine and what kinds of interaction and production they partially 
allow. Previously, McLuhan and the Narcissus Narcosis Syndrome was 
mentioned, the Syndrome implies the complete enthrallment with the 
medium: the impossibility of seeing its effect on individuals and the 
environment and social relationships at large in the moment in which a 
certain medium is pervasive and dominant. It is then worth remembering 
that, for McLuhan48 (1964: 78), the only one capable of detecting these 
effects in advance, whether positive or negative, was the artist. This can 
help explain why a project like the Future Library opens so many 
questions about the archive while not necessarily answering them, rather 
than promoting a narcissistic feedback loop. 
Finally, a conception of the archive as event can serve as a strategy to 
                                                
48
 Also for Jack Burnham the role of the artist in current times would be that of 
preparing society for the rapid discoveries and changes regarding the moment of a 
‘post-biological logic for technological development’ (Burnham 1968).  
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consciously—as far as it is possible—use, interact, build and, surely, be 
constructed, interpreted and used in our interaction, intertwining and 
actualisation of the different modalities of archives that can be 
encountered. 
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4.	Technological Unconscious & Floating Signifier 
 
The present chapter intends to delineate what has been identified as an 
unavoidable relationship to explain and understand a basic incongruity 
between language and the world, or more precisely in this context, 
between the digital and the physical—namely, the relationship between 
floating signifier and technological unconscious. As conceptualised by 
Peirce, there is a hard-core of the sign that does not signify, and at the 
same time, there is a non-symbolic dimension of the world that cannot be 
translated in language. Lévi-Strauss theorised that the floating signifier 
aims, precisely, to cover this flaw (1950). Therefore, the floating signifier 
appears as a suitable concept not only to better understand digitalisation, 
but also the relationship between art, technologies and the conformation 
of subjectivities. In this sense, the floating signifier is not simply a 
signifier able to be emptied with any meaning, but is becomes a “place” 
for the constitution of subjectivities. The role of technologies, in a very 
broad sense, and of art in this processes will be soon become apparent. If 
art has always had a preponderant role in the constitution of 
subjectivities, at the present moment the interplay between art, 
technology and subjects undoubtedly needs further analysis. In this 
context, the role of the floating signifier does not have to be related to art 
and artworks considered as simply empty signifiers to be filled with any 
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meaning (or desire) the subject wishes to project on it, but on the 
contrary, it offers the link (and possibly the key) to understand how the 
construction of subjectivities can unfold and change in and through 
technologies.  
This is the reason why in the first place I propose to delineate the 
conceptualisation of a technological unconscious following its genealogy 
from Sigmund Freud (1925; 1930 [1962]), Walter Benjamin (1935), 
Jacques Lacan (1955 [1991]), Jacques Derrida (1967b), Franco Vaccari 
(1979), Vilém Flusser (1983), Rosalind Krauss (1993) to Antonio 
Caronia (2006), to suggest that there exists a stratus in technology and in 
the processes of interaction with it that is not accessible to human 
thought, but that it is however symbolically structured (Vaccari 1979). 
Because the structures of these inaccessible layers of technology and 
technological processes have been designed, programmed, modified, 
used by subjects who have distributed their cognition all along the 
systems (Hayles 1999; 2005), one of the most important features of the 
technological unconscious is its collective dimension (Vaccari 1979). 
Thus this collective dimension is not only embedded in the technological 
unconscious structure, but it plays an important role in the constitution of 
new subjectivities.  
At this point, and to explain how the conformation of new subjectivities 
comes about, I compare, and ultimately assimilate, the technological 
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unconscious to Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisation of the plane of 
immanence (1991) because both work as ‘an abstract machine’ (36), as a 
processor, so to speak, that works independently of the subject’s will, or 
of the meanings that arise in it. 
Then, how is this new subjectivity conformed? How does it unfold in the 
plane of immanence of the technological unconscious? It is necessary to 
think in terms of space, although not of an Euclidean space, but of an 
electronic one: The abstract machine of the technological unconscious 
works as the ‘place’ (Hillis 1999: 62-3) in which new subjectivities are 
constituted by their coming to a point of view (Deleuze 1988 [1993]). If 
to become a subject it is necessary to assume a point of view, in the non-
space of electronic spaces the floating signifier has the specific task of 
creating a point of view for the constitution of a digital subject, of a 
subject who is embodied in the digital, as it will be developed in the 
following chapter. 
 
4.1 The Floating Signifier 
 
In his ‘Introduction a l’oeuvre de Marcel Mauss’ (1950) Claude Lévi-
Strauss defined mana as the magical mystical substance that comprises 
magic, and which has ‘an undetermined quantity of signification, in itself 
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void of meaning and thus apt to receive any meaning’. The term mana 
gave origin in semiotics to the concept of ‘floating signifier’ to talk about 
a signifier without any referent, an empty signifier that can potentially be 
filled with any meaning.  
Jeffrey Mehlman clearly explains in his article ‘The Floating Signifier: 
From Lévi-Strauss to Lacan’ (1972) that the signifier is the structure of 
language itself while the signified is the known. The world ‘means’ 
(signifies) since the beginning, and humankind expects to ‘know’ it, this 
unfitness between the synchronic (the structure of the world) and the 
diachronic dimensions (what humankind can know about it) are covered 
by the floating signifier: the floating signifier has a semantic function, 
which is to overcome the overspill (surabondance, in the original in 
French) in signification between language and the world, allowing 
symbolic thought to operate within it. In modern Western culture this 
function has been taken over by science, yet in ancient tribal cultures, 
such as the ones Lévi-Strauss was studying, this was the mission of 
magic (Caronia 2006). 
Therefore, the floating signifier also seems a suitable concept to explain 
the corresponding incongruity and overspill happening in digitalisation 
processes, and in the digital in general, which is also consistent with what 
has been exposed so far in order to overcome dichotomies like 
digital/material. First of all, the incongruity is obvious, as has been 
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explained above in terms of difference and repetition for any digitised 
element. Secondly, and increasingly more often, it is possible to find for 
the digital an ontology of its own in which no material referent is to be 
found and a particularly strong abundance of floating signifiers can be 
encountered—signifiers with no symbolic value that can be filled with a 
myriad of signifieds. One need merely think of the nearly infinite range 
of profiles and avatars that any individual can open at any time, which 
can be filled with any content. These are evidently working as empty 
signifiers able to be filled at any time with any signified. While profiles 
and avatars are possibly the most evident examples, they are not the only 
ones. Devices and apparatuses can also work in the same way. 
As proposed in a previous work (Galati and Bianchi 2014), an example 
of this phenomenon is the screen working as a floating signifier: when 
the screen is (mistakenly) confused with an image, and not fully 
understood as a simulacrum as proposed in the second chapter, it works 
as a kind of (potentially dangerous) floating signifier, because it remains 
thus inscribed in the fiction that the screen can be whatever one wants. 
The screen thus becomes a TV, an audio set, a cinema, a museum, a map, 
a notebook, plus a “group of friends”, one’s personal diary; the screen is 
then asking us to fill it, to touch it, constantly, to load it with contents, 
meaning, and, ultimately, with desires. In fact, one of the most risky 
effects of a screen when working as a floating signifier is the illusion 
created by one’s desires that the screen is desiring us in turn, that it is 
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actually asking us interact with it, to answer messages, to post things, in 
summary, to give it our attention. Within the context of a different 
theoretical framework and dealing with two specific kind of apparatuses, 
robots and social media, Sherry Turkle (2011) was criticising a similar 
type of phenomena: the development of empathy towards robots, and a 
complete dependence of smart-phones and connectivity in general. These 
are shown by the author as palliatives for flaws or lacks that one is not 
willing, or able, to face and deal with. Flaws and lacks, voids, they could 
be called, that can be erased each time with the most suitable palliative, 
which is very often the desire to be desired. However, it can serve to be 
aware that these are often projected desires—some of the infinite 
meanings that can be given to a floating signifier and some of the infinite 
roles or needs it can cover—like the illusion emotional reciprocity with a 
robot. The danger though lies in the power it can have over us, because 
as stated above, mana is the magical substance of which magic is formed.  
It is not by chance that art, since the origin of humankind, had a similar 
function to that of mana: magical, and then eventually religious. 
Especially because of this, I propose that neither devices, such as the 
screen, nor art, should be considered in this context as floating signifiers 
on which to project one’s desires; but that art, on the contrary, has an 
ethical and thus potentially subversive power in the conformation of 
subjectivities, such as I exemplified with Amalia Ulman’s Excellences & 
 181 
 
Perfections in the second chapter, or with Katie Paterson’s Future 
Library in the previous one.  
 
Even if not literally talking about floating signifiers, Gilles Deleuze also 
treated the unfitness between language and the world in his book La 
Logique du sense (1969). To explain the creation of sense, Deleuze talks 
about series, about two series of cultural elements that combine and 
intersect producing meaning in the points of encounter. However, there is 
also an exceedence in the series that encounter, the series never 
completely fit. One series, the one corresponding to the signifier, always 
presents an excess over the other, but it is this same excess that permits 
the circulation, displacement and thus the generation of meaning among 
them, this very overspill is what generates sense (40). Deleuze 
exemplifies how series and the production of sense works with Lacan’s 
comment on the short story by Edgar A. Poe ‘The Purloined Letter’ 
(1845) in which the signified series displaces in the signifier: the letter 
that cannot be found that was all the time in plain sight to everyone—but 
that occupies a different role, and thus is filled of different meaning, 
according with its change of position in the story and of the point of view 
of the different actors. Some lines ahead, Deleuze’s example of Alice in 
the Sheep’s shop (41) also illustrates how the series that combine are 
those of an empty space—thus the series that coincide with the floating 
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signifier, and those of continuous displacement— therefore the ones 
corresponding to the different signifieds. Alice looks to the empty shelf 
trying to “catch” the brilliant thing that is always on the move, always on 
another shelf. In this sense, meaning is produced in the overspill, or 
better, thanks to it—but it is also always “on the move”, it is never fixed, 
nor static, it changes, and can be hardly be grasped. 
 
4.2 The Technological Unconscious 
 
With his article ‘Civilization and its Discontents’ (1930 [1962]), 
Sigmund Freud is possibly the first to write about technological 
innovations as prosthetic limbs that humankind has developed to operate 
in the world enlarging its powers. Freud suggested that every tool 
humankind has created since its origins has been meant to extend its 
powers over the world: 
 […] Long ago he formed an ideal conception of omnipotence and 
omniscience which he embodied in his gods. To these gods he 
attributed everything that seemed unattainable to his wishes, or that 
was forbidden to him. One may say, therefore, that these gods were 
cultural ideals. To-day he has come very close to the attainment of 
this ideal, he has almost become god for himself. With every tool 
man is perfecting his own organs, whether motor or sensory, or is 
removing the limits to their functioning. […]  
Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God. When he 
puts on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but those 
organs have not grown on to him and they still give him much 
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trouble at times. […] Future ages will bring with them new and 
probably unimaginably great advances in this field of civilization 
and will increase likeness to God still more. ([1930] 1962: 37–39) 
 
This quote, not only “foresees” how civilisation brought humankind’s 
capabilities even closer to those of a god—which can be seen, for 
instance, in how digital technologies allow a phenomenon such as 
ubiquity through avatars and projections of the body—but also opened 
the path for the theorisation of a technological unconscious as follows. 
In this regard, Walter Benjamin picks up Freud’s assertion and observes 
that photography, enlarging the power of sight, has created a sort of 
‘optical unconscious’ that permits one to see what the eye is not capable 
of. For instance, the human eye cannot perceive that when a horse is 
running, at a certain point, all of its body is suspended in the air. That 
moment can be captured and revealed to the human eye by the camera: 
the possibilities of human vision enlarged to almost-divine capabilities by 
the photographic device. But his analogy with Freud’s theory does not 
end there. The optical unconscious is similar to the subject’s unconscious 
because it evidences a nucleus—in this case in the capabilities of the 
eye—that is not accessible to the subject (Benjamin 1935). Freud’s 
theorisation of the unconscious is the first step in the process of the 
crumbling away of the ‘liberal humanist subject’ (Hayles 1999), given 
that according to the theory of the unconscious the subject is guided in 
most of its actions by forces that it cannot account for; in the same way in 
 184 
 
which the optical unconscious is that part of the sense of sight that cannot 
be accessed by the subject without the help of a machine. Benjamin’s 
conceptualisation of the optical unconscious was the first in art history in 
which art made with machines is considered to develop, project and 
produce objects typical of a given technology engaged in a cybernetic 
cycle with a human agent, and of course it will be fundamental for 
further reflections on what could be called the aesthetical autonomy of 
certain technologies, as will be shown.  
In this context, it is also pertinent to recall Derrida’s analysis of the 
relationship between machines and psychic apparatuses, which was 
already noticed by Freud in a letter to Wilhelm Fliess (Derrida 1967: 
335-337). Already then, Freud had the impression, when describing the 
representation of the psychic apparatus, of being faced with a machine 
that could work by itself, independently from the subject’s intentions. 
Yet although the machine can work autonomously, it doesn’t in any way 
have its own energy, which means that it is dead. Thus, what has an 
independent way of working is the psychic apparatus and not its 
representation, the machine, which are both synonyms of death for 
Derrida (335). The machine in this sense is pure representation—
representation of thought—because a machine cannot, at least yet, ever 
work by itself; it always needs an external source of energy and input. As 
Derrida remarks, this is the first objection that Freud found in his 
comparison of the Wunderblock and the way in which the psychic 
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apparatus works: ‘There must come a point at which the analogy between 
an auxiliary apparatus of this kind and the organ which is its prototype 
will cease to apply. It is true, too, that once the writing has been erased, 
the Mystic Pad cannot “reproduce” it from within; it would be a mystic 
pad indeed if, like our memory, it could accomplish that’ (Freud 1925: 
230). Thus Freud identified a part of psychic processes that worked in a 
similar way as the machine, but in no way assimilated the machine to 
human agency. At this point Derrida begins to go through the questions 
that Freud did not ask, even though his theorisation brought him to the 
limit of what can today be considered the only questions to ask. In the 
first place, if the machine is not, evidently, the psychic apparatus but only 
its representation, how has it increasingly begun to ‘resemble memory’ 
(Derrida 1967b: 337)? The second fundamental question is about 
metaphors—which defined ‘in this case the analogy between two 
apparatuses and the possibility of this representational relation’ (337)—
and the necessity, that had evidently emerged, of creating an additional 
and representational prosthetic psychic apparatus, the machine, in order 
to ‘supplement its finitude’ (337). In Derrida’s terms prosthetic memory 
as a representation of the psychic apparatus is related to death, thus 
paradoxically—and here it is possible to detect an analogy with the mal 
d’archive as explained in the third chapter—the creation of a prosthetic 
memory that aims at avoiding the oblivion of death has its origin in death 
itself, namely, the machine and the representation of psychic processes 
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and memory. 
Freud’s ideas as outlined above and Benjamin’s comparison between the 
optical unconscious and the subject’s unconscious are crucial, and led 
Italian media theorist, mathematician and philosopher Antonio Caronia to 
talk about a ‘digital unconscious’ and to ask if, accordingly, digital 
technologies, more specifically the computer, could not reveal 
something, or everything, to humankind about how the unconscious 
works (Caronia 2006). As a matter of fact, it did: More recently John 
Johnston has convincingly demonstrated how cybernetic theory was 
fundamental for Jacques Lacan in his theorisation of the three registers of 
the I, namely, the symbolic, the imaginary and the real. 
In The Allure of the Machinic: Cybernetics, Artificial Life and the New 
AI (2008), Johnston dedicates a whole chapter to explain the (little 
known) relevance of cybernetic theory and the universal Turing machine 
for Lacanian theory. He more specifically addresses how Lacan got to 
advance that the symbolic order worked as an universal Turing machine: 
Turing’s thesis states that every task that can be expressed as an 
algorithm or any process that can be formally (mathematically) described 
has an equivalent in a Turing machine. Consequently, the universal 
Turing machine is a machine that can model how any Turing machine 
works, because it can perform very different tasks or calculus that can be 
performed by any of these machines; in short, this means that it is 
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programmable. As Johnston argues, this kind of machine is an abstract 
machine. It has a certain logical form that can work independently of any 
material instantiation (2008: 71). 
What Lacan found interesting in cybernetic theory and, especially, in the 
universal Turing machine was that it enabled a new understanding of the 
autonomy of symbolic processes for which language was a kind of 
program that runs on the universal Turing machine of the unconscious, 
an unconscious that operated independently of the subject’s will 
(Johnston 2008: 78). The unconscious, or more precisely the symbolic 
order, therefore works as a machine that follows certain logical 
operations, that are not controlled in any way by human decision: ‘Lacan 
understood the symbolic function as a particular kind of computational 
assemblage that made human behaviour meaningful’ (Johnston 2008: 
67).  
Thus, the basis for the theorisation of a technological unconscious were 
already laid in 1925 by Freud and 1955 by Lacan, respectively. 
Moreover, as it was shown, Derrida had already written in 1967 about the 
conceptualisation of the psychic apparatus as a machine in terms of a 
metaphor, a metaphor, but a metaphor nonetheless. Thus, in a certain 
way, all the confusion and subsequent discussion about the attribution of 
human agency to machines could have been avoided. 
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Katherine Hayles shows that, not only Lacan but also subsequently 
Deleuze and Guattari, conceived human cognition and psychology as 
intertwined with machinic processes (2005: 177). In this sense, Hayles 
brilliantly explains the line of thought through which Lacan, Deleuze and 
Guattari challenge human agency in the measure that a part of the 
unconscious works as a processing machine—a question that Lacan was 
very aware of, as Johnston shows when quoting Lacan’s definition of the 
symbolic order: ‘The symbolic world is the world of the machine. Then 
we have the question as to what, in this world, constitutes the being of 
the subject’ (Lacan 1991 quoted in Johnston 2008: 72). Hayles’ analogy 
for the acceptance of the inverse of this reasoning is less convincing: 
‘Finally, if desire and the agency springing from it [the unconscious] are 
essentially nothing more than the performance of binary code, then 
computers can have agency as fully authentic as humans’ (Hayles 2005: 
177). If it is true that with psychoanalytic theory the deconstruction and 
challenge of the subject as a ‘humanist individual subject’, as she defined 
it, begun at the end of the nineteenth century, with all the consequences 
that it had, among which the consideration of humans as intelligent 
machines, it is not possible to take for granted that applying this way of 
reasoning to machines will give as a result the investment of machines 
with agency and desire; said in other words, it is not, at least, an 
automatic result of reversing the line of thought resulting from Lacanian 
and Deleuzian theory. It is more likely, as also Hayles shows, the result 
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of anthropomorphising the machine, and of distributed cognition (of the 
programmer, for instance) all along the system—in this case, research on 
cellular automata and artificial life. In fact, what is most interesting in 
Hayles’ theory in this book (My Mother Was a Computer) as well as in 
the previous How we became posthuman (1999) is the assertion that a 
metaphor used to explain a behaviour which is similar to human 
behaviour—such as explaining the emergence of strings of code as 
‘reproduction’, for instance—has begun to be understood in a literal 
sense, that is to say, that a certain narrative became transparent to many 
of the actors in that context. 
In her now canonical book The Optical Unconscious (1993), Rosalind 
Krauss used Benjamin’s conceptualisation of the optical unconscious as 
explained above as a point of departure to then invest—to be consistent 
with psychoanalytical vocabulary—the word ‘unconscious’ with the 
Lacanian sense, ignoring, however, all of Lacan’s theorisation on the 
relationship between the unconscious, the universal Turing machine and 
cybernetics. As in many others of her writings, Krauss searches to 
overcome Clement Greenberg’s theorisation of modernism using the 
structuralist semiotic square and Lacanian theory to read it in terms of 
topography instead of narrative (Krauss 1993: 13). The optical 
unconscious is then in Krauss’ view a kind of anti-vision. If opticality, 
understood as a sort of pure vision, is the conscious (or could she say the 
symptom?) of modernism, then the optical unconscious is the logic that 
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undermines the modernist logic from within, just as the unconscious does 
with the conscious mind: 
The optical unconscious will claim for itself this dimension of 
opacity, of repetition, of time. It will map onto the modernist logic 
only to cut across its grain, to undo it, to figure otherwise. [...] 
Lacan pictures the unconscious relation to reason, to the conscious 
mind, not as something different from consciousness, something 
outside it. He pictures it as inside consciousness, undermining it 
from within, fouling its logic, eroding its structure, even while 
appearing to leave the terms of that logic and that structure in 
place. (Krauss 1993: 24) 
 
 
According to Krauss, the artists of the optical unconscious included Max 
Ernst and some other artists close to the Dada group, especially Marcel 
Duchamp. Clearly, Greenberg deeply despised all of these artists. In 
Krauss’ theorisation, these artists’ oeuvre and discourse worked as the 
optical unconscious—unconscious in the Freudian/Lacanian sense of the 
repressed—of modernism and its corresponding opticality ‘eroding it 
from inside’. Opticality consists in the optical relationship established 
between the viewer and the work, a purely disembodied kind of vision 
that would become, according to Krauss, modernism’s new medium, as it 
will be deeply explained in chapter 6. For example, the gesture of 
pointing in Max Ernst is the most ‘readymade’ of his motifs; it is 
repeated in several of Ernst’s works as if it were a pre-fabricated motive, 
which Krauss argues with different examples (Oedipus Rex, Répétitions, 
Loplop Presents, La Nature, quoted on page 82).  
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Fig. 30. Max Ernst, Loplop Presents, 1930. 
 
She then made this readymade topic coincide with the Lacanian 
automaton, the repressed that returns as repetition, to end up saying that, 
consequently, ‘the hand is Ernst’s object a’ (82). The main problem with 
Krauss’ position is that she forces Lacanian theory and talks about an 
unconscious as if ‘Modernity’ had one, thus presupposing the existence 
of an unconscious in Modernity as if it were a subject; and at the same 
time, she “analyses” artists through their artworks: If talking about 
certain repeated topoi in an artist’s work as readymade undoubtedly 
makes sense, taking things further as to identify ‘Ernst’s object a’ seems 
more far fetched, and especially useless.  
Although not putting it in these terms, Vilém Flusser also theorised 
something comparable to Benjamin’s optical unconscious at work in the 
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photographic apparatus. In his work of 1983, Towards a Philosophy of 
Photography, Flusser proposed that images were originally aimed to 
explain the world in the first place, that they were mediations between 
humans and the world that were supposed to make this relationship 
clearer and comprehensible. Instead, images ‘turned into screens’ (8) that 
never cast light on the world, but just obscured it, interposing themselves 
between us and the world, in the sense that instead of using images to 
navigate reality, humans now interact with the world through them.  
In addition to this, the photographic image not only escapes the 
functionary’s (or photographer’s) intentions, but the photographic device 
makes photographers to become a function of the machine: 
The camera is programmed to produce photographs, and every 
photograph is a realization of one of the possibilities contained 
within the program of the camera. The number of such 
possibilities is large, but it is nevertheless finite: It is the sum of 
all those photographs that can be taken by a camera. Thus 
photographers attempt to find the possibilities not yet discovered 
within it. (Flusser 1983: 26) 
 
This means that the machine always performs its own program, which is 
aimed at perpetuating and improving itself indefinitely: ‘The camera’s 
program provides for the realization of its capabilities and, in the process, 
for the use of society as a feedback mechanism for its progressive 
improvement’ (Flusser 1983: 46). Therefore, not only do the 
photographer’s intentions not count, but also, photographers and people 
taking snapshots, become a function of the camera, which eternally 
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performs its own program. This is the black box, the hard core of the 
photographic apparatus. Although written many years before, all this 
theorisation seems to predict the advent of some smart-phones’ 
applications that include filters such as Instagram and similar. One can 
only ask what kind of agency a user has, or merit as a photographer, 
when looking at the results of the photographs taken and modified 
through such programs.  
Even before Vilém Flusser and Rosalind Krauss, Italian photographer 
Franco Vaccari theorised a ‘technological unconscious’ in a series of 
essays first published in 1979. Although Vaccari explicitly quotes 
Lacanian theory, he doesn’t state from which seminar or work he is 
quoting, but he may very likely be familiar with Lacan’s article of 1955 
‘Psychoanalysis and cybernetics, or on the nature of language’ (1991). 
He considers that this technological unconscious at work in the 
photographic apparatus is independent of the photographer’s will, and at 
the same time, it is symbolically structured: 
The technological unconscious shouldn’t be interpreted as a pure 
extension and enhancement of human capacities, but it is necessary 
to see in it the instrument of a capacity of autonomous action; 
everything happens as if the machine were a fragment of 
unconscious in action. The structure of the machine is analog to the 
structure of the unconscious, it doesn't have depth and it is ignorant 
of the flows that run through it. (Vaccari 1979: 5)49 
 
                                                
49
 All translations from Italian of Vaccari are mine. 
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In this sense, the most interesting thing the machine does is not 
necessarily artistic, nor is it guided by the photographer’s intentions. The 
most interesting part for Vaccari is what it does by itself, in which there 
is no intention, just action. In this way the technological unconscious 
becomes directly connected with the readymade, or better, with 
readymade images. The photographer would only choose images that are 
already there and put them into context, such as the conceptual artist 
does. This conception of the readymade is far from Krauss’ association 
of the readymade as Lacanian automaton; instead, Vaccari uses Lacanian 
theory as a tool to further understand technology, or better, certain artistic 
productions, such as photographs produced by a certain technology.  
Vaccari calls ‘technological unconscious’ what Flusser calls ‘black box’ 
or ‘the program of the apparatus’: what the machine can realise without 
the conscious intention of the user or photographer—for both the 
photographic apparatus performs an action, or a program, beyond the will 
of the ‘functionary’ or photographer. For Vaccari this happens in terms 
of the Lacanian unconscious, which is symbolically structured, and the 
most interesting results do not involve the intention of the photographer, 
nor follow her will. For Flusser, it happens in terms of a program, of an 
intentional perpetuation, an improvement of the will of the machine, and 
he is even more apocalyptic in the conception of the machine that is 
performing the fulfilment of the program of the camera using the 
photographer in order to improve and perpetuate itself. 
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Two important and fundamental moves make Vaccari’s theoretical 
approach extremely valid and interesting. Vaccari considers the 
technological unconscious and its symbolic structure as something 
unlikely to be completely decoded by a human subject. Yet the key to 
decode the technological unconscious is nonetheless held collectively. 
The technological unconscious is not meant to be analysed as if 
belonging to a subject, but it can offer the key to uncover certain 
collective symbolic traces. It can be a way to access, at least in part, a 
collective imaginary: 
[...] the other [path to make meaning emerge from the photographic 
sign] is to interpret the photograph as a sign belonging to a 
language which is only in part reducible to man, a sign which is a 
symptom, a sign which works as a spy of something repressed that 
instead of being individual is collective. (Vaccari 1979: 14) 
 
The second fundamental move that Vaccari does is from the subject, the 
photographer, to the device: He is not analysing “a subject”, nor 
considering an artistic movement as if it were one; instead, he is focusing 
on the photographic apparatus advancing that it has ‘an autonomous 
capacity of organisation of the image in shapes that are already 
symbolically structured, independently from the subject’s action’ (18). 
Thus the move is from Benjamin’s optical unconscious with focus on the 
expansion of the subject’s capabilities, to his technological unconscious 
with focus on the device’s autonomous action. However, it is worth 
drawing attention to the assertion that in the technological unconscious 
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images are symbolically structured independently from any subject’s 
intervention: it means that the symbolical dimension has been embedded 
in the device (unconscious) and that it is at work even without any further 
human agency. An interesting example in this regard is the 
aforementioned algorithm in smart phone cameras: the algorithm has 
evidently been created by a human programmer to improve the quality of 
the photographs performing certain tasks, which include snooping in the 
user’s image library and social networks to figure out: a. what someone 
might look like, b. how the user would like someone to look, and modify 
the image accordingly (Steyerl-Jordan 2014). In this sense, the algorithm 
not only behaves independently of the user’s will, but also, as already 
advanced, limits the power that the same technological unconscious may 
have to reveal events, things and images that could be unknown to the 
user until that point, at the same time that it may limit any creative 
power: the user is limited to see again and again who and what she 
already knows, and in the ways she already knows. 
This observation is also fundamental to understand the relationship 
between the technological unconscious as it has been developed thus far: 
as the possibilities of the machine of revealing some (very small) part of 
the subject’s unconscious (Benjamin 1935; Caronia 2006); as the 
machine which can reveal its own unconscious (Vaccari 1979; Flusser 
1983) which is anyway symbolically structured and collectively built 
(Vaccari 1979)—and floating signifier. 
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 4.3 Space, Place, Cyberspace & Electronic Space 
 
This section considers that is it possible to relate the floating signifier 
with the technological unconscious as the dimension in which the 
conditions of possibility of a digital ethic and aesthetic reside. If, 
following Deleuze (1988 [1993]), it is accepted that the subject is 
constituted by the ‘point of view’ and that she is ‘what remains in the 
point of view’ (19-20)—and considering that in cyberspace there is no 
point of view because there is no space (Manovich 2001: 219)—the 
technological unconscious can be assimilated to a plane of immanence in 
which meaning unfolds through the floating signifier. The floating 
signifier is the site, the place that constitutes a different point of view for 
the subject to assume in the digital each time. The subject comes to the 
point of view, as Deleuze proposes, constituting herself as a subject who 
is embodied in the digital, as it will be explained soon. 
 
Consequently, it is necessary to explain what space means in this 
context—moreover what is cyberspace, or as it will be rather called, 
electronic space.  
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In his book Digital Sensations: Space, Identity, and Embodiment in 
Virtual Reality (1999), Ken Hillis makes an interesting differentiation 
between space, place and landscape with the aim of investigating the 
possibilities of sight and embodiment in virtual environments and virtual 
reality. 
For defining space, Hillis introduces the difference between the modern 
Western conception of communication as ‘the transmission of messages 
across space’ (62) and explains an older and ritual conception of 
communication linked to a place ‘with its forms of language and habitual 
social interactions’ (62).  Analysing the conceptions of space in Aristotle, 
Euclid, Newton, Descartes and Einstein, Hillis defines absolute, relative 
and relational space: 
Absolut space suggests macro level or “big picture” realities. 
Experientially, relative space accords more closely with individual 
meaning, and relational space may suggest an ability to imagine a 
continuum or at least linkages between the meanings of absolute 
and relative space. Although VEs are based on Euclidean geometry 
and a Cartesian grid of absolute space (along with distance and 
motion) and objects are represented and relate to one another 
“therein”. (73) 
 
Hence, Hillis shows that whilst absolute space is often a concept apt to be 
formally described in the context of physics, mathematics and 
philosophy; relative and relational space have a more symbolic, ritualistic 
charge that can be assimilated to the definition of place: ‘The place itself 
is a middle ground drawing together the disparate elements into 
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communication’; in this sense, place, or a ritual conception of space is ‘a 
possibility that grounds the basis for coming together’ (62-3). It is 
evident that in this case the conception of place coincides with the 
relational dimension, and with the meaning and intentionality actors 
share in that dimension.  
However, whilst virtual reality and immersive digital environments imply 
a representation of absolute space, this research does not focus 
specifically on virtual environments, but on the digital as a whole—
whether representational of absolute space or not. Thus in this context, 
the digital and its possibilities tend more to create a situation of place. 
The digital presents itself as the previously mentioned relational 
dimension, in which proximity is more often relational and symbolically 
charged than physical, and in which an idea of agora, or common ground, 
can be lived in representational as well as non- representational 
environments. It is now important to make clear that the concept of 
representation in this precise context—related to the representation of 
space—is used almost as a synonym for perspectival representation, that 
is to say, of the mathematical and conceptual methodology used to 
represent three-dimensional, absolute space, on a two-dimensional 
surface—whether canvas, paper or a computer screen.  
Then what is cyberspace? The Oxford Dictionary defines it as ‘the 
notional environment in which communication over computer networks 
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occurs’, but, as it is well known, the term became popular thanks to 
William Gibson’s short story ‘Burning Chrome’ (1982), and especially, 
shortly later, through his novel Neuromancer (1984), in which it is 
defined as follows: 
Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by 
billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being 
taught mathematical concepts... A graphic representation of data 
abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. 
Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the 
mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding. 
(Gibson 1984: 74) 
 
It is interesting to note that Gibson, many years later, in the independent 
documentary No Maps for These Territories directed by Mark Neale said 
about the word that “…seemed evocative and essentially meaningless. It 
was suggestive of something, but had no real semantic meaning, even for 
me, as I saw it emerge on the page” (2000), it was thus, a floating 
signifier. Of course, Gibson means that he liked how the word sounded 
while not being sure what it meant, but as it will be argued soon, in this 
context cyberspace is closely related to the floating signifier. Anyway, 
Gibson’s somehow blurry definition of cyberspace conveys the idea of  
‘representational data’, but not necessarily of ‘space’, in the sense of 
three-dimensional, absolute space. 
As Lev Manovich also shows, even if cyberspace may often entail the 
idea of representation, the truth is that ‘there is no space in cyberspace’ 
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(2001: 219). Even in a representational digital environment, there is 
neither continuity, nor the extensive property of something similar to 
space, but just a ‘collection of separate objects’ in a ‘vacuum’ produced 
by a computer graphics program for modelling a 3D environment (219).  
Instead of exploring philosophical and/or mathematical notions of space 
the way Hillis proposed, Manovich explores the definitions of space in 
the history of art. The classical history of art that began with Heinrich 
Wölfflin, Alois Riegl and Erwin Panofsky at the beginning of the 
Twentieth century—continued by Ernst Gombrich at the Warburg 
Institute—considered that the object of study of art history was the study 
of evolution of style (Ginzburg 1966). As Manovich points out, the study 
in the evolution of representation of space also took place within this line 
of study.50 For example, Panofsky related the systematic representation 
of space in the Renaissance to the development of scholastic and abstract 
thought. Even though we perceive representational virtual space as 
described by Panofsky—homogeneous and continuous—computer 
generated space is in fact more of an aggregate of objects sparse on a 
                                                
50
  In this sense, many theorists, but especially Tomas Maldonado (1992), have pointed 
out how Western European culture chose, approximately in the Fourteenth century, to 
represent space and reality in general in a “realistic” way, for which a specific 
methodology like the linear perspective was developed—at first more or less intuitively, 
and subsequently codified by Filippo Brunelleschi and Leon Battista Alberti. This way 
of representing reality, and thus space, is often taken for granted and considered as a 
“natural choice”. Because perspectival representation is at the basis of the main 
productions and forms of Western culture, among them photography, cinema, and 
especially new media, it has become transparent. However, it is not superfluous to 
remember that other cultures, and Western culture before the Renaissance, have chosen 
differently. 
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‘vacuum’. ‘What is missing from computer space is space in the sense of 
medium: the environment in which objects are embedded and the effect 
of these objects on each other’ (Manovich 2001: 220). The conception of 
space as a medium, not just as a void on which to display objects is 
fundamental, and according to Manovich, completely missing from 
mainstream computer graphics. However in this context, computer 
graphics has little relevance. The present dissertation proposes to replace 
the word ‘cyberspace’ with ‘electronic space’ because this expression 
better conveys the digital understood independently from issues of 
representation. Following Hillis’ definition outlined above, electronic 
space is a type of place. It is a kind of public arena in which proximity is 
often conceptual, or psychological, always mediated, and not necessarily, 
or even seldom, physical. There are digital places that are 
representational, like videogames, like Second Life, like virtual reality 
environments, and so on; there are also other, no less symbolically 
charged, places where interaction, forms of encounter and social 
dimensions evolve that cannot be recognised as representations of any 
“physical” reality. The latter form of digital place includes social 
networks, chats, many apps, and the like. These electronic spaces work in 
fact as places of agency and generation of sense, no less than a physical 
agora. In this sense, it will be proposed that the technological 
unconscious works as a plane of immanence in which meaning unfolds.   
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4.4 The Technological Unconscious as a Plane of Immanence 
 
Deleuze and Guattari defined philosophy as ‘a constructivism’ that has 
two main qualitative aspects, which are simultaneously constitutive and 
complementary: the creation of concepts and the laying out of a plane of 
immanence (1991: 23). If concepts are ‘concrete assemblages, like 
configurations of a machine’, the plane of immanence is ‘an abstract 
machine’, thus concepts are the gears of the abstract machine (36). The 
authors consider that concepts are events, which in their vocabulary 
means that a subjectivity is needed for concepts to become events, to be 
actualised, whilst the plane is ‘the horizon of events’, and this is 
independent of any observer (36). 
It is not difficult to find once more a point of coincidence with Jacques 
Lacan. As advanced above, for Lacan the symbolic register of the 
unconscious works like the Universal Turing Machine, independently of 
the subject’s will. Deleuze and Guattari considered machinic processes 
not only related to human subjectivity, agency and cognition, but also, as 
in this case, in the way the plane of immanence functions. 
Now following the same line of reasoning, and considering the 
technological unconscious as a dimension that works independently of 
human agency although it is symbolically structured, it is not difficult to 
accept that the technological unconscious can be assimilated to a place of 
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immanence. Deleuze and Guattari’s words can make this link even 
clearer: 
The plane of immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought 
but rather the image of thought, the image thought gives itself of 
what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one’s 
bearing in thought. (37) 
 
Therefore, if, as intuited by Antonio Caronia, the technological 
unconscious can help reveal something about how the unconscious part 
of the human mind works, the same can be said of the plane of 
immanence because it is ‘the image thought gives itself of what it means 
to think’. In this sense, the plane of immanence/technological 
unconscious is, in Derrida’s terms as developed above, a sort of 
representation of thought, a machinic process, in which anyway symbolic 
processes are embedded. 
The technological unconscious is the plane of immanence, so what is the 
link between the technological unconscious as a plane of immanence and 
the floating signifier? Within the plane of immanence, the floating 
signifier constitutes a point of view. As Deleuze explains in Le Pli: 
Leibniz and the Baroque (1988 [1993]), the subject is constituted by the 
point of view, but this point is not exactly a point but a place, a position, 
a site (27), she who is a subject is the one that inhabits a point of view. 
The point of view is a point of view in a variation, in a change, in a 
metamorphosis—but it doesn’t change with the subject. It is the subject 
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who has to come to the point of view. This is, according to Deleuze, the 
foundation of perspectivism, and more specifically of the baroque 
perspective. This perspectivism can be quite evident, for example, in 
Gian Lorenzo Bernini’s colonnata at Piazza San Pietro in Vaticano (Figs. 
33, 34): one can walk around, under and through the colonnata enjoying 
spaces and shadows, or the overlapping of the columns, but the truth is 
that Bernini conceived of two spots, which are clearly signalled on the 
piazza’s pavement, standing on which the viewer has the “right” point of 
view from which all the rows of columns look aligned and it is possible 
to see just a single column in each row.  
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Figs. 31, 32. Gian Lorenzo Bernini, Piazza San Pietro, Colonnata,1656-1667.  
 
In Baroque painting, ceiling decorations are further clear examples of the 
importance of the point of view. For example, in The Glory of St. 
Ignatius (1685), the Jesuit brother Andrea Pozzo, dedicated the paintings 
on the ceiling of the Church of Sant’Ignazio in Rome to an apotheosis to 
Saint Ignatius. To achieve a maximum impact on the viewer, who would 
be always at a great distance and watching from below, he built a grid 
with strings at an average eye-level, then projected it on the ceiling 
illuminating it with candles from below to calculate the deformation of 
the figures from this precise point of view. In this way, the correct or 
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privileged point of view was at the centre, and the effect decreased when 
moving to the borders. 
In this regard, Deleuze praises Michel Serres’ analysis of  ‘the 
consequences and presuppositions of the new theory of conic sections’ 
(1988 [1993]: 21), so considering the previous examples his words 
become clearer: 
[...] in a world of infinity, or of variable curvature that has lost 
notion of a center, he [Serres] stresses the importance of setting 
point of view in the place of the missing center; of the new optical 
model of perception, and of geometry in perception, that casts aside 
tactile notions, contact and figure, in favor of an “architecture of 
vision”; of the status of the object, which now exists only through 
its metamorphoses or in the declension of its profiles; of 
perspectivism as a truth of relativity (and not a relativity of what is 
true). (Deleuze 1988 [1993]: 21) 
 
Another clear example in this respect is the anamorphosis: in 
anamorphoses the drawing is distorted and it can only be appreciated in 
its full figurative coherence from one point of view, or with the help of a 
mirror. Anamorphoses, and Baroque art in general, exemplify the 
necessity for the subject to come to the point of view in order to actualise 
the object, and at the same time to become a subject by beholding truth. 
Hans Holbein’s famous painting The Ambassadors (1553) is a perfect 
example of anamorphosis At the bottom, centre of the perfect portrait of 
the two ambassadors a strange and almost uncanny figure is depicted. It 
is unrecognisable and at first glance looks like a big stain. Still, when the 
viewer comes to the right point of view, the stain reconfigures itself into 
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a perfect skull, the most recognisable iconographic trait of the vanitas, 
the symbol of human finitude.  
 
Fig. 33. Hans Holbein the Younger, The Ambassadors, 1533. Oil on oak, 207 x 209.5 cm. 
National Gallery, London 
              
Fig.34. Hans Holbein the Younger, The Ambassadors, 1533. Detail, anamorphosis. 
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However, this perspectivism must not be confused with a 
representational perspectivism.  As is now clear, Deleuze doesn’t address 
the representation of space, but rather the possibilities to constitute 
subjectivities by assuming a point of view, and eventually attaining truth.  
Within the non-space of electronic space, and the deeper realm of the 
technological unconscious, the digital subject is constituted by coming to 
the point of view built by the floating signifier. The subject needs a point 
of view to act and interact in electronic space as a subject. However, in 
electronic space there is no space, there are only some virtual places. It is 
thus the function of the floating signifier to constitute this point of view, 
which is different each time, and comprises many different points of 
view at the same time, like the shining object in the Sheep’s shop. This 
means is that the electronic space can be representational or not, but in 
any case, the subject must assume a point of view in it, and this is the 
role of the myriad of floating signifiers that she can found and inhabit in 
the digital. This is also how meaning is generated and circulates in the 
technological unconscious/plane of immanence: through the feedback 
loops between (digital) subjects and complex environments; thus, this 
process is twofold because new subjectivities are generated in turn. 
For example, a first person shooter video game run on Oculus Rift will 
changes the point of view along with the user in order to achieve a higher 
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level of realism and immersion (Bolter and Grusin 2000). This is the 
main difference and advantage in the race to achieve further realism and 
immersion that new media in general, and especially virtual reality 
environments, have compared to a fresco or painting: the tromp-l’oeil 
effect is lost as soon as the viewer moves away from the “correct” point 
of view, so instead of looking for the “correct” point of view in which the 
scene will come together for her, the (perspectival) point of view changes 
with the user.  
What happens then with non-realistic digital environments? In such 
prospectively non-representational environments there is also a point of 
view, the point of view constituted by the floating signifier, yet this is not 
the point of view of perspectivism (in the sense of a perfect configuration 
that can only be beheld from a precise locus). In the case of a social 
network, let’s say Facebook to name the most famous and popular 
example, there is a proliferation of floating signifiers—of signifiers, that 
can be considered electronic spaces, to be filled with any content—that 
can generate different points of view. The most obvious floating signifier 
in this regard would be the user profile: filling a profile creates an 
electronic space (for the user), a point of view to inhabit from which to 
see the newsfeed, other users’ wall, profiles, to send messages, in short, 
to inhabit this electronic space. Thus, this is one of the ways in which the 
floating signifier works to create a point of view for the digital subject. 
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There are many similar cases that vary slightly, yet this example suffices 
to illustrate the function of different social networks.  
In this sense, an interesting case is the recently launched app and social 
network Periscope, which is linked to Twitter. Once the user has 
connected both accounts, Periscope offers the possibility to follow one’s 
Twitter contacts, but it is not limited to them. Accessing the users’ video 
camera on the smart phone, the app allows the user to live-broadcast 
whatever they wish. There is a feed of the users one follows, but also a 
worldwide feed of the users broadcasting at that precise moment, 
regardless of whether one follows them or not. This feature is perhaps 
due to the relative difficulty of live-broadcasting compared to tweeting—
if for no other reason because, from a more technical point of view, the 
app exhausts the battery in a very brief period of time.51 On the website, 
Periscope’s tagline reads: ‘Explore the world through someone else’s 
eyes’,52 which sounds pretty much like ‘the wire’ in Kathryn Bigelow’s 
                                                
51
  When the app was launched, some journalists conjectured about its potential use in 
conflict zones, for example, Jonathan Albright speculated in an article on the Huffington 
Post (2015) about a “return of the scoop” for journalists: about being, maybe by chance, 
in the middle of an action or event that deserved to be live-broadcasted. However, so 
far, it cannot be said that a significant use of this sort has been detected. Some reasons 
can be hypothesised: the fast consuming of the battery, difficulty of broadcasting in 
extreme situations, the fact that the app is related to Twitter and Twitter, as well as other 
social media, is blocked in many countries—it is probably the sum of all of these 
reasons.  
52
 https://www.periscope.tv/ 
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1995 film Strange Days,53 or it may even have been the idea behind the 
(as yet unsuccessful) Google Glass.  
 
               
Figs. 35, 36. Periscope screenshots from a user’s live broadcasting from Paris on 
November 15, 2015. 
 
However, in Periscope things are a bit different, and simpler than Google 
Glass, and maybe its interest resides precisely in this. In Periscope the 
user assumes two points of view at the same time: her own in her own 
profile and the other users’ broadcasts of what she chooses to see. It is a 
more complicated identification than a film director’s point of view, or 
an amateur video posted on YouTube, because it is only possible to 
                                                
53
 Strange Days was set in 1999. Lenny Nero is an ex-cop who deals with illegal 
recording of memories directly from the cerebral cortex through a device called ‘the 
wire’. The wire not only records, but also reproduces the memories making the user 
actually see and feel the recorded memories without mediation. The wire would be, in 
Bolter and Grusin terms, the completely transparent medium. 
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watch Periscope videos when they’re live.54 One sees in real time what 
the other user is seeing because Periscope also includes a chat that allows 
viewers to interact with the user broadcasting. Users can potentially offer 
their opinions on how a video is being shot, or even ask the person who 
is broadcasting their video to change angle or focus on a certain detail. In 
other words, Periscope offers possibilities to adapt the shooting-users’ 
point of view to the viewing-users’. This thus enables the intertwining of 
a multiplicity of points of view, some that have to do with perspectivism 
and sight, while others address the construction of an electronic space 
within the place of immanence of the technological unconscious. In this 
intertwining and interaction, the generation of meaning is produced, 
among other things, through the development of complex subjectivities. 
These subjectivities can alternately change, influence and create their 
own and other’s points of view. This is one of the most interesting 
possibilities that the technological unconscious as a plane of immanence 
can produce: the development of new subjectivities through the 
interaction with a collective dimension. This text doesn’t seek to 
uncritically praise an app like Periscope, but merely to advance the 
perspective that the app’s logic can potentially open interesting pathways 
that other apps perhaps don’t.   
                                                
54
 At least, this was the case until the most recent update that was available while 
writing this thesis. As it is well known, new features for apps can be introduced rather 
quickly. However, Periscope seems interested in continuing to limit viewing to live 
videos.  
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Another device that bears mentioning is Microsoft HoloLens.55 This 
technology consists of a headset—it is actually bulkier than just lenses—
that mainly uses computer graphics to create what is usually known as 
augmented reality, or as Microsoft calls it on its website, ‘mixed reality’. 
Unlike Google Glass, whose main function is to record, take photos and 
use limited augmented reality features (which are basically two-
dimensional), the HoloLens (Fig. 39) intends to offer an augmented 
reality. Like every augmented reality, the HoloLens overlaps computer 
graphics on the lens with the user’s perception of material reality. These 
computer graphics are not flat, or two-dimensional, but as the very name 
suggests, they are holograms,56 which is to say, they are perceived as 
volumetric and occupying the three-dimensional space. The promotional 
video on its website suggests that this device will allow users to interact 
with both material reality and the holographic projection of different 
programs, including applications like Skype, or Minecraft, but also 
design software that enables projected three-dimensional modelling, and 
so on.  
                                                
55
 https://www.microsoft.com/microsoft-hololens/en-us 
56
 Some theorists, like Pier Luigi Capucci, maintain that this technology does not use 
holograms at all, but simply computer graphics and that therefore the use of the prefix 
“holo” is misleading (Capucci, April 2015, private conversation)  
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Fig. 37. Microsoft HoloLens, promotional photo. Available from: 
http://www.theverge.com/2015/1/21/7868251/microsoft-hololens-hologram-hands-on-
experience 
 
In this sense, the HoloLens works as an apparatus that, through the 
aforementioned technology, adds projected objects to the user’s material 
reality. Even if the HoloLens does not create a complete immersive 
environment, it nonetheless has to follow the user’s perspectival point of 
view in the same way that a virtual environment would, otherwise the 
“realistic effect” would be lost. An interesting point in this respect is that, 
as the projection of a non-representational application like Skype into the 
user’s physical space suggests, a kind of overlapping between floating 
signifiers may occur, for example those generating a subjective point of 
view, and those generating a physical disposition in space that was not 
needed, or that couldn’t happen before. It is as if this technology could 
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generate a physical referent, projected “objects” and virtual realities, 
which, like many Web 2.0 applications, neither have an antecedent or 
referent in the material environment, nor need one on the Internet. As 
previously explained, this is the case with different social media, thus it’s 
pertinent to discuss electronic space that conveys the idea of place, of a 
symbolically charged arena that doesn’t necessarily allude to a physical 
space.  
If it comes to be effectively developed and massively commercialised, a 
technology like the HoloLens may foster a stronger perception of 
virtuality that corresponds to the third wave of cybernetics as 
conceptualised by Hayles (1999). Hayles identified three concepts each 
of which leads to one of the three stages in the development of cybernetic 
theory, the first one from 1945 to 1960 in which the central concept was 
homeostasis, the second from 1960 through 1980 corresponding to 
reflexivity, and the last one, from 1980 to the present day in which we are 
immersed in virtuality. Virtuality is, according to Hayles, ‘associated 
with computer simulations that put the body in a feedback loop with 
computer generated images’ (14). What this state of virtuality produces is 
the sensation that there is a world of information that functions in parallel 
with ours and that we can often somehow “enter” this world, and that at 
the same time, our “physical” world is interpenetrated by patterns of 
information, our bodies included, which is the case, for example, of 
DNA. The problem with this, more or less, fictional—fictional in the 
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sense of metaphorical—pervasive idea is the power that we give to 
information, privileging the idea of pure information over materiality and 
downplaying its necessary, unavoidable material instantiation. Going 
back to the HoloLens case, this virtuality and partially fictional 
perception of virtuality as defined by Hayles can be further complicated 
by the fact that this device not only creates the feeling that we can 
“enter”, or at least interact with the parallel world of computer graphics 
that takes place “behind” the computer screen or simply in commonly 
held notions of cyberspace. Indeed, it creates exactly the opposite effect: 
the idea that objects that have up to this point exclusively inhabited 
cyberspace are now among us, occupying our very vital environment. 
This technology is still very new, and the fact that it is not even in a Beta 
stage makes speculations hazardous, yet the fact that research is being 
undertaken in this direction makes it pertinent to begin to reflect on it. It 
thus seems legitimate to ask what kind of subjectivities—of digital 
subjects as it will be defined in the next chapter—these kinds of 
interactions and apparatuses produce.  
It is in fact this last question that the present text can contribute to 
answer: It has been shown how it is through the propagation of different 
points of view that meaning can be engendered and circulate in the 
technological unconscious/plane of immanence. Meaning is produced 
collectively and circulates in the actions and interactions between 
subjects and technological environments. 
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The different points of view, generated by the floating signifiers, actually 
happen to be ‘inhabited’ by subjects, who in coming to the point of view, 
by assuming a position are constituted as digital subjects. This process is 
not a metaphor, but a description, from the assumption of a certain point 
of view. In this case, the floating signifier is not being mistakenly 
considered as an image, or as some kind of mirage, the subject is not 
projecting in it any desires, but she is actually inhabiting it and occupying 
it. Its relevance consists in that by acknowledging this, the subject can, at 
least partially, be aware and decide which kind of subjectivity she is 
becoming. This choice thus implies effort and responsibility; in short, 
assuming a point of view is also assuming a certain ethical position. It 
now becomes apparent another way in which we are posthuman: we are 
conformed as subjects not only through feedback loops with 
technological environments, devices, programs but by the assumption of 
a point of view in a technological dimension that is both artificial and 
collective. 
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5.	Embodiment	in	the	Digital	
 
In his Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-82 
(2001a), Michel Foucault talks about the relationship between subject and 
truth, asking how a subject can access truth and what the modalities of this 
access are, if they even exist. Foucault chooses René Descartes as a point of 
departure for these lectures. According to Descartes, the subject can access 
truth because she is a thinking individual that possesses reason, which is the 
only condition to attain truth. Therefore, the subject can remain the same and 
does not change in the process of attaining truth. Foucault sustains that 
Descartes’ proposal is an innovative one. In fact, in Occidental thought from 
Antiquity to the Middle Ages there was no guarantee that the subject could 
gain access to truth if she did not change, as access to truth implied a necessary 
transmutation of the subject. Ancient thought had a rigid conception of the 
object, which remained static and unchanged. The subject, however, was 
considered mobile and capable of shifting. With Descartes, and modernity, this 
dualism is overturned, and replaced by the one previously mentioned: a static 
subject and changing object (2001a: 3, 13, 16).  
 
Consequently, this chapter addresses the following questions: if digitalisation 
processes in general are understood in terms of ontological repetition and even 
différance (as was advanced in the previous chapters), what happens to the 
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subject in this process? Is it possible to talk about a digital subject, or even 
more precisely a subject who is embodied in the digital?  
 
5.1 The Subject as Embodied Process 
 
As he stated in an interview from 1984, Michel Foucault’s main topic of 
interest was that of the relationship between subject and truth (1994: 273-294). 
Foucault explains that even when he dedicated a lot of time and writing to 
problems related to the dynamics of knowledge and power, the issue of the 
relation between subject and truth was always his main focus and what he 
considered to be the base of his philosophical investigations. He resisted any 
definition of subject as a substance, or any a priori definition of the subject, 
because Foucault defines the subject as a form, and ‘above all, this form is 
never identical to itself’ (274). The subject considered as a form is a changing 
subject, a different subject in its different relationships with different 
apparatuses: different at school, in family relationships, when voting, paying 
taxes, or in its sexual life. This subject is never the same, not in the sense that 
one is true and the other is false or simulated, but rather that the subject’s 
relationship with itself is always different depending on different contexts. 
Above all, this is a conception of an active subject.  
This passage from the conception of a passive subject—such as in the case of 
Foucault’s studies of mental illnesses and mental institutions (1954, 1961, 
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1963), or of criminals and the jail system (1975)—to an active subject relates 
to the practices of the care of the self  (souci de soi), which the French 
philosopher developed in his late writings (1984). The care of the self is closely 
linked with the importance of knowing oneself in the first place to be able to 
attain truth, and not of just studying and knowing one’s object of study. 
Nonetheless, despite the active, political position achieved through the 
practices of the care of the self, Foucault is always aware that these practices 
are also ‘proposed, suggested, imposed by its culture, society and social group’ 
to the subject (1994: 275).  
This conception of the subject as active, as ever changing, almost as a process, 
is cardinal to the development of a subject who is embodied in the digital, 
which will be outlined in the pages that follow. 
 
Katherine Hayles has discussed the end of the humanist liberal subject within a 
completely different theoretical framework, which is complementary to the 
aims of this research. She argues that a post-humanist subject has emerged, a 
subject that is not necessarily a cyborg,57 although it can be. This subject lives 
in a constant feedback loop with other entities that are not necessarily human, 
such as computers, digital networks and electronic texts (1999). In this sense, 
                                                
57
 Calleja and Schwager state that the word cyborg was first coined by Manfred E. 
Clynes and Nathan S. Kline in 1960 to refer to mechanically enhanced ‘that could 
negotiate in extra-terrestrial environments’ (Clines and Kline 1960: 27, quoted in 
Calleja and Schwager 2004), and that ‘Clynes and Kline’s cyborg theories are an 
extension of Wiener’s work on cybernetics in the late 1940s’ (2). 
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her case against the widespread idea that information can exist without any 
material instantiation, and, moreover, that subjectivity predominantly consists 
of information and is therefore immaterial, can be considered already over. In 
the book, Hayles acutely shows how this definition of information, along with 
its conceptual separation from a material base, is linked to capitalism and its 
corresponding definition of subjectivity: namely, a humanist liberal subject 
who fully owns his or her (but most often his) body and is perfectly conscious 
and in control of its boundaries and power (290). Consequently, the idea of 
owning and having complete control over one’s own body as if it were a 
commodity or property is concomitant with capitalist logic. 
In the more recent My Mother Was a Computer (2005), which advances that 
the post-human subject has been already widely theorised and accepted, Hayles 
focuses ‘on different versions of the posthuman as they continue to evolve in 
conjunction with intelligent machines’ (3). More specifically, the book seeks to 
redefine and adjust the definition of materiality, as some conceptualisations of 
the post-human may still carry opposing dualities that correspond to the liberal 
humanist tradition such as material-information, body-soul, and virtual-real 
(3).58 Hayles identifies the intrinsic characteristic of an entity to ‘count as a 
person’ as agency: ‘Agency enables the subject to make choices, express 
intentions, perform actions. Scratch the surface of a person, and you find an 
agent; find an agent, and you are well on your way toward constituting a 
subject’ (172). 
                                                
58
 All of which have already been discussed in the previous chapters. 
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She criticises how many authors attribute agency to machines through 
analogies like the following: if the human brain works like a machine and 
subjects are defined by agency, then machines are also able to possess agency. 
In fact, this line of reasoning, as explained in the previous chapter, does not 
fully explain the process. It is true that a similar logic can be detected in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1980 [1987]) interpretation of cellular automata as the 
ideal model of the a-centered, non-hierarchical system of the rhizome, as this 
quote shows: 
Cellular automata appear as well in their description of 
schizoanalysis, which “treats the unconscious as an acentered 
system, in other words, as a machinic network of finite 
automata (a rhizome), and thus arrives at an entirely different 
state of the unconscious” (18). The implication is that the 
unconscious, like cellular automata, is mechanistic and 
rhizomatic. (Hayles 2005: 172) 
 
Yet it is nonetheless inaccurate to understand Lacan’s conceptualisation in this 
same sense (please see chapter 4). This discussion directly relates to the 
problematic of the technological unconscious as described above, and 
especially with Lacan’s theorisation of symbolic order as a Universal Turing 
machine, which doesn’t necessarily imply that the human brain works like a 
machine, and even less so that machines are capable of agency or desire (which 
Deleuze and Guattari contend, as Hayles illustrates). It simply means that one 
of the registers of the unconscious that regulates the I works independently of 
human will, as a program running on a machine. 
However, what is perhaps more interesting in this context, despite Hayles’ 
opinion, is Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of subjectivity as a process. 
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At the very beginning of A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
they discuss what a book is:   
There is no difference between what a book talks about and 
how it is made. Therefore a book also has no object. As an 
assemblage, a book has only itself, in connection with other 
assemblages and in relation to other bodies without organs. 
We will never ask what a book means, as signified or 
signifier; we will not look for anything to understand in it. 
We will ask what it functions with, in connection with what 
other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in which 
other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed, 
and with what bodies without organs it makes its own 
converge. (1980 [1987]: 4) 
 
A book thus defined is a Body without Organs (BwO). The BwO is a 
conceptual construction the authors developed to emphasise the rhizomatic, 
non-hierarchical conception of things, as well as subjectivities that are 
conceived more as processes than as finished and closed entities, as the quote 
above shows. What matters about a certain Body without Organs is how it 
relates to others—how it communicates, how it changes. The BwO is not 
defined by its physical boundaries, nor by its materiality. In this sense, this 
conception of the BwO is also a conception of the subject as process, despite 
the fact that, as Hayles’ mentions, the vocabulary to develop this 
conceptualisation is often quite ‘esoteric’ in Deleuze and Guattari.  
At this point, nonetheless, it must be clarified that Hayles’ definition of the 
digital subject does not coincide with the conception of the digital subject 
proposed in the context of this text: namely, that ‘digital subjects are 
understood as autonomous creatures imbued with human-like motives, goals, 
and strategies’ (5). In Hayles terms, digital subjects are any kind of digital 
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entity, like Sims’ creatures, for instance. In contrast, what the text at hand aims 
to understand is what kind of subjectivity might arise from the cybernetic loop 
between a subject and any kind of digital reality. How does the subject change 
along with the change in the object, in successive repetitions, and according to 
the different points of view that she will have to come to inhabit?  How can she 
be understood more specifically as a subject embodied in the digital? 
When discussing emergence and the attribution of will and agency to digital 
creatures, Hayles opposes a continuous analog subjectivity, with a fragmented 
digital one, which is founded on the fragmentary ontology of digital 
technologies: 
In fact, emergence depends on such fragmentation, for it is 
only when the programs are broken into small pieces and 
recombined that unexpected adaptive behaviors can arise. 
To summarize: the analog subject implies a depth model of 
interiority, relations of resemblance between the interior and 
the surface that guarantee the meaning of what is deep inside, 
and the kind of mind/soul correspondence instantiated by and 
envisioned within the analog technologies of print culture. 
The digital subject implies an emergent complexity that is 
related through hierarchical coding levels to simple 
underlying rules, a dynamic of fragmentation and 
recombination that gives rise to emergent properties, and a 
disjunction between surface and interior that is instantiated 
by and envisioned within the digital technologies of 
computational culture. (203) 
 
Nevertheless, in the same way that opposing materiality and information was a 
complex, and at the same time purely illusory act, it makes sense to also avoid 
the opposition between fragmented and continuous. The digital subject should 
instead be considered as a cybernetic cycle and thus as a process that is both 
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fragmented and continuous, analog and digital—in short, as a complex 
subjectivity.  
In this context, the notion of writing and its constant deferral—Derrida’s 
différance explained in the first chapter—can also be of interest to further 
understand complex environments and subjectivities. These subjectivities and 
environments do not separate analog and digital, nor material and immaterial, 
but, in the same sense of writing and text outlined by Derrida, conceive of 
subjectivity in terms of a net: as a fabric or tissue of constant references and 
dialogues that neither allow the search for an origin, nor a presence (Derrida 
1967a [1978]; 1967b; Sini 2011; Fusaro n/d). Writing is not the transcription of 
the voice, of the phonè that finds in the voice the transparent medium of an 
absolute presence: that of a certain Concept. In this sense, writing is no longer 
a double of a double, but it becomes ‘the significant of the significant’ in which 
langue and writing are one and the same thing and neither is the representation 
of the other (Fusaro n/d). Derrida sought to deconstruct the predominant 
logocentric paradigm. Within the context of this research, his efforts can help 
deconstruct the conception of the digital as representation, as developed in the 
first chapter, as well as the dialectic oppositions between analog and digital, 
fragmented and continuous, and subject and object. Precisely, Derrida’s 
conception of the writer is especially pertinent regarding the relationship 
between subject and object. The French theorist considers the writer/poet to be 
the master, substance and topic of her own book. The book is thus shaped and 
conformed by the writer’s mind, yet the writer is simultaneously modified, and 
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somehow also generated by her own book (Derrida 1967a [1978]; 1967b; 
Fusaro n/d). Thinking about digital subjects as complex subjectivities that 
inhabit and navigate complex environments—not only in terms of constant 
deferral, but also avoiding the fallacy that the digital is a surrogate and/or 
projection of the analog, material “original”—can help better understand the 
complexity of these new dimensions and subjectivities. 
In this sense, the digital subject contains a multiplicity that it projects in 
different environments, which is a part of this new complex subjectivity—at 
once analog and continuous—that can only be partially controlled by the 
subject. This is one of the reasons why, as Baym and boyd (2012) suggest in 
relation to social media, we must increase our awareness of how the complex 
subjectivities that inhabit complex environments function59 and strive to 
                                                
59
 There are some points of contact between what is defined here as complex 
environments and what the authors called ‘collapsed contexts’ (Baym-boyd 2012). 
According to their conception, collapsed contexts imply the collapsing of relationships 
and social dynamics developed on social media environments and in face-to-face 
relationships. The notion of a collapsed context holds a somewhat negative connotation. 
Baym-boyd propose to approach the problematics that arise from this collapsing 
strategically:  ‘navigating collapsed contexts requires a wide variety of strategies. While 
some people seek to engage in strategic facework and minimize visibility, others seek to 
publicize themselves in ways that may complicate their relationship to different 
members of their audience. Vivienne and Burgess show how the process of creating 
private stories for online public consumption can crystallize self-understandings as 
people negotiate their positions relative to publics both intimate (e.g. family, friends, 
and co-workers) and unknown. In constructing these identities they must consider how 
they will be received by their intimate publics and also how the public telling of their 
stories might affect their loved ones, as with one person who chose to use photographs 
of flowers rather than relatives in order to protect family members from possible future 
stigma. Vivienne and Burgess show that private information is not the same as privacy, 
nor is public the same as publicity. The experience of making a story public in a 
persistent, searchable form made people more aware of the public value of the private 
and the potential of such sharing to create and impact unknown publics, changing how 
they understood the nature of ‘‘private’’. These processes are not static, but ongoing. 
Vivienne and Burgess parse apart the different phases of digital storytelling, showing 
that public and private are continuously reconfigured over time from the earliest stages 
of contemplating telling one’s story to managing that story’s visibility long after it has 
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develop strategies to inhabit and navigate them. One way to better understand 
these new complex situations can be a broader conceptualisation of 
embodiment in the digital as follows. 
 
5.2 Embodiment in the Digital 
 
As advanced in the previous chapter, the conceptualisation of the floating 
signifier, overspill and the technological unconscious can help to overcome the 
fiction of a correspondence between language and the world. This explains not 
only digitalisation processes per se, but also the emergence of a digital subject 
and enables a new way of thinking embodiment and subjectivities in the 
digital. Consequently, the emergence of a digital subject comes along with the 
emergence of new media, which demands the constitution of a point of view. 
The subject is constituted by the ‘point of view’ and by its coming and 
inhabiting the point of view (Deleuze 1988). Thus, the technological 
unconscious is the plane of immanence in which meaning unfolds through the 
                                                                                                                   
first been shared. […] As people communicate publically through social media, they 
become more aware of themselves relative to visible and imagined audiences and more 
aware of the larger publics to which they belong and which they seek to create. They 
negotiate collapsed contexts, continuously shifting power dynamics, and an open-ended 
time frame. Through discussing the personal, mundane, and everyday, people negotiate 
a sense of public place and help new publics—both wanted and unwanted—to coalesce. 
Socially mediated publicness may be a source of support and empowerment while 
simultaneously posing conflict and risk (324-325).The idea of complex environments 
includes, but far exceeds, the context of social media and social dynamics. 
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floating signifier, which is the site that each time hosts a different point of view 
for the constitution of a digital subject. 
 
5.2.1 Virtual/Actual Possible/Real 
 
To better explain this process, one must understand the dynamics of the 
four states of being: namely, the virtual, real, actual and possible. 
Deleuze explains these states in his book on Leibniz (1988 [1993]), in 
which he defines the virtual in opposition to the actual (and not to the 
real), while the real is opposed to the possible.60 In this sense, the real is 
the image of the possible that is realised: 
But the coupling of the virtual-actual does not resolve the 
problem. There exists a second, very different coupling of the 
possible-real. For example, God chooses one word among an 
infinity of possible worlds: the other worlds also have their 
actuality in monads that are conveying them. Adam who does 
not sin or Sextus who does not rape Lucretia. Therefore there 
exists an actual that remains possible, and that is not forcibly 
real. The actual does not constitute the real: it must itself be 
realized, and the problem of the world's realization is added 
to that of its actualization. God is “existentifying,” but the 
Existentifying is, on the one hand, Actualizing and, on the 
other, Realizing. (1988 [1993]:  104) 
 
In this respect, the main issue is that actualisation can only happen in the 
monads, the world can only be actualised ‘in the soul’, that is to say, in the 
                                                
60
 However, Deleuze had also analysed the relationship between real and virtual many 
years before in Différence et répétition (1967). 
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subject, and each subject expresses this actualisation through its respective 
point of view. Yet realisation can only happen in the body, or in matter (1988 
[1993]: 104): both aspects, realisation in the body and actualisation in monads, 
are exceptionally useful to understand actualisation as a phenomenon, or event, 
and realisation as the possibility of embodiment in the digital.  
A compelling aspect of this position is how it offers the subject a field of 
infinite creative potentialities, rather than considering the virtual as non-
realised possibilities. The virtual implies creation because it is always 
problematic:  
The virtual is not opposed to the real but actual. Contrary to 
the possible, static and already constituted, the virtual is like 
a problematic complex, and requires a process of 
transformation: actualization. Actualization is creation, an 
invention of a form from a dynamic configuration of forces 
and purposes. (Lévy 1995: 7)  
 
As opposed to the realisation of the possible, which is static and already 
defined—because everything that can be realised in the possible is already 
contained within it as a potentiality without the slightest chance of change or 
unpredictability—the virtual needs to be actualised. Since this actualisation can 
only happen in the subject, it will be different every time. Each actualisation 
will contain an element of creation because each subject will actualise the same 
virtuality differently. In short, actualisation is an event (7). According to 
Lévy’s analysis, a text is the virtualisation of memory, thus it will be actualised 
differently each time it is read, even if by the same person. The possible 
different interpretations—and even its different translations and printings—
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imply different sorts of creation that can neither be repeated, nor be the same 
each time. Instead, a text that is saved as a file in the computer is a potentiality 
and is only realised when the file is opened and the characters appear on the 
computer screen (or on paper if it is printed). However, all the characteristics 
of a text are already contained and saved as code in the database, which simply 
appears without changes—the only difference being that it is now readable on 
the screen or on the page. These are clear examples that best illustrate the 
distinctions between the different modes of being, which are a legacy of 
Scholastic philosophy. 
Having explained this, one of the main questions that arises is: what are 
the possibilities of actualising the virtual in the digital? Or, in other 
words, what possibilities does the digital offer to actualise those 
virtualities emerging among the events unfolding in complex 
environments? The answer can only be found in the digital embodied 
subject. 
It must be said that most often (Haraway 1991, Caronia 1996; 2006; 
Hayles 1999; Calleja-Schwager 2004,) the stress and focus has been on 
what kind of human subjectivity arises from the feedback loops between 
analog and digital environments. While this focus was an aspect of the 
first part of this text, the second half of this chapter attempts to 
understand the digital subject as a subject embodied in the digital. This 
conceptualisation, as it will soon be further explained, has the advantage 
of definitively eliminating the idea that human interaction within digital 
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and artificial environments is disembodied. Instead, I propose to think of 
this novel entity as a new kind of embodiment, which, among other 
things, eliminates the separations between subject and object. 
In this sense, it is useful to remember Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson 
and Eleanor Rosch’s notion of enaction as embodied cognition (1991), 
which argues that embodied cognition proposes a completely different 
conception of the relationship between brain, body and world from that 
of computation. Thus, with the concept of enaction the authors build on a 
theoretical framework that emphasises the fact that the ways in which a 
certain organism, or cognitive agent, experience the world are fully 
determined by the feedback loops between the environment, the 
organism’s sensorimotor system and its physiology (1991: 35, 165-7). 
This move somehow reintroduces the phenomenological perspective, 
especially that of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945), and the idea that 
cognitive agents construct their image and perception of the world 
through their activities and interactions with it as situated living bodies. 
The concept of enaction is more than relevant in this context because it 
not only implies that the world can be known and perceived by the neural 
activity of the cognitive agent, but more importantly through the 
organism’s activities and interactions with the environment through its 
body. Enaction therefore implies, as its name allows us to intuit, not a 
passive, receptive idea of cognition, but an active and fully embodied 
one. 
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It is now clear how the conception of enaction and of situated living 
bodies can help to develop the theorisation of the digital subject as a 
subject embodied in the digital: it is obviously not the point that our 
bodies somehow reconstitute themselves in electronic space—because 
we know that this can’t yet happen—but precisely that we interact and 
live the digital not only with our neuronal networks, but also with our 
entire body. In this sense, Francesco Alinovi’s article ‘Orgasmo 
simulato’ (Simulated orgasm) (2015), brilliantly analyses the relationship 
between sex, eroticism and video games from different points of view, 
including from a physiological perspective. It is clear from this analysis 
how the simple identification that one can project on a character in 
cinema, or in a book, does not suffice to explain what happens in the 
digital. The digital not only refers to the possibilities of interactivity, but 
also to the adoption of a point of view that by definition implies a further 
intertwining of the cognitive agent with other cognitive agents in both 
digital and analog environments, as well as a concrete neurophysiological 
effect upon the subject. Moreover, through the constitution of the 
aforementioned point of view, the subject actually comes to inhabit a 
place in the digital, thus becoming a situated living body: a cognitive, 
embodied agent in relation to others. 
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5.2.2 The Point of View 
 
Deleuze defines the point of view as ‘not exactly a point but a place, a 
position, a site, a “linear focus” [foyer linéaire], a line emanating from 
lines. To the degree that it represents variation or inflection, it can be 
called point of view’ (1988 [1993]: 19-20). The point of view is thus the 
place that can only be inhabited by a soul, by a subject. Nonetheless, this 
subject in no way pre-exists the point of view, but it becomes a subject 
when it comes to inhabit the point of view, thus the point of view 
constitutes it as subject. To become a certain kind of subject necessitates 
transformation, movement and process because variation exists only in 
the point of view:  
A needed relation exists between variation and point of view: 
not simply because of the variety of points of view (though, 
as we shall observe, such a variety does exist), but in the first 
place because every point of view is a point of view on 
variation. (20) 
   
Furthermore, it is never the point of view that varies, but it is through the 
point of view that a subject can apprehend variation: by changing and 
adopting the point of view, the subject is constituted as a subject, and the 
same time it can apprehend variation and change. In this sense, one can 
also easily recall Foucault’s observation regarding the pre-Cartesian 
subject: a subject that needed to change with its object to attain truth and 
 235 
 
to be able to know: a dynamic, changing subject. This observation will be 
expanded upon in the pages that follow.  
The aforementioned references have clarified how the floating signifier 
can constitute a different point of view for the constitution of the subject 
each time. Being constituted and embodied in the digital, in the 
technological unconscious, therefore does not produce an individual, 
unified and static subject, but rather a subject in variation. It is a subject 
that can be understood as a process, or even better, as an event.  
 
5.3 Complex Subjectivities Embodied in the Digital  
 
Michel Foucault’s writing about the relationship between subject and 
truth provides a suitable model to advance the conversation about the 
digital subject. 
Foucault dedicated his Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the 
Collège de France 1981-82 (2001a) to exploring the modalities and 
possibilities of the subject’s access to truth. In the first place, he offers a 
definition of philosophy in order to distinguish it from spirituality. 
Philosophy is the discipline that intends to find the limits and 
possibilities of the subject’s access to truth, while attempting to allow 
this access through study. On the contrary, spirituality does not take this 
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access for granted. To attain truth, the subject must deserve it. It must 
change and elevate itself in order to earn this access. Thus there is no 
access to truth without a radical transformation of the subject (15). It is 
therefore evident how modern philosophy conceives of a static subject, 
while spirituality considers the truth as something permanent while the 
subject constantly changes in order to hopefully reach said truth.  
Foucault believes that the modern age of the history of truth begins when 
the subject can have access to truth trough the sole power of knowledge, 
through study and without having to change in any way. He writes: 
 
I think the modern age of the history of truth begins when 
knowledge itself and knowledge alone gives access to the 
truth. That is to say, it is when the philosopher (or the 
scientist, or simply someone who seeks the truth) can 
recognize the truth and have access to it in himself and solely 
through his activity of knowing, without anything else being 
demanded of him and without him having to change or alter 
his being as subject. […] 
 
If we define spirituality as being the form of practices which 
postulate that, such as he is, the subject is not capable of the 
truth, but that, such as it is, the truth can transfigure and save 
the subject, then we can say that the modern age of the 
relations between the subject and truth begin when it is 
postulated that, such as he is, the subject is capable of truth, 
but that, such as it is, the truth cannot save the subject. (17-
19) 
 
Foucault identifies the breaking point with the previous paradigm in 
Descartes and the loss of the dimension of the care of the self. The idea 
of “knowing oneself” was at the base of the care of the self in Greek, 
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Roman-Greek and Christian cultures, therefore Foucault inquires how 
this dimension was lost. How did the relevance of the care of the self lose 
its importance on the path of the access to truth? Foucault finds the 
answer in Descartes and the Cartesian moment, which is synonymous 
with the birth of Modern thought, and that eliminates the care of the self 
as a means to access truth. Knowledge, from then on, is the only means 
that warrants this access, and most importantly, there is no need for the 
subject to change in order to attain it (16). The pre-Cartesian subject is 
also the active and changing subject that Foucault refers to when giving 
his definition of the subject as a form that is never the same, which 
reconfigures itself in its interaction with different apparatuses and 
instances. Again, this active characteristic is attained through the 
practices of the care of the self as quoted above. 
Remembering and reconsidering the characteristics of the active, pre-
Cartesian subject can help build a theoretical framework that explains the 
construction of the digital subject.  
In the same way that the pre-Cartesian subject had to change to attain 
truth, thus changing with the object/world, the digital subject comes to 
varied points of view, which constitutes her as a subject in the digital:  
Such is the basis of perspectivism, which does not mean a 
dependence in respect to a pre-given or defined subject: to 
the contrary, a subject will be what comes to the point of 
view, or rather what remains (demeure) in the point of view. 
That is why the transformation of the object refers to a 
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correlative transformation of the subject [...]. (Deleuze 1988 
[1993]: 19-20) 
 
Remarkably, this perspectivism does not imply relativism. It doesn’t 
imply a variation of truth related to the subject’s will or belief, but rather 
on the contrary is ‘the condition in which the truth of a variation appears 
to the subject’ (20).  
There is always variation in the assumption of an ever-changing point of 
view that has already been identified in the floating signifier. At the same 
time, the virtual/digitalised world and the object can only be actualised in 
monads, in the subject. She changes in the same movement because ‘if 
the status of the object is profoundly changed, so also is that of the 
subject’ (19). Therefore if a digitised world exists it is because there was 
a deep change in the object/world, which necessarily implies a change in 
the subject, that is the digital subject: it is a subject that assuming a point 
of view, occupies the place built for her in the collective dimension of the 
technological unconscious by the floating signifier, and through this 
process constitutes itself as a new subjectivity. In doing so, the subject 
actualises this world—generating meaning and in the process changing 
with it—becoming a digital subject, a subject who is embodied in the 
digital. This conceptualisation has the advantage of definitively 
eliminating the idea that human interaction within digital and artificial 
environments is disembodied, as well as weakening an anthropocentric 
perspective.  Instead, as I’ve explained above, this text proposes 
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considering this entity as a new kind of embodiment that simultaneously 
inhabits and conforms these complex environments. If the posthumanist 
subject implies an overcoming of the boundaries of the liberal humanist 
subject, it is not only because these limits have been trespassed by the 
machinic and digital networks, but because they have been also 
trespassed by other subjectivities, which are part of the technological 
unconscious.  
In this sense, it’s worth remembering the collective dimension of the 
technological unconscious: thinking about the technological unconscious 
as a plane of immanence as the place for the emergence of a complex 
subjectivity in collective terms allows us to consider the digital subject 
not only as a cyborg, as a subject in constant feedback loops with the 
machinic, but also as a distributed, multiple and complex subjectivity that 
is symbolically structured amidst a collective dimension. The digital 
subject thus fosters a shared and collective unconscious structure that 
partly constructs its subjectivity, but to which she also contributes to 
determining. Hayles asserts that technology goes in certain directions and 
not others, in part, because of the collective imaginary featured in 
literature—which could be extended to cartoons, films and other cultural 
manifestations (1999: 21). When Hayles delineates these formats as an 
anticipatory imaginary of technology, she is in part saying that certain 
ideas “are in the air”, which is partly what the imaginary is. Another way 
of putting it would be to say that all of these ideas and developments 
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follow the desires, or more accurately the programs, of a collective 
technological unconscious. 
The iPhone’s robotic assistant Siri provides a concrete, if a bit pedestrian, 
example of how this works: 61 when the user launches Siri, she or he 
(depending the user’s preference and the availability for each language) 
will ask her what she needs. From that point, Siri will “learn” about the 
user and from her. For example, if the user asks “Call my sister” Siri will 
then ask, “Who’s your sister”? After knowing the name, Siri will look it 
up in the address book and call her. From then on, every time the user 
asks for her sister, Siri will call that name in the address book. Siri learns 
from the users’ accents and expressions, yet she can also fake emotions 
like jealousy.62 Thus, Siri perfects itself as it interacts with a variety of 
people with different accents in the different languages it is available 
in—potentially being able to eventually awaken feelings of sympathy, 
                                                
61
 On Apple’s website (2015), the brief text defining Siri urges iPhone users to: ‘talk to 
Siri as you would to a friend and it can help you get things done—like sending 
messages, placing calls, and making dinner reservations. You can ask Siri to show you 
the Orion constellation or to flip a coin. Siri works hands-free, so you can ask it to show 
you the best route home and what your ETA is while driving. It works with HomeKit to 
let your voice be the remote control for connected products in your home. And it’s 
tuned in to the world, working with Wikipedia, Yelp, Rotten Tomatoes, Shazam, and 
other online services to get you even more answers. The more you use Siri, the more 
you’ll realize how great it is. And just how much it can do for you’. 
http://www.apple.com/ios/siri/ 
62
 My mother language is Spanish, yet I live in Italy where I study, teach and write in 
English every day in addition to speaking Italian. When I got my iPhone three years 
ago, I tried to use Siri in all three languages. Ironically, Spanish Siri couldn’t understand 
my Argentine accent and Italian Siri was not available at the time. British Siri seemed to 
understand me better than American Siri. I made some effort with Spanish Siri and 
chose a male voice. Once, when he called the number I asked him to, I said “Thank you, 
handsome”, to which he answered “I am sure you say that to all your devices”. 
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and perhaps even empathy. So while Siri obtains information and 
improves its performance through interaction with human cognisers, 
human cognisers may also develop feelings of empathy with Siri.63 In 
this sense, Siri’s performance and the ways it affects humans entwine 
through complex feedback loops that are undoubtedly multiple and 
collective, rather than a relationship between a singular subject and an 
individual-computer.  
Of course, this “learning” from the users happens in all “low-level” 
artificial intelligences, but the process is also active the other way 
around: in entering the feedback loop with the computer and its different 
programs, the user learns and performs the algorithm implied in them 
(Manovich 2001). The logic of the ‘computer layer’, as Manovich calls 
it, interpenetrates the logic of the ‘cultural layer’, and both are partly 
unconscious, and collective. The fact that today one cannot conceive of a 
smart phone without the copy-paste function—which was an irritating 
flaw of the first iPhone—is a perfect example. Being able to copy-paste 
is now part of our collective capabilities and necessities, and it was a 
feature that not so many years ago was not possible, despite the fact that 
it was more or less consciously desired.  
                                                
63
 In Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other 
(2011), Sherry Turkle has deeply, and at time apocalyptically, analysed the current 
human tendency to fill certain personal and emotional lacks with technology (whether 
through social networks, chat rooms, or robots). Turkle maintains that we’ve developed 
feelings for robots that should be addressed to people, and that we nurture these 
relationships instead of facing fears and flaws in order to be able to maintain 
satisfactory human relations with other humans, or without the mediation of digital 
networks. 
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At this point, thinking about the subject as process—as an event, an 
active and ever changing subject—becomes pertinent. It’s obviously 
impossible to conceive of subjectivities in terms of the boundaries of the 
body or to view the brain as a simple information processor. The digital 
subject not only helps understand the implications and characteristics of 
this kind of subjectivity, but it also reveals its immersion in a collective 
dimension of the technological unconscious—which contributes to the 
formation of a complex subjectivity as much as the feedback loops with 
the machinic.  
Two different projects help to illustrate this point: The Exceptional and 
the Every Day: 144 Hours in Kyiv and Camera Restricta. The 
Exceptional and the Every Day: 144 Hours in Kyiv (2014) is an artistic 
project undertaken by Lev Manovich in collaboration with Jay Chow, 
Alise Tifentale and Mehrdad Yazdani. As the artist’s website64 explains, 
the project  
is the first […] to analyze the use of Instagram during a social 
upheaval. Using computational and data visualization 
techniques, we explore 13,208 Instagram images shared by 
6,165 people in the central area of Kyiv during 2014 
Ukrainian revolution (February 17 - February 22, 2014).  
 
Without using hierarchal categorisation, or any form of ordering that is 
not strictly geographic, the project aims to assemble all of the photos that 
                                                
64
 http://manovich.net/index.php/exhibitions/hours-in-kiev 
http://www.the-everyday.net/ 
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Instagram users in the area posted during those dates as a means of 
showing how common, every day life mixes with extraordinary and 
dramatic events like war.  
 
 
Fig. 38. Lev Manovich, Jay Chow, Alise Tifentale, and Mehrdad Yazdani, The 
Exceptional and the Every Day: 144 Hours in Kyiv, 2014. (Screenshot). Available from: 
http://www.the-everyday.net/. 
 
The artists not only analysed images but also metadata like tags, time and 
geo-location in order to build a chart. Their intention was to show war 
from the perspective of ordinary people who had to carry on with their 
daily routines while coping with its incursion into their lives. As 
Manovich explained, this is a new angle that doesn’t normally emerge 
from professional reportage for print or television, which usually focuses 
on the most exceptional and salient events. The project’s perspective isn’t 
necessarily “truer” than a professional one, yet it deftly illustrates how 
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the technological unconscious emerges as a collective dimension (which 
is largely inaccessible to the individual subject). Instagram is often used 
uncritically with little reflection on how the platform operates—an aspect 
that Flusser could have certainly commented upon at length, and not 
positively. Yet applying the appropriate methodological analysis and 
adopting a clearly defined point of view may also show certain 
information that users didn’t necessarily intend to display, nor were even 
aware that they were even displaying. In this sense, the application’s 
technological unconscious worked with its own logic—like grouping and 
displaying certain photos in a certain location and making them available 
for other unknown users in remote locations—while Manovich and his 
team assumed a point of view in the plane of immanence that made 
meaning emerge.  
A second, more critical and sarcastic example, is Danish interaction 
designer Phillip Schmitt’s Camera Restricta. Not strictly an artistic 
project, this camera obstructs a user from taking photos of a place, 
monument or building that its algorithm determines has already been 
photographed too many times. In other words, Camera Restricta forbids 
clichés. Its tagline on the designer’s website states: ‘A disobedient tool 
for taking unique photographs’. Schmitt elaborates on how it functions:  
Camera Restricta is a speculative design of a new kind of 
camera. It locates itself via GPS and searches online for 
photos that have been geo-tagged nearby. If the camera 
decides that too many photos have been taken at your 
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location, it retracts the shutter and blocks the viewfinder. You 
can't take any more pictures here.65 
 
Therefore, the Camera Restricta wouldn’t let a user standing in front of 
the Eiffel Tower take the same photo that millions of tourists have 
already taken. The apparatus thus forces the user to find new points of 
view.  
 
 
Fig.39. Phillip Schmitt, Camera Restricta. A disobedient tool for taking unique 
photographs, 2015. 
 
Of course the success of such a device is yet to be seen:66 why would 
someone buy a camera that doesn’t allow her to take the photos she 
                                                
65
 http://philippschmitt.com/projects/camera-restricta 
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wants where and when she decides? Why wouldn’t someone be able to 
take as many photos of the Eiffel Tower as she wants? Or a photo of their 
cappuccino or their feet extended in front of the sea, for that matter? All 
kidding aside, this compelling idea potentially holds great subversive 
power: in this case, the machine’s technological unconscious can help 
fight against stereotypes by pushing the user to find new points of view. 
In doing so, Camera Restricta makes the user aware when she falls into a 
repetitive cliché67. In doing so, the camera forces the viewer to occupy 
new floating signifiers to empty with new meaning. It propels the viewer 
outside of known, stereotyped comfort zones and towards a possible 
encounter with the unknown. Of course, this doesn’t guarantee that the 
user will necessarily find something interesting or relevant, but the 
design offers the possibility of opening new, as yet explored territories. 
At the same time, this kind of apparatus illustrates how easily we adopt 
                                                                                                                   
66
 As a matter of fact, the camera hasn’t seemed to be very successful so far: 
http://www.repubblica.it/tecnologia/prodotti/2015/09/17/news/la_fotocamera_che_si_rif
iuta_di_scattare_foto_banali-122914628/?ref=HRERO-1 
67
 In this sense, an artistic/technological project like SuperCut (supercut.org) is 
somehow an antecedent even if a less “subversive” and interactive one. The SuperCut 
was developed in just twenty-four hours by Andy Baio and Michael Bell-Smith on May 
2011 as part of Rhizome’s Seven on Seven program. On the website, the programmers 
define SuperCuts as follows: ‘“Supercuts” are obsessive-compulsive montages of video 
clips, meticulously isolating every instance of a single item, usually clichés, phrases, 
and other tropes. […]Supercut.org is a site dedicated to documenting the cultural 
phenomenon in a clean, browsable index that anyone can contribute to’. Thus the 
website is collectively constructed, and even if it was not necessarily the initial aim of 
the project, it brings forward many clichés from audiovisual media, especially cinema 
and TV series. People contribute their supercuts and identify certain tropes that have 
been repeated so many times as to be completely emptied of meaning, and thus, become 
cliché. One hilarious example is a trope entitled “Zoom and Enhance” 
(http://supercut.org/video/88/), that reveals the much-abused motif in a film or 
television series, during which a character identifies a key event, face or hint in a piece 
footage or photo, and makes the person managing it to “zoom” in, and then “enhance” 
the section with the discovery.  
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simple views, thus making a collectively unconscious banal tendency 
evident to the user so she can avoid them in favour of exploring different 
possibilities and assuming new points of view. This example illustrates 
how the assumption of a point of view in the technological unconscious’ 
plane of immanence can generate new meaning while the subject 
changes, or can change, through its interaction with the apparatus and 
other cognitive agents. The Camera Restricta does not adhere to a 
classical definition of interactivity, yet it is precisely the collective 
dimension of this apparatus’ technological unconscious—which is in part 
constructed through the millions of geo-located photographs circulating 
online—that determines whether or not a user will be permitted to take a 
certain shot. 
The process of digitalisation of the subject necessarily implies the 
conception of a subject embodied in the digital, rather than a fiction in 
which the subject becomes a “discrete” or “virtual creature”. The digital 
subject is neither completely fragmented, nor a projection of an original, 
material self, but instead finds the possibility of inhabiting the digital 
though the assumption of a point of view. This assumption of the point of 
view is embodied because, as a cognitive agent, the digital subject 
engages in feedback loops with complex environments—both digital and 
analogue. The explanation of this process has been grounded both on the 
concepts of enaction and embodied cognition put forth by Maturana, 
Rosch and Thompson, as well as Derrida’s concept of writing and 
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deferral, which has the radical force of avoiding both representation and 
of making evident how the subject modifies the environments which she 
helps construct—and is modified and constructed by these environments 
in turn. This is also part of the mutation the subject undergoes in order to 
reach the point of view in the plane of immanence, the collective 
dimension of which has already been outlined at length. This process of 
mutation marks a definitive erasure of the division between subject and 
object—because both have been dissolved in feedback loops that engage 
digital and non-digital environments and complex, collectively-structured 
embodied subjectivities.  
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6.	Medium 
 
In her book How We Became Posthuman (1999), Katherine Hayles analysed 
the process through which the conception of the liberal humanist subject led the 
way to the posthuman subject, a subject who lives in complete intertwining 
with the digital. However, this process was not innocuous. As mentioned 
several times in the previous chapters, it made the (imaginary) perception that 
information could do without material instantiation pervasive within many 
fields of knowledge, a process that Hayles claims originated in the Macy 
Conferences and the evolution of cybernetic theory. This research identified an 
analogous process within the artistic realm:  when Clement Greenberg 
delineated the concepts of opticality and colour field as the main characteristics 
that “defined” modernist painting, he conceived of these in a purely 
disembodied subject (Krauss 1993). In this context, this chapter proposes 
considering that the actual overcoming of modernism comes along with the 
advent of the posthuman—tracing its origin to Marcel Duchamp and his 
“invention” of the readymade, and not with postmodernism—the theoretical 
consistency of which, at least within the artistic field, this research questions. In 
doing so, this text intends to unify the main concepts and theories of the artistic 
field with those of cybernetics, to bring together ‘Turing land’ and ‘Duchamp 
land’.  
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The posthuman was initially defined along with Hayles as the trespassing of the 
limits of the humanist liberal subject. However, in the fourth and fifth chapters 
complementary theorisations were proposed to further elaborate on this 
definition. In this sense, the relationship between technological unconscious, 
floating signifier and complex subjectivities is pertinent to expand the notion of 
the posthuman. 
In order to examine the whole process, it is necessary at this point to 
understand the different acceptations of the concept of medium within the 
context of modernist and postmodernist theory. 
 
6.1 The Medium in Modernism and Postmodernism 
  
The critical debate on the passage from modernism to postmodernism 
takes completely different points of reference, depending on whether its 
object is the visual arts, architecture, philosophy or literature. Within the 
context of visual art, the concept of medium is the common thread that 
goes through the debate. The idea of ‘medium specificity’ is also at the 
centre of the debate, beginning with Clement Greenberg’s writings, 
which were subsequently strongly criticised by Rosalind Krauss and 
Thierry De Duve. 
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In ‘Avant-Garde and Kitsch’ (1939) Greenberg states that, not finding 
inspiration in the external world, the artist has to turn to abstraction. The 
content of the work dissolves into form, so that it cannot be reduced to 
anything that is not within its limits (6). To find aesthetic validity, and 
not be arbitrary, art must focus on its medium, on its ‘processes and 
disciplines’ (6), which Greenberg identifies with its material support: 
namely, flatness and the delimitation of flatness. 
According to Krauss, Greenberg thought modernism would lie in the 
attempt of the various kinds of art to seek out and show the constitutive 
elements, or languages, intrinsic to them. In modernist theory each art 
should reach the highest level of “pureness” and use only its intrinsic 
traits, like bi-dimensionality and colour in the case of painting. This is 
why, for Greenberg, abstraction would become a synonym of painting 
itself (Krauss 1999c: 156). Greenberg rarely talked about “medium”, but 
in a collection of essays published in 1961 entitled Art and Culture, he 
writes about the ideal relationship between form and content in the work 
of art or literature, stating that the genesis of abstraction has its origin in 
the complete melting of form into content in such a way that the work of 
art (or literature) cannot be reduced in any way to anything other than 
itself (Greenberg 1961: 5-6). In one of the few times that he explicitly 
uses the word “medium”, Greenberg clearly identifies it with the 
materiality of the work. When talking about the art of the Middle Ages, 
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he states that as the subject of the artwork was determined in advance by 
the commissioners, ‘the artist was free to focus on his medium’ (16). 
In this way, the modernist position—of which Greenberg is the 
paradigmatic case insofar as art critique is concerned—identified matter 
with medium. Its pureness was related with its famous ‘intrinsic 
properties’, namely, flatness and colour:  
By now it has been established, it would be seen, that the 
irreducible essence of pictorial art consists in but two 
constitutive conventions or norms: flatness and delimitation 
of flatness; and the observance of these merely two norms is 
enough to create an object which can be experienced as a 
picture: thus, a stretched or tacked-up canvas already exists 
as a picture- though not necessarily as a successful one. 
(Greenberg 1961: 40) 
 
In The Transfiguration of the Commonplace (1981) Arthur Danto aimed 
to develop a philosophy of art that could explain the ontological 
difference between a common object and an artwork. In short, he was 
looking for a definition for “art”. As is well known, his endeavour had 
little success. Yet through this attempt Danto became one of the first 
theorists to deconstruct68 Greenberg’s position when analysing mimetic 
representation and the ‘theory of transparency’ (Danto 1981: 229), even 
if he never names Greenberg, or modernism. The theory of transparency 
supposes a complete identification of the artwork with its content, 
understanding its material support as completely invisible or 
                                                
68
 Here I borrow and decontextualise Derrida’s term. 
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‘transparent’ as long as meaning concerns. When developing his critique, 
Danto clarified the difference between matter and medium: 
The medium, towards which the theory of transparency took 
such a straitlaced posture as to pretend it didn’t exist, cannot 
ever be eliminated. There will always be a rest of matter 
which cannot be evaporated in pure content. Even so, one has 
to make the difference between medium and matter. (1981: 
229) 
 
For Danto it was clear that a work’s materiality always emerged and in 
some way influenced the content of a work. Danto called the opposite 
issue, on which Rosalind Krauss would deeply elaborate later, ‘the theory 
of opacity’: 
In the contemporary art world there is a tendency as 
reductionist as it was the theory of transparency. We could 
call it the theory of opacity […] It is the theory that the 
artwork is only the matter of what it is made. 
The issue of the content of an artwork cannot be logically 
rejected, even if it doesn’t have any, given that the medium 
cannot be identified with matter. (Danto 1981: 229) 
 
Not quoting Greenberg directly, it is evident that the theory of opacity 
coincides with the modernist position on the ‘intrinsic possibilities of 
painting’. Without further elaborating on this claim, mainly because it 
was not a central concern of his writing, Danto provides a definition of 
medium that extends beyond its identification with mere materiality. 
A few years later, Thierry de Duve dedicated his book Pictorial 
Nominalism: On Marcel Duchamp’s Passage from Painting to the 
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Readymade (1984) to Marcel Duchamp’s abandonment of painting. De 
Duve’s contends that Duchamp invented the readymade and abandoned 
painting during the same years that avant-garde artists working in Paris 
turned towards abstraction or the abandonment of figuration (around 
1912). De Duve maintains that Marcel Duchamp’s abandonment of the 
pictorial practice, the birth of abstraction in painting, Duchamp’s 
‘invention of the ready-made’ and the process of industrialisation are 
events that are fundamentally intertwined. He proposes reading these 
events in relation to each other—he does not see them as separated 
events like Greenberg does; from this de Duve derives another account of 
the ‘birth of abstraction’ and of the very idea of art discovering its 
‘intrinsic languages’, which is the central idea of modernism. 
Greenberg thought that this deconstruction had a limit and 
modern painters got rid of the ‘expandable conventions’ of 
painting to show an irreducible reminder consisting of its 
‘essential conventions’.  (de Duve 1984: 156) 
 
Moreover, the ready-made must be considered in light of Duchamp’s pictorial 
practice. In spite of its three-dimensionality, the readymade is not a 
continuation of sculpture, but rather painting. Therefore, it should be analysed 
within the context of the pictorial tradition (de Duve 1996: 150). De Duve 
proposes considering this pictorial practice as ‘pictorial nominalism’, which 
would imply the passage from an ontological to an epistemological conception 
of painting: from the conception of ‘painting as being’ to the conception 
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‘painting as knowing’ (1984: 156). 
Duchamp “invented” the readymade through the re-contextualisation of 
everyday, industrially produced objects like the bike wheel or the urinal. Yet, as 
de Duve illustrates in Kant after Duchamp (1996), the artist also conceived of 
painting as a form of readymade—or more precisely, of ‘art as choosing’ (161-
162). In the Symposium Art as Assemblage in 1961 (quoted in de Duve 1996: 
163), Duchamp explained that painting was essentially the process of choosing 
between different tubes of paint: the painter assembles her palette. Even if she 
mixes to create shades of different colours, the tube of paint was nonetheless 
‘readymade’. Thus, the impossibility of the artist creating something ex nihilo, 
from scratch, was evident for Duchamp. Working with everyday objects rather 
than readymade colours was a natural evolution of the artist’s concept, and for 
Duchamp, comprised the cornerstone of an artistic practice rooted in selection 
rather than manual production (162). 
A link to industrialisation—which was almost unbearable to an artist like 
Picasso (Krauss 1998) or to a critic like Greenberg—was thus irrelevant for 
Duchamp. In considering ‘art as choosing’ and not in making with his own 
hands, his artistic ability remained untouched. It didn’t matter to him whether 
he selected from handmade objects or industrially fabricated ones. 
Ironically, de Duve also shows how Greenberg’s extreme conception of 
painting as flatness—an exaggeration of the intrinsic properties of painting—
actually defined painting as exactly what he hated most: the readymade.  
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According to Greenberg’s definition of painting, one could state that a blank 
canvas, such as one that could be bought in an artistic supply shop, was already 
a picture. De Duve writes: 
He found himself fetishizing the formal characteristics of 
painting and the very unpainted canvas. 
Since these formal characteristics no longer depend on craft, 
they had to take refuge in the empirical conventions of easel 
paintings, in the very fact of being flat and delimited pieces 
of canvas stretched on a frame. […] 
In taking things to this level of absurdity, Greenberg’s 
arguments show the impasse to which an ontological 
conception of the specificity of painting must lead. 
Concerned to show that ‘modernist painting’ only 
deconstructs the historical conventions of painting one by 
one, in order to better anchor it to the irreducible being, his 
arguments end up localizing this being on the formal and 
technical qualities of an unpainted canvas, a readymade 
bought in a supply store! (de Duve 1984: 156) 
 
De Duve’s book attempts to revert what he calls ‘the central aporia of 
postmodernism’: namely, only being able ‘to conceive of what is called 
“postmodern” through the historicist and avant-garde categories of 
modernism’ (1984: xxi). This is why postmodernism doesn’t have to be 
another modernist rupture. He claims, ‘it is not the end to pictorial 
originality, but the arrival of another conception of it, a new kind of 
aesthetic questioning’ (1984: xxi). De Duve proposes reading 
postmodernism and this new kind of aesthetic questioning through 
nominalism: a practice he claimed Duchamp and industrialisation 
introduced. Thus, he proposes interpreting Duchamp’s oeuvre, especially 
the invention of the readymade, in a nominalist key. 
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Nominalism is ‘the doctrine that only individual or disparate things exist 
and that our classifications of them are only contingent and changeable 
inventions’ (xxi). This means that what is often considered to be ‘a 
picture or a painting is not given by an essential nature’ (xii). Things 
taken for granted as essential to the practice of painting (such as bi-
dimensionality) were only ways to name or conceive of painting’s 
possibilities: ‘[Duchamp] liked the cosa mentale of painting, but he knew 
that the mental must be incarnated in the visible if is not to run the risk of 
becoming literary or philosophic and thereby cease to be painting’ (de 
Duve 1984: 44). The difference between retinal and conceptual was not 
the same for Duchamp and Joseph Kosuth: for the former, it was not so 
much that abstract painting was retinal, but rather that the idea of it 
was—it was a kind of painting placed under a certain idea of art (de 
Duve 1984: 45). Therefore, the passage from conceiving painting as 
being (modernist position), to painting as knowing (Duchamp’s invention 
of the readymade) implies the passage from an ontological to an 
epistemological conception of the pictorial practice. 
 Many points that Frederic Jameson makes in his critique of 
postmodernism entitled Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism (1991) coincide with De Duve’s writing on the ‘central aporia 
of postmodernism”. For instance, Jameson illustrates that Jean-François 
Lyotard’s version of postmodernist theory uses the category of 
“narrative” to explain itself (i.e. the end of narratives). Both Jameson and 
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de Duve contend that postmodernism continues to use the historicist 
categories of modernism to develop its own theory, thus it contains 
mimesis in its own title—replicating another theory, most often 
modernism itself. 
A historical reading of postmodernism, rather than a stylistic 
one, would not consider postmodernism to be a style to 
choose among many others, but instead ‘as the cultural 
dominant of the logic of late capitalism’, which can allow ‘a 
genuinely dialectical attempt to think our present of time in 
History’ (Jameson 1991: 44-45). 
 
To avoid the danger of homogenisation by this periodising hypothesis, 
Jameson proposed, following Raymond Williams, understanding 
Postmodernism ‘as a cultural dominant: a conception which allows for 
the presence and coexistence of a range of very different, yet subordinate, 
features’ (Jameson 1991: 5). This cultural dominant is what in fact 
defines postmodernism, and makes it a feature of modernism, and not an 
independent paradigm: 
I am very far from feeling that all cultural production today is 
“postmodern” in the broad sense I will be conferring on this 
term. The postmodern is, however, the force field in which 
very different kinds of cultural impulses—what Raymond 
Williams has usefully termed “residual” and “emergent” 
forms of cultural production—must make their way. If we do 
not achieve some general sense of a cultural dominant, then 
we fall back into a view of present history as sheer 
heterogeneity, random difference, a coexistence of a host of 
distinct forces whose effectivity is undecidable. (Jameson 
1991: 5) 
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In addition to the ‘death of the author’ and its erasure of the high-
modernist notion of personal “style”,69 the postmodern also introduced 
pastiche—which entails the (indiscriminate) re-utilisation of styles from 
the past or from other artists and their decontextualisation in space and 
time. Unlike parody, which consciously presents an exaggeration of a 
certain style for comic and ironic effect, pastiche empties the overlapped 
and mixed styles evacuating them of their original significance or 
meaning. 
According to Jameson, pastiche is mainly caused by the disappearance of 
the subject. This elimination of style is blank irony, which is like parody 
but without an aim: it is ‘pure laughter’. 
The disappearance of the individual subject, along with its 
formal consequence, the increasing unavailability of the 
personal style, engender the well-nigh universal practice 
today of what may be called pastiche. This concept, […] is to 
be sharply distinguished from the more readily received idea 
of parody. (Jameson 1991: 15) 
 
Without the possibility of imitating ‘personal styles’—because there are 
no personalities, or feelings, or authors to imitate—parody disappears 
and pastiche comes in. Pastiche is parody emptied of its linguistic 
possibilities, of ‘ulterior motives’. After digging in the past, it 
resuscitates dead historical styles as cultural zombies. ‘This situation 
evidently determines what the architecture historians call “historicism,” 
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 Individual style was a predominant element of the study of art history since Wölfflin.  
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namely, the random cannibalization of all the styles of the past, the play 
of random stylistic allusion, and in general what Henri Lefebvre has 
called the increasing primacy of the “neo”’ (Jameson 1991: 15). 
Pastiche, the historicist vein of postmodernism, can be clearly 
appreciated in architecture (and the appetite for architecture). But, as 
Jameson mentions, this desire to consume is not directed towards quality 
spaces of architecture itself, but it is in fact an appetite for photography: 
for what can be called mediated architecture. Buildings are projected to 
exist, and to be consumed as an image rather than habitable spaces, in 
exactly the same way that ‘the deepest subject of all video art, and of all 
postmodernism itself, is precisely reproductive technology itself’ 
(Jameson 1991: 96). This consideration of postmodernism still 
acknowledges the historical vector, whilst, as it will be shown, other 
theorisations will tend to eliminate it. 
More recently Rosalind Krauss (1999a) expanded the definition of 
“medium”, criticising Greenberg’s position (as usual) and theorising the 
possibilities of its ‘reinvention’. When Greenberg identified the specific 
traits of painting as the mere physical characteristics of its support—
namely, bi-dimensionality and colour—he emptied the term medium of 
any of its aesthetic possibilities, erasing the concept of medium itself 
(16). This implosion caused what Krauss calls the ‘post-medium 
condition’, a status generated by the implosion of the term medium that, 
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contrary to Greenberg’s intentions, blurred any demarcation of 
specificity. As a result, artistic practice came to be identified as ‘art in 
general’: art is not painting, sculpture or video anymore, but simply art 
that operates with the resources that the artist finds significant or 
instrumental for her practice at any given time. Moreover, Krauss 
identifies a semantic shift that replaces the term medium with media—
both in terms of mass media and also the plural of medium as a collective 
noun: precisely, the post-medium condition. 
How did this shift come about? How was medium reinvented? And how 
did it continue to reinvent itself over and over again? The medium does 
not simply coincide with the material support or technique, but it also 
involves the conventions with which a particular genre operates, 
articulates or works on that support: 
For in order to sustain artistic practice, a medium must be a 
supporting structure, generative of a set of conventions, some 
of which, in assuming the medium itself as their subject, will 
be wholly ‘specific’ to it, thus producing an experience of 
their own necessity. (Krauss 1999a: 26) 
 
In the sixties, opticality became a medium of its own. It was in a certain 
way, Greenberg’s own re-invention of the medium, even though, as it 
will be shown, the operation doesn’t fully coincide with the process of re-
invention of the medium as Krauss describes it. Yet it certainly helped 
Greenberg escape his own cage: that is to say, the complete identification 
of the medium with materiality. Greenberg thought that he had isolated 
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the essence of painting in bi-dimensionality, the delimitation of flatness. 
However, he would shift his analysis from the field of the real, vertical 
pictorial surface to define opticality as the vector that connects the 
vertical pictorial surface with the viewer—thus defining opticality as a 
phenomenological relationship, and not as a certain materiality: 
“Opticality” was thus an entirely abstract, schematized 
version of the link that traditional perspective had formerly 
established between viewer and object, but one that now 
transcends the real parameter of measurable, physical space 
to express the purely projective powers of a pre-objective 
level of sight: “vision itself”. (Krauss 1999a: 29) 
 
The most relevant aspect of this definition for the context of this research is 
how Greenberg conceives of opticality not only as a new medium in itself, but 
also as a completely disembodied conception of vision: it was a purely optical 
phenomenological relationship with vision (18-19). This disembodied 
conception of vision is also out of time, it is ‘virtual’ in the sense that it is ‘out 
of the here and now’ (Lévy 1995: 9-11), outside of the physical coordinates of 
place. It seems paradoxical and ironic that Greenberg’s first conception of 
medium identified it with the strictly physical characteristics of the support, 
whilst this second is completely ‘virtual’, as defined by Lévy: completely 
disembodied and almost transcendental, as is the exit from the ‘here and now’. 
It seems relevant here to mention Katherine Hayles’ definition of ‘materiality’, 
which she outlines in her book My Mother Was a Computer. As already 
extensively explained, Hayles has argued, both in this book and previous texts, 
 263 
 
against the idea of disembodiment in the context of new media at large, and 
more specifically regarding texts and electronic texts. In this sense, her 
definition shows interesting coincidences with Krauss’ definition of medium 
(italics are mine): 
The following definition provides a way to think about texts 
as embodied entities without falling into the chaos of infinite 
difference: The materiality of an embodied text is the 
interaction of its physical characteristics with its signifying 
strategies.  
Centered in the artifact, this notion of materiality extends 
beyond the individual object, for its physical characteristics 
are the result of the social, cultural, and technological 
processes that brought it into being. (103) 
 
The above quote illustrates the impossibility of any medium being disembodied 
(even if not talking about “medium”), plus the collective dimension that adds 
meaning to it—a dimension that Krauss implies when she talks about the ‘set of 
conventions’, but does not particularly emphasise (which proves to be 
particularly pertinent in this context). 
 
6.2 Art at Large 
 
Before delving deeper into the crucial conceptualisation of opticality as a 
disembodied kind of vision and its consequences, it is important to 
further analyse the reinvention of the medium. In this sense, it is worth 
remembering that Krauss is inspired by Walter Benjamin and his 
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conception of the redemptive characteristics of the obsolescence of the 
medium: The medium is redeemed in its aesthetic possibilities once it has 
become obsolete, once its interest as a commodity of mass consumption 
has been definitely lost (1999a: 41). 
 Therefore, for Krauss the reinvention of the medium, as an ensemble of 
conditions derived from the material conditions of a given technical 
support, consists in developing a form of expression from these 
conditions that can be at the same time ‘projective and mnemonic’ (58). 
In short, it means that once a medium has become obsolete the artist can 
recontextualise and re-signify it to make its utopian and real aesthetic 
possibilities emerge. Putting it in more banal words, it is the idea of 
vintage.70 
According to this line of reasoning, put forth by Krauss but followed 
more recently by many other theorists like Domenico Quaranta (2010), 
the current time is that of the post-medium condition. After the 
interpretation of the medium as a mere material support, and then as 
opticality, the medium is cancelled through the evacuation of all its 
aesthetic significance. According to Krauss, this is what defines the post-
medium condition: the medium has been ‘exploded’ to return to the 
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 A certain commodity becomes old-fashioned in the period immediately after it 
becomes obsolete, but some time later its aesthetic possibilities arise, freed as it is of its 
interest as object of consumption, and so it becomes vintage. 
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‘complex technological instruments of advertising, of communication 
and of information’ (Krauss 1999b: 16). In short, there are no longer any 
medium-specificities, no “painters” or “sculptors”, but only “artists”.  
The medium has been exploded, and therefore art is art in general. 
Two main factors have determined the beginning of the post-medium 
condition: conceptual art (beginning of course with Duchamp) and video 
art. Conceptual art implodes the idea of an aesthetic medium and turns 
everything into a readymade that collapses the difference between the 
aesthetic and the commoditised or/and industrialised. The constitutive 
heterogeneity of video art, on the other hand, avoids any reduction to an 
essence or unifying core (Krauss 1999a), which means that the notions of 
authorship and a unified materiality are not defining characteristics of 
video art. 
However, it would be more accurate to say that if there is anything that 
can be called post-medium condition, it owes its existence to Marcel 
Duchamp’s invention of the readymade and the conception of art as a 
process of selection (de Duve 1996:162). Thierry de Duve’s writing 
features a subtle yet significant difference in its conception of post-
mediality when compared to Krauss. Duchamp’s invention of the 
readymade was about painting before it was about art in general. It 
legitimated the fact that ‘you can now be an artist without being either a 
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painter, or a sculptor, or a composer, or a writer, or an architect—an artist 
at large’ (154). 
Moreover, it had the effect of making everyone involved talk about art, to 
reflect upon art when seeing it, and to make painting about painting. In 
short, it made art, and its public, become reflexive. It is the effect that de 
Duve calls passing from ‘the specific to the generic’: 
Five years, later, at the New York Independents, Duchamp 
put his abandonment of painting on the record. Fountain 
spoke of art, or prompted people to speak of art in connection 
with it. We have passed from the specific to the generic, and 
this passage is a switch of names. Exit the painter, entre the 
artist, the artist in general. His name was Richard Mutt, that 
is, anybody, since anybody could be an artist at the 
Independents, even a manufacturer of bathroom fixtures 
whose corporate name was The J.L Mott Iron Works. (1996: 
194) 
 
On top of this, the readymade made ‘art as choosing’ pervasive. How 
else can the widespread and popularity that the contemporary conception 
of the role of the curator has? What does the curator do if not choose 
readymades and create a bigger artwork: an exhibition. As Nicolas 
Bourriaud asked, what is the curator if not a DJ of readymades (2001)? 
Not everyone has to agree with this job description of the curator, but this 
is how the role is primarily theorised, described and taught at the 
moment.  
In Krauss’ estimation, the post-medium condition coincides in a certain 
way with postmodernism. There are no longer personal styles, but the 
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personal reinvention of the medium through its own obsolescence, which 
at its time becomes a personal style. A reason for this is Krauss’ 
commitment to fighting the element of “anything goes” that she detected 
in the art of the sixties and Seventies. The introduction of postmodernist 
theory in her writing was a means to both order and limit this tendency, 
which she obviously linked more to pastiche in contemporary art 
(Papaetros and Rose 2014).71 This theorisation also falls into what de 
Duve calls a ‘central aporia of Postmodernism’, and postmodernism 
avails itself of the categories and values of the modern, becoming just 
one of its features.  
The following section will argue that considering the readymade as 
medium can provide a means to overcome this flaw, which has been 
pointed out many times. 
 
6.3 ‘Marcel, no more painting, go get a job’72, or The 
Readymade as Medium. 
 
                                                
71
 Krauss’ early writing, as a student of Clement Greenberg was primarily formalist and 
subsequently phenomenological before the turn described above.   
72
 Duchamp referred to J.J. Sweeney in a 1956 interview that he told this to himself 
when returning to Paris in 1912 (Duchamp 1975 [2005]; also quoted in de Duve 1984, 
1996).  
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Is there another way out of the ‘central aporia of postmodernism’ (de 
Duve 1984: xxi), apart from de Duve’s reading of painting as a 
nominalist practice? Considering the readymade as medium offers 
another possibility. As 20th century art history has illustrated, the 
readymade has proven to be a medium in itself. If one replaces 
‘electronic texts’ with ‘artworks’ in Hayles’ definition of materiality—a 
term that the previous section established as a near synonym of Krauss’ 
definition of medium—the definition will apply equally as well to the 
readymade: ‘The materiality of an artwork [embodied text] is the 
interaction of its physical characteristics with its signifying strategies’. If 
there is something in which the readymade excels, it is in its signifying 
strategies. In fact, the readymade as a medium in itself in part explains 
Clement Greenberg’s visceral refusal of Duchamp and Duchampian art 
because it implies a fully embodied conception of artistic practice. 
Therefore, it is the perfect opposite of Greenberg’s completely 
disembodied conception of art, namely opticality as a medium. 
In this sense, de Duve already showed how the readymade was 
Duchamp’s substitution of painting. The readymade was Duchamp’s way 
out of painting without stopping being an artist altogether.73  
                                                
73
 And painting was already readymade for him, since it is just choosing the readymade 
colours and displaying these colours on a readymade canvas both bought in a supply 
store (de Duve 1996: 161-163).  
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The readymade functions as a medium for all art at large, including 
curatorial practice. Every time an artist is just an artist, and not a 
“painter” or a “sculptor”, she works with the medium of the readymade. 
The readymade not only substituted painting, the bi-dimensionality of the 
canvas, but it became a “blank medium” that could be emptied of any 
necessary materiality. The readymade could thus be described as the 
floating signifier of media. This is what Krauss and others call the ‘post-
medium condition’, however this research would rather call it “the 
readymade as medium”: an empty medium able to be filled with 
whatever materiality is necessary at a given time. It is the “counter-
medium” of opticality, a fully embodied, material, even sensuous 
medium—at least it was for Duchamp. 
The readymade was not simply a “new” medium, but it is also the link 
between art in general and industrialisation. As de Duve advances, the 
readymade is ‘the central complex source of the conceptual problems of 
the pictorial practice’—certainly another excuse for Greenberg to refuse 
Duchamp, and all that he (artistically) implied. For Duchamp, among 
other artists, industrialisation had made painting as an art and craft 
impossible and impracticable because of photography and the industrially 
produced tube of paint. Some artists chose to “fight the battle” against 
industrialisation by turning to abstraction and becoming what could be 
called “mechanical modernists” like Malevich and Mondrian, while 
artists like Seurat created purely “retinal” painting. Duchamp chose the 
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radical path, and as can be expected, he did so with a touch of humour. 
He reinvented the medium of painting by doing two things: firstly, 
transforming “painting” in the act of “choosing”, and secondly, instead of 
choosing among industrially produced canvases and colours, he chose a 
completely finished manufactured object. i.e. the Bicycle Wheel (1913) 
and Fountain (1917). This was Duchamp’s way of keeping painting 
alive. He knew that the only way to do so was to illuminate the causes of 
its death, which—as a practice linked to craft—was industrialisation. The 
readymade as a medium was Duchamp’s way of painting with an 
industrial object, the cause of its very impossibility (de Duve 1984: 155).  
 
Another key point in the readymade as medium is its the definitive 
rupture with taste. Since the readymade is painting without any craftsman 
virtuosity, and it is a way of thinking about painting without painting, 
any judgement of taste becomes superfluous. When curator James 
Johnson Sweeney asked Duchamp how he escaped from the judgment of 
‘good taste’, Duchamp simply replied, ‘through the use of mechanic 
techniques. A mechanical design does not imply a kind of taste’ (1955 
[2005]: 157). What all the avant-gardes perform, but the invention of the 
readymade decisively proves this point, is the definitive rupture between 
the categories of the good, true and beautiful. From then on, art could be 
good and true, but not necessarily beautiful—it’s even better not to be 
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beautiful. Contemporary art becomes “suspicious” and borders on kitsch 
if it is “too pretty”. Prettiness is allowed in design and everyday objects, 
especially if they are industrially produced, but not so easily in art.74 This 
unthinkable rupture in taste has been fully achieved by the readymade as 
medium, it changed the conditions of (industrial) production, and thus, 
the conventions of taste.  
If industrialisation is ‘the central complex source of the conceptual 
problems of the pictorial practice’, then the readymade can be another 
tool for thinking about the virtual and the technological in relation to the 
visual and aesthetic dimensions. In the same move, the readymade 
overturned the virtual (the cosa mentale of painting against its materiality 
and the modernist conception of the medium) and the technological 
(industrial production against craftmanship) and their relationship with 
aesthetics—that is to say, with the category of the beautiful. In this sense, 
the readymade can be considered an embodied-conceptual medium. The 
conceptual dimension is there, and it is indispensable, but it always has a 
material instantiation, which is course of industrial production: it is 
readymade, the aesthetic dimension then is given by the artist’s choice. 
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 I am in debt to Gabriel Kameniecki for some of the ideas expressed in this paragraph 
on beauty, art and taste—especially on the relationship between “accepted” beauty and 
design, which we discussed on the phone (aprox. on October 2006) while I was writing 
the text for a show I curated at the Museo de Arte Moderno de Rosario, Argentina, 
entitled Belleza manifiesta (Manifest Beauty) that took place from May through June 
2007. 
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This is the reason why the readymade as medium is the link that can help 
put modernism and the posthuman in a cybernetic loop, as will be 
explained in the following section. 
 
6.4 Modern, Postmodern & Posthuman 
 
6.4.1 Why Not Postmodernism 
 
‘Qu’est-ce qu’on appelle la postmodernité? Je ne suis pas au courant.’ 
   (Michel Foucault, interview with G. Raulet, 1983) 
  
From the previous section it is not difficult to deduce how as a category 
and historical moment of (art) criticism postmodernism is a continuation 
of modernism—the very category, movement and historical moment that 
it tries to ‘deconstruct’. Not that one want to fall into the same trap of 
Krauss and some other theorists of the “October group” that was 
criticised in the fourth chapter, namely that of analysing a period or a 
movement as if it were a subject. For example, even though Hal Foster 
claims at the beginning of Prosthetic Gods (2004) that  
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For the most part, my methodological ambition is to set modernist 
works and psychoanalytic notions to resonate with one another—
not to impose theory on art, but to see how one might implicate the 
other. Thus Gauguin is queried in relation to the dynamics of the 
dream, Picasso vis-à-vis the structure of the primal scene, Loos in 
relation to the formation of the anal character, Ernst vis-à-vis the 
complications of schizophrenic representation, and so on, but the 
psychoanalytic notions are tested in these encounters as well. As 
we know, psychobiographical accounts and symbolic readings can 
be reductive—often they obscure rather than elucidate the complex 
mediations that obtain between an art object and an art subject 
(artist or viewer)—yet neither kind of interpretation is on offer 
here. I do not read my artists by the book of Freud; rather, I focus 
on points of connection, conscious and not, between modernism 
and psychoanalysis—on common interests in origin stories and 
heroic fictions, in moments of regression and reaction, in 
imbrications of enigma and desire, in relays between traumatic 
events and psychological defenses (fetishistic and apotropaic 
representations appear frequently in this book) (xxii) 
 
he does in fact “analyse” in the psychoanalytic sense artistic movements 
and artists discussed along the book; as when he states:  
This reaction against shit and smell, dirt and disorder, is also at 
work in art: to defy its order is literally to mess with it. “Anal 
eroticism,” Freud writes elsewhere, “finds a narcissistic application 
in the production of defiance,” a formula that might be adapted for 
avant-garde defiance too, given all the anti-aesthetic gestures, from 
Dada to “abject art” in the 1990s, that have invoked dirt and shit. 
Of course Picasso does not push his avant-garde defiance to the 
point of utter desublimation; in his primitive scene he flees this 
point— he hates the dirt and the smell projected there. Thus, 
however taken he may be by the potency of this disorder, he reacts 
against it fiercely; he is desperate for distinction, eager for 
mastery—to the point of an aggressivity, even a sadism, that he 
also projects onto the primitive (“they were against everything . . . I 
too am against everything”). Again the question arises: how is this 
ambivalence registered pictorially? (33-34) 
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Yet in a certain way, postmodernist theory, especially written by the 
aforementioned authors, sounds a bit like a teenager rebelling against the 
father: most concepts and texts put forth the exact opposite of the 
corresponding concepts in modernism without truly being able to exit its 
logic75.  Jameson is perhaps an exception. Although he is considered to 
be one of “the” theoreticians of the postmodern, he nonetheless doesn’t 
seem quite convinced about it either. Instead, he tends to criticise it from 
within, as is evident from the first quote on page n. 8 of this chapter. 
It is not so much that postmodernism “doesn’t exist”, but it hasn’t offered 
the most suitable framework to give an account of the overcoming of 
modernism or of the current state of affairs. In short, postmodernism 
doesn’t have sufficient explicative power, at least not within the artistic 
and media theory fields. 
The way in which Hal Foster writes about postmodernism as a 
‘postmodernism of resistance’ (1998: xiii) seems a bit naïve and 
superficial when he states that postmodernism ‘(…) seeks to question 
rather than exploit cultural codes, to explore rather than conceal social 
and political affiliations’ (xiii) without mentioning in the least how—it 
seems like  he could hope for a performative power of language. The 
Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture is a compilation of articles 
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 It has already been brilliantly summarised by de Duve: to ‘have only been able to 
conceive of what is called “postmodern” through the historicist and avant-garde 
categories of modernism’ (1984: xxi). 
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by numerous authors addressing diverse disciplines (edited by Hal 
Foster), but in most cases the impression is the same: it seems that it was 
necessary to fight, to overcome modernism and it was still not very clear 
how. The fact that the book is from 1998 makes all this worse, because 
Hayles published How We Became Posthuman only a year later, 
presenting the real key; and, as it was already explained, the theoretical 
tools were already available. 
The recent publication Retracing the Expanded Field: Encounters 
between Art and Architecture (Papapetros-Rose 2014) offers conclusions 
regarding the postmodern that are worth mentioning here. It is the result 
of a conference and a seminar on art and architecture organised by the 
Department of Art and Archaeology and the School of Architecture of 
Princeton University in April 2007 that also includes responses by artists, 
theorists and architects. The conference aimed to discuss the 
developments and current validity of Rosalind Krauss’ canonical article 
‘Sculpture in the Expanded Field’ (1979), in which Krauss introduced the 
term “postmodernism” to talk about what was at the time the current state 
of affairs in the artistic field. The book comprises transcriptions of a 
round table that discussed the expanded field then (chapter one), in which 
Rosalind Krauss took part; the second chapter is a collection of papers 
from the Seminar Table followed by discussion; and the third chapter is 
the transcription of the roundtable on the expanded field now. These 
three chapters completed the section dedicated to the discussions that 
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took part on 2007. The fourth chapter consists of a collection of 
documents that includes not only the original article as published in 
October 8 (Spring 1979), but also many unpublished images belonging to 
the October archive. Finally, the fifth chapter includes responses from 
twenty theorists, artists and architects. It is significant that this same 
article was also reproduced as an essay on postmodern culture in the 
aforementioned book The Anti-Aesthetic (35-47). The discussion in the 
second chapter on Seminar Table makes clear that, from a theoretical 
point of view, Krauss moved from the formalist to phenomenological 
approach, and finally, to a structuralist point of view through using the 
Klein group to analyse the expansion, and structure, of the sculptural 
field. The Klein group was defined in Krauss’ original article as a 
diagram used in the field of mathematics, and referred to as the Piaget 
group, among some other designations, ‘when used by structuralists 
involved in mapping operations within the human sciences. By means of 
this logical expansion a set of binaries is transformed into a quaternary 
field which both mirrors the original opposition and at the same time 
opens it’ (1979: 37) 
In the previous round table, Krauss stated that she was writing against a 
certain ‘anything goes’ tendency in contemporary art for which the 
euphemism was ‘pluralism’. In doing so, she almost shyly introduced the 
concept of “postmodernism” to explain the end of medium specificity. 
However, as Hal Foster suggests in his brief but dense contribution 
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entitled ‘Diagram as Closure’ (87) closure would be the ‘ability of the 
diagram to arrest time and to suspend history […]’ (87). This arrest of 
time is a flaw of postmodernist theory that Jameson tried to 
counterbalance through his insistence on the importance of time and 
History and Raymond William’s conception of the ‘cultural dominant’, 
as defined several pages prior : 
Postmodernism not as a style to choose among many others, 
but ‘as the cultural dominant of the logic of late capitalism’ 
which can allow ‘a genuinely dialectical attempt to think our 
present of time in History’ (Jameson 1991: 44-45). 
 
As a matter of fact, two dimensions were neglected in Krauss’ article at 
the time and that recurrently appear throughout this book: time and the 
body. In the Expanded Field Now roundtable (third chapter), Stan Allen 
introduces the temporal element by proposing to talk about the term 
notation, and to compare it with other terms already introduced in the 
discussions, such as mapping and diagram. From the responses yet 
another way of introducing temporality in the expanded field could be 
drawn: not (only) through the body and movement—which could open a 
discussion on the theatrical dimension (199)—but through the digital 
dimension, as suggested by Sarah Oppenheimer (220). In fact, 
Oppenheimer and Matthew Ritchie are the only contributors who 
addressed the issue of the digital and computarisation of culture. In his 
response, Ritchie has a point when he states that if there is no human 
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activity so far that cannot be mediated except for computational space, it 
is evident that the field also has to be expanded in this sense (235).  
Eve Meltzer’s response in the last chapter summarises and analyses 
several of the issues discussed throughout the book, which were also 
mentioned before: namely, Krauss’s escape from historicism and 
embrace of structuralism—and how this move left the body, the sensory 
and the material out of the diagram. For Meltzer, what matters thirty 
years later is recovering a new conception of art that considers ‘a more 
expansive model of the human subject’ (186). 
It is also worth remembering that if  ‘Sculpture in the Expanded Field’ 
introduced the notion of postmodernism in order to frame, and limit, the 
pervasive ‘anything goes’ tendency in the artistic field at the time, it 
nonetheless attempted to do so using modernist categories and 
methodology—which Julia Robinson referred to in her response as ‘the 
default toolbox’ of modernism (192).76 Considering that the publication 
of the articles and books mentioned above span over three decades,77 this 
discussion among this group—comprising some of the most influential 
minds in the artistic field—seems not to have moved forward in any way, 
with the exception of some of the younger critics and the artists, as the 
different contributions commented above show. 
                                                
76
 As has previously been illustrated, Thierry de Duve observed many this tendency 
many years beforehand.  
77
 The texts mentioned above were published in 1979, 1998 and 2014.  
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Postmodernism could not explain the overcoming of the humanist liberal 
subject, not only because it used the theoretical tools, concepts, and ideas 
of modernism, but also because it simply wasn’t the framework with 
which to see the whole picture. The pertinent paradigm is not merely “the 
end of all narratives”, style and the collapsing of high culture and mass 
culture. It is rather a completely different paradigm, the first 
characteristics of which are the overcoming of the limits of the subject’s 
body, both symbolically and physically. This overcoming relates to the 
society of control and the society of information—with late capitalist 
technologies, and feedback loops between humans and technological 
apparatuses. It’s not only related to the individual’s body, but it also 
implies the overlapping and intertwining of different materialities and 
subjectivities, that of the physical reality and that of the virtual, electronic 
spaces, and places.  
 
6.4.2 How Art Became Posthuman 
 
This research advances that the true overcoming of the modernist 
paradigm happens in the posthuman, a paradigm in which the ‘humanist 
liberal subject’ becomes a digital subject, a cyborg, a posthuman subject. 
This deconstruction of the subject began long ago, likely with Freud’s 
theory of the unconscious, according to which the subject is no longer the 
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owner and master of herself because she is guided by a hidden motor: by 
concealed drives of which she would never become fully aware. 
As it was suggested in the previous chapters, the conception of psychic 
activity as intertwined with certain machinic processes was not alien to 
Freud himself—nor to several of his “followers and critics”, like Lacan, 
Deleuze and Guattari. In this sense, the theorisation of a technological 
unconscious related to floating signifiers in and through which new 
subjectivities and meaning are generated can be considered as a further 
expansion of the aforementioned deconstruction of the humanist liberal 
subject, and thus of the conception of the posthuman itself.  
That a theorist so fully immersed in Freudian and especially Lacanian theory 
such as Krauss had completely ignored Lacan’s conceptualisation of the 
symbolic register as a universal Turing machine and his article about 
‘Psychoanalysis and Cybernetics’ (1991) is striking, to say the least. Whatever 
her motives were, it would have a decisive influence on the theorisation of 
postmodernism in art without even considering what has been called, since 
around 1999, the posthuman. Such an analysis certainly would have been 
possible given that theoretical outlines were already within reach. Furthermore, 
this omission gave way to the rift between ‘Turing land’ and ‘Duchamp land’ 
(Manovich 1996)—between the mainstream artistic field that mainly develops 
in galleries, museums and the art market, and cybernetic art (which includes 
telematic art, net.art and new media art at large), which mainly develops in the 
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academic context, universities, specialised institutions; and that, even if 
cybernetic art arrives relatively early to the museum in some cases, it is seldom 
properly exhibited, not to mention conserved. 
An interesting example turns up when considering the work of artist Damiano 
Colacito (1973). Since the mid-Nineties, Colacito has used video games, 
especially first person shooter games, to explore issues of three-dimensional 
representation in Western art—in particular the evolution of the representation 
of the perspectival space. In the vast majority of his production, Colacito cracks 
into the video game library to attain the vectorial structure and the texture 
mapping of certain objects that he considers relevant, both within the game’s 
narrative and on the level of representation. He then builds the object in 1:1 
scale, conserving the proportions but approximating the measurements, given 
that within the space of the video game there are no measures, everything is 
constructed in a proportional relationship among the objects and the “space”. 
The objects are built in wood (most often by the artist himself) and then 
recovered with texture mapping printed in Scotchprint. In Wolfenstein’s 
HALFTRACK (2005), for instance, Colacito built the halftrack one finds in the 
video game Return to Wolfenstein Castle (2001), which is set during World 
War II. The artist reproduces exactly how the artifact was seen on the screen on 
wood—thus slightly pixelated and having facets and angles instead of real 
curves. 
Although his work is well known among new media curators and has been 
 282 
 
featured in several exhibitions on game art, Colacito maintains that his work is 
closer to painting than to sculpture—and even farther from game art (private 
conversation, October 2007). Despite being an avid player, and the fact that he 
knows that a player would recognise any of the objects that he chose to 
“materialise”, he in fact deals with the history of representation and 
perspective. Colacito observed that the evolution of three-dimensional 
representation on flat surfaces in Western art was almost replicated by the 
(much shorter) history of representation of space in videogames, thus he 
chooses, among other things, to comment upon this throughout his oeuvre.  
 
 
Fig. 40. Damiano Colacito, Wolfenstein’s HALFTRACK HANOMAG SDKFz 251, 2005. 
Iron, wood, polystyrene, resin, Scotchprint 3M, 530 x 225 x h 173 cm. 
 
 283 
 
Critically, curators and art theorists tend to only consider his source material, 
namely video games, and not the core issues that his works discuss.78 
Similarities with the lectures of the readymade are not difficult to detect now: 
basically, the same tendency to read the work and the readymade in terms of its 
materiality, and not as art at large and in continuity, or in rupture, with a larger 
tradition—including that of new media theory. In Colacito’s case, videogames 
are the raw material with which he develops a broader investigation about 
issues of representation in Western art and visual culture, videogames included. 
In Duchamp’s case, the readymade becomes his medium for making art 
altogether, painting included—it is not just an industrial object giving birth to 
conceptual art, it doesn’t just convey the cosa mentale, but it deals with artistic 
practice at large. 
A suitable explanation of this sort of critical blind spot was suggested by 
Magda Bijvoet in her book Art as Inquiry (1996), in which she analyses the 
first encounters between art and technology in the Sixties, and the 9 Evenings 
event as a fundamental part in the process: 9 Evenings was a nine day event in 
1966 featuring pieces realised by artists collaborating with 
technologists/engineers, among them Robert Rauschenberg and John Cage. 
When explaining the diametrical difference between the critiques made of the 9 
Evenings event received79, she asserts that critiques coming from writers with a 
                                                
78
 It doesn’t seem to matter whether these are mainstream or specialised arts 
professionals. 
79
  From that event on, E.A.T., founded by Robert Rauschenberg and Billy Klüver, dedicated to 
pairing the efforts in producing artistic experiments between artists and technologists: ‘The 
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technological background, or who methodologically applied Systems Theory as 
Jack Burnham did, could fully appreciate the relevance of the experiment 
because it’s main interest was exactly that of being completely experimental: 
Few if any had the prescience to appreciate the events for 
what they were: man-made systems with a completely 
different set of values from those found in structured 
dramatics or the one-night kinetic spectacular. [...] This 
suggests that systems-oriented art—dropping the term 
“sculpture”—will deal less with artifacts contrived from their 
formal value, and increasingly with men enmeshed with and 
within purposeful responsive systems.  
Such a change should gradually diminish the distinction 
between biological and nonbiological systems, i.e. man and 
the system as similarly functioning but organizationally 
separate entities. (Quoted in Bijvoet 1997: n/d) 
 
Critiques by mainstream art critics with a classical art historical background, 
like Brian O’Doherty,80 focused more on technical problems and lack of 
continuity of the event: 
The evenings received, on the whole, an appalling press, 
based mainly on the justifiable irritation of interminable 
delays, technical failures of the most basic sort, and long, 
dead spaces between, and sometimes in the middle of pieces. 
Yet, as such irritation faded away, one is left with startlingly 
                                                                                                                   
objectives of the 9 Evenings will be continued by Experiments in Art and Technology, Inc. 
This foundation will further the creative interaction between industry, engineers and artists. 9 
Evenings is an experiment in the true sense of the word: its results are open for the future’ 
(n/d). In the catalogue, Rauschenberg wrote: ‘Working with engineers is inspiring. I could not 
do what I want to do without them. It is no longer possible to bypass the whole area of 
technology. We have no assurance, for example, that buildings will have walls for much 
longer. I can foresee art schools giving courses in electronics and vacuum mouldings. We can’t 
afford to wait. We must force a relationship with technology in order to continue and we must 
move quickly. The most positive thing I can say is that technology does not lead us back into 
history, but advances us into the unknown’ (quoted by Bijvoet: n/d). 
80
 Brian O’Doherty, also known as Patrick Ireland, is an artist, critic and academic, most 
famously the author of Inside the White Cube: The Ideology of the Gallery Space 
(1976). 
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persistent residual images, and strong hints of an alternative 
theater that has been lagging in its post-Happenings 
penumbra between art and theater. (Quoted in Bijvoet 1997: 
n/d) 
 
Bijvoet’s hypothesis is that while the result of the collaborations, the “works” 
were focused in a process, precisely in the process of experimenting with art, 
science and technology—and not in a finished object—critics with traditional 
art historical or art theoretical formation may not have had the theoretical tools 
to conceptualise that kind of event (n/d). Instead, they considered only the final 
result, as Lucy Lippard asserted (quoted in Bijvoet: n/d), and could not garner 
the conceptual tools necessary to build a new aesthetic theory as Burnham tried 
to do, which could grasp the entire importance of these collaborations. By 1975 
the greater part of the mainstream art world, Rauschenberg included, had lost 
interest in the collaborations between art and technology, and both paths 
(almost) definitively, and with very few exceptions, split.  
 
6.5 Under (Re)Construction 
 
How can these apparently irreconcilable “lands” come together again then? 
Theorists like Christiane Paul, Oliver Grau, Peter Weibel, and many others 
actively discuss and work to establish greater continuity between “traditional” 
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art history and media art histories.81 Although a lot has been achieved, it is 
hardly possible to say that both lands have come together82. The reasons for the 
difficulty of this confluence are varied, and identifying them certainly does not 
warrant that the problem will be solved practically. This text intends to 
contribute to this discussion by identifying a conceptual chasm, as it could be 
called, that should have kept both histories in continuity, and instead allowed 
them to split. By reconstructing the cybernetic loop between the conceptual 
toolkit of both ‘lands’ I intend to at least bring them back together theoretically. 
I want to proposed that this chasm was generated by Greenberg’s conception of 
opticality as disembodied vision, which is completely coherent with the 
definition of information as independent of a material substrate—and possibly 
had an influence on the aesthetic conception of modernist art that began to 
separate it from more processual aesthetics, such as the ones developed at 
E.A.T. and other kinds of incipient new media art. The chasm has a name: it is 
the readymade as medium. 
In any event, one key element of this conception of opticality is that it is the 
exact opposite of Duchamp’s conception of vision. For Duchamp, vision is only 
                                                
81
 The whole Media Art History project is devoted to this aim. Please see 
http://www.mediaarthistory.org/ 
82
 The recent publication Mass Effect. Art and the Internet in the Twenty-First Century 
(2015) reports the somehow harsh discussion on Artforum (September 2012/January 
2013) between Claire Bishop, Lauren Cornell and Brian Droitcour about Bishop’s 
article “Digital Divide: Contemporary Art and New Media”, regarding which both 
contenders address this same subject. However, each of them defend their position from 
the point of view of mainstream art, in Bishop’s case, and from the point of view of 
digital art, in Cornell’s and Doitcuour’s case, each one making their point, but without 
being able, once again, to bring both points of view together, that is to say, without 
being able to consider the artistic field as one. 
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carnal: ‘The optic chiasm that Duchamp suggests, however, is unthinkable 
apart from a vision that is carnal through and through. Con, as they say, celui 
qui voit’ (Krauss 1993: 114). It is possible to identify here one of the causes of 
Greenberg’s refusal of Duchamp in the embrace of industrialisation, in clearing 
the way to the expansion of what is called today conceptual art, and the 
rejection of craft and materiality: The aseptic conception of art conveyed in 
modernist theory, and especially in Greenberg’s opticality, as opposed to 
Duchamp’s erotic, almost voluptuous conception of the gaze as always 
embodied and filled with concrete physical desire. 
The second fundamental issue is how this disembodied conception of vision—
of opticality as medium—coincides with the definition of information as 
completely disembodied.83 Information was thus understood as a pattern, as a 
mathematical function, that, as Hayles masterfully demonstrates, gave rise to a 
long-running conception of information as “something” that is completely 
independent from any material instantiation, which has hopefully been 
overcome by now. It is striking how both examples remained unnoticed and 
disconnected, despite the fact that they took place during relatively the same 
time period. Hayles contends that information came to be defined as a pattern 
                                                
83
 The definition I refer to was used within the context of the Macy Conferences and 
identified and extensively explained by Katherine Hayles, as quoted in the introduction 
to the present work.  
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because in post-war/Cold War America a conception of information more in 
line with the conception of the ‘liberal humanist subject’ was needed.84  
Greenberg’s motivations for promoting American art, and the shift of 
contemporary art’s centre from Paris to New York post-war have been 
extensively discussed in other works (see Stonor Saunders 1999; Battaglia 
2008). Both processes can be easily read as part of the same one: the re-location 
and re-balance of power after World War II took place both within the context 
of scientific/technological expansion—and in relation to the development of 
cybernetic theory—as well as in the art world and other structures of 
production of sense. America gained a position of leading power in both 
realms, following the virtual destruction of Europe after two massive wars. 
Disembodiment was a key factor in both cybernetic theory and the theory of 
modern art, which allowed an aseptic conception of subjectivity in its relation 
to technology and machines (in the case of cybernetic theory) and in the 
subject’s relation with the artwork and its materiality (in the case of 
modernism). Although both positions may seem completely antagonistic—as 
one deals with the relationship between individuals and machines, while the 
other proposes a complete rejection of industrialisation and mechanisation 
within the context of art and artistic production—both are engaged in the same 
feedback loop that brings together the mainstream art world and cybernetics—
                                                
84
 In this choice, Hayles explains, Donald McKay’s definition of information which 
contemplated also the meaning conveyed in a message, and its effects on the receiver, 
was disregarded, 
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what I’ve repeatedly referred to as Turing land and Duchamp land. As it has 
already been shown, the missing link in this hypothesis is the conceptualisation 
of the readymade as medium. The readymade as medium, as a technological, 
industrial, serialised, embodied medium is the link between modernism and the 
posthuman. The readymade is the blank medium, a kind of floating signifier, 
which, as shown in the fourth chapter, has relevant implications in the 
conformation of (new) subjectivities. It provides the missing bond in the chain 
that allows avoiding a forced theorisation of postmodernism, at least in art 
theory, and makes evident the fact that the real overcoming of modernism 
happens in the posthuman. 
 
It wasn’t only Greenberg in the Sixties who rejected the readymade, it 
also found resistance among artists at the time of its invention and 
diffusion. Rosalind Krauss likely didn’t have the tools to properly 
evaluate the importance of the developments in cybernetics, as Bijvoet 
noted about other authors. Krauss was probably a modernist herself and 
couldn’t accept (or wasn’t interested in doing so) technique and the 
readymade as the missing links to overcome it. However, in the Picasso 
Papers (1998) she identifies another key point of the chasm: analysing 
Picasso’s incursion into the practice of pastiche from 1916 until 
approximately 1924, Krauss shows how Picasso feared the process of 
mechanisation that was penetrating art through photography. His fear 
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was related to the rejection of ‘readymade images’ and abstract art. Even 
if cubism tried to break with the conventions of representation, it 
managed to always remain anchored to “reality”85—both of which 
implied serialisation and the lost of craft in the pictorial practice. The 
following quote makes clear, firstly, Krauss’ point about Picasso’s fear of 
the penetration of industrialisation in the craftsmanship of the pictorial 
practice, which the artist considered intrinsic and fundamental to it. 
Secondly, it offers another example of Krauss’s use of psychoanalytic 
theory to “analyse” artists through their works, which this research has 
already criticised and rejected:  
For Picasso's line now imbibes the robotic character of a mark 
made in the course of tracing, a line that is so slavishly indebted to 
the model lying below it that it has lost any connection to the 
draftsman's own distinctive hand. It is such an experience of the 
mechanical that will, on the one hand, mark the "second-degree" 
condition of pastiche, the fact that the artist's relation to the image 
is always mediated by another proper name, another author. On the 
other hand, the mechanical will penetrate the "cultural" network of 
interartistic associations to descend to the industrial base of 
production exploited by Duchamp in the early teens and insistently 
disseminated by Picabia's illustrations of Haviland as a desk lamp 
or the American girl as a spark plug: the ground at which the 
automation of drawing takes the form of the motley "dumb" 
outlines of the mechanical draftsman's rendering of the industrial 
object—the line as invariant, the line as intended for mass 
production. It is Picasso's line itself, then, that ties the knot linking 
the manufactured object and the pastiched image, revealing them 
both as simply two orders of readymade.  
                                                
85
 Krauss shows how even in the most abstract Cubist works, both Braque and Picasso 
always included an identifiable element, such as a nail, to keep the composition and the 
reading of the work anchored in reality and to not enter the definition of “strictly 
abstract art” (1998). 
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Fig. 41. Francis Picabia, Voilà Haviland, 1915. 
 
Further, it is in the meshes of this knot that we recognize the 
operations of reaction formation86. Picasso's supposed classicism, 
so clean, so pure, so effortlessly productive, is the underside of 
mechanization nastily taking command. Thus, from the depths of 
this dialectical relation, in which opposites are inextricably bound 
as the two faces of the same reality, the very signature of Picasso's 
virtuosity is branded by the mark of art's deskilling. For that feature 
of his calligraphic magic—his capacity to spin out intricate 
anatomical contours without lifting his pencil from the page—
carries the mechanical production of the contour, in the form of 
tracing, as a kind of disease with which it has already been 
infected. Not only is it there in the modality of the line itself, so 
mockingly resistant to the shifts and swells of traditional drawing's 
attempts to make contour responsive to volume. But it also seems 
to control the very form Picasso's “neoclassical” style will go on to 
take, as the bloated, disarticulated quality of a figure's hands and 
fingers, for example, or the staring, abbreviated set of its eyes 
appears to have its roots in this brutally summary quality of a 
drawing made as if by tracing. (1998: 142, 151) 
 
                                                
86
 Italics are mine. 
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The irony is that when Picasso introduced the piece of chair in his 
collage-painting Still Life with Chair Caning (1912), for example, in 
order not to represent, but to present the actual chair, he was actually 
introducing the readymade in his own work. 
Although the readymade was perceived early on as the link between art 
and industrialisation—which became the canonical, almost cliché 
interpretation of its function within modernism and avant-gardes—its 
reading focused exclusively on industrialisation as opposed to craft (de 
Duve 1984, Krauss 1998, Foster 2004). This analytical approach 
ignores87 its reading as embodied vision and technology, which is in 
fundamental continuity with what would have been called the first 
collaborations between art, science and technology—and later new media 
art. Moreover, it is coherent what this text arrived to conceptualise as 
embodiment in the digital: the floating signifier in the digital is also a 
kind of medium, an empty medium like the readymade, and what it 
allows is for an embodied subject to see, operate, navigate, generate 
sense in complex environments.  Once again, Duchamp connects art, 
technology, and embodied subjects in a feedback loop that may have 
been too ahead of his time. Although Duchamp was obviously not talking 
of embodiment in digital environments, or nothing of this sort, his 
invention and use of the readymade as medium, and his oeuvre in general 
                                                
87
 In The Optical Unconscious Krauss underlines that vision was embodied to 
Duchamp, but does not relate embodied vision to the readymade. 
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can be considered to have set the bases for its future development: he 
was, concretely, intuiting the conformation of new kinds of subjectivities, 
and, I dare say, he was already one of them. 
For example, in the series of notes that Duchamp wrote for a conference 
entitled A propos of myself at the City Art Museum in Saint Louis, 
Missouri in 1964, there is the explanation that was to be developed on an 
image of La Mariée, one of the series of studies he did for the work 
famously known as the Grand Verre (1915-1923), whose original title is 
La Mariée mise à nu par ses célibataires, meme (The Bride Stripped 
Bare by Her Bachelors, Even).  
It consists of a few paragraphs in which Duchamp explains how he had 
abandoned painting and decided to undertake ‘an adventure’ that would 
not keep any (stylistic) link with any of the pre-existing schools or 
movements at the time (1964 [2005]: 192). But most interestingly, when 
referring to the title of the work, The Bride, Duchamp makes clear that 
the work has nothing to do with the realistic representation of a bride, but 
with his own idea of it, which was ‘expressed by the overlapping of 
mechanical elements and visceral forms’ (192).  
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Fig. 42. Marcel Duchamp, The Bride (Preparatory study for the Grand Verre), 1912. 
 
It is not difficult to identify here, and in the whole work of the Grand 
Verre as a consequence, a conception of a proto-cyborg. One could single 
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out as the trope of the 19th century, and up to this moment, the 
automaton: a completely mechanical humanoid. The Bride (1912) can be 
considered one of the first times, if not the first in the artistic domain, in 
which the mixing of human and mechanical elements are conceived to 
conform a single entity, namely, a female bride, a cyborg bride.  
 
To put the whole analysis in the context of the rest of the research, and 
why not, of more recent times, it seems pertinent to recall Richard 
Prince’s and Amalia Ulman’s case studies, as proposed in the second 
chapter. The comparison of the use of a social network like Instagram by 
both artists shows, among other things, how Prince can be considered as 
an exponent of the previous paradigm and corresponding subjectivities, 
namely, that of the humanist liberal subject, while Ulman’s work is a 
stunning example of what inhabiting the posthuman actually means. 
While Prince’s use of Instagram seems to locate him both as a sort of 
victim (of the technology) and victimiser (through it), Ulman’s work is 
paradigmatic precisely to unveil these kind of mechanisms. 
In Excellences & Perfections Ulman blurs the limits between herself, the 
artist and the character she invented evidencing the ways in which new 
subjectivities emerge in the intertwinement between subjects and 
complex environments.  Specifically, it exposes how by using a floating 
signifier to assume a point of view, in this case an Instagram profile, the 
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artist was able to operate in the technological unconscious/plane of 
immanence, in this case of social networks, generating at the same time 
sense—through a relevant artistic piece, but not only—and unveiling, at 
least partially, some of its mechanisms. In this sense, the piece 
underscores not only more evident aspects of the interaction with and 
through social media like personal overexposure, but specifically how 
physical reality collapses with the digital one—what I called complex 
environments—conforming in the process complex subjectivities; and 
how the separation between subjects and objects is no longer clear, and 
most importantly, it is not relevant anymore.  
Moreover her work—which could be representative of other works of the 
sort—definitely makes evident the blind spot in art critique and theory 
that the present chapter describes: Through Excellence & Perfections 
recently Ulman got wide attention not only from the press but also from 
curators. The work was featured, among other shows, at the Whitechapel 
Gallery in the exhibition Electronic Superhighway (2016-1966) curated 
by Omar Kholeif with Emily Butler, and Séamus McCormack. However, 
to say “the work” is misleading because what was exhibited was a 
selection of just two of the Instagram posts from the project that were 
printed and hanged on the wall like any other photography. The problem 
with this decontextualisation and (mis)understanding of the work as a 
sort of derivate from the original project reminds of a similar confusion 
that took place almost twenty years ago at Documenta X (1997), when 
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curator Catherine David dedicated a whole space within  the exhibition 
called Hybrid Workspace to include works by pioneers of net.art, 
cyberfeminsm and tactical media (Deseriis and Marano 2008: 65). The 
issue at that time was that to prevent people from surfing or checking 
emails on the computers that displayed the showcased pieces, all the 
works were running on the computer hard drives but were not actually 
online. The question this curatorial decision arises is obvious: what sense 
does it make to have a section dedicated to this kind of art if its very 
specificity, namely to be online and accessible to everyone, is going to be 
eliminated? Then, returning to Ulman’s project, a very similar question 
comes to the mind: Excellences & Perfections is (or was) an Instagram 
performance that lasted four months. Decontextualising just two 
images—instead of finding a way for the public to access Instagram 
within the exhibition space, virtual or physical—makes the work look 
like another banal reflection about “the selfie phenomenon”, at best; as 
also Kerstin Stakemeier remarked in her review of the show for 
Artforum: 
This is clearly the case with the curators’ presentation of Amalia 
Ulman’s Excellences & Perfections, 2014. While the original work 
staged a carefully preproduced trail of Instagram posts that seemed 
to document the downfall and resurgence of a young female artist 
over the span of several months, visitors to the show see only two 
large-scale, painterly reproductions of Instagram posts, each 
showing the artist taking an exaggerated selfie. In this format, her 
work appears less a critique of the sexed mechanisms of online 
social exposure than a narcissistic repetition of them. (2016: 250) 
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Nonetheless, this confusion is in continuity not only with the one at 
Documenta X, but also with the critical blind spot that Bijvoet identified 
at the time of 9 Evenings88. Interestingly enough, Ulman’s work is the 
trigger of the confusion at the same time that it offers an explanation for 
it. If a part of the problem was, as Bijovet pointed out, that critics with a 
traditional art historical education didn’t have the tools to understand 
process-based artworks and only looked for a finished art object, I’d like 
to propose Ulman’s case to cast light on yet another key point that has to 
do with a change of paradigm in the conformation of subjectivities: it has 
been outlined above how her work already implies a kind of subjectivity 
that can be called posthuman, whilst Prince seems to be part and dealing 
with the logic of the previous paradigm (that of the humanist liberal 
subject), a paradigm in which appropriation art was still pertinent. 
However, when he tried to deal with a medium that works with and is 
part of logic and mechanisms of the posthuman he seemed to have 
remained trapped in the old logic, and he obviously doesn’t understand 
how it works, nor what it does. Therefore, an explanation that 
complements Bijvoet’s can be that the problem doesn’t have to do only 
with traditional or less traditional art historical formation but also with 
subjectivities—and to be clear, this is in no way related to issues of age, 
or generations (i.e. millennials, digital natives, etc.), but with the 
                                                
88
  As explained above in 6.4.2 
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construction of subjectivities that this text intended to describe. If the 
artists and artworks analysed above can be considered to be respectively 
corresponding to the modern and posthuman paradigms, accordingly, it is 
possible to consider that the blind spot in critique also has to do with the 
misalignment in the transitions and overlappings in the passage from one 
to the other: there are artworks and artists that are not only addressing 
topics related to the posthuman, but most importantly who are obviously 
complex subjects themselves, and operate within this paradigm and logic 
which is evidently embedded in what they do; however, some of the 
critics, curators, theorists dealing with them are, like Prince, still tied up 
to the old one and cannot fully grasp the reach of their work.  
These misalignments, it can be hypothesised, are due to the fact that even 
when the overcoming of modernism with the posthuman can be 
acknowledged in an (art) theoretical context, subjects may not be 
automatically aware of it. Here, McLuhan’s statement of 1969 still 
resonates with some currentness: ‘In the midst of the electronic age of 
software, of instant information movement, we still believe we’re living 
in the mechanical age of hardware’ (5). 
  
In conclusion, the posthuman implies the breaking of the limits of the 
‘liberal humanist subject’, and the constitution of new subjectivities of 
which Amalia Ulman is a paradigmatic case.  It is also the 
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conceptualisation and enactment of a digital subject, a subject embodied 
in the digital as well as in material environments; a complex subjectivity 
who is also intertwined in the collective dimension of the technological 
unconscious. The acceptance and condition of embodiment was already 
inherent to the readymade, which was proposed as one of the tools to 
reconstruct the cybernetic loop between concepts of traditional modernist 
critical theory and that of cybernetics. This reconstruction implies, at the 
same time, a definitive and clear rupture with modernist discourse, as 
well as the acceptance of the emergence new kinds of subjectivities and 
otherness, both of which can open the path for a true continuity and 
coherence within art historical discourse, critique and practice.  
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Conclusions 
 
To conclude, how can the meeting between Duchamp and Turing be 
summarised? How do all of the previously explained theoretical 
frameworks and hypotheses contribute to bringing these two “lands” 
together? 
In the first place, it was necessary to revise how digitalisation is 
understood and to bypass dichotomist conceptions of the different 
materialities we interact with and enact into. This undertaking proves 
essential to understanding our current state of affairs in relation to 
complex environments—both within the artistic field and in culture more 
broadly. It is impossible to continue to consider digitalisation in terms of 
representation, whether in terms of an original or as a surrogate of a 
“more real reality”. To come to this understanding, it is necessary to 
understand digitalisation in terms of repetition—namely, that among 
these repetitions difference can be found.  It is the diversity conveyed 
among the similar, and even the identical. In this sense, it doesn’t matter 
whether the image of a certain digitised artistic object or space has a 
material referent in our material environment. It doesn’t make a 
difference because digitalisation shouldn’t be conceived in hierarchical 
terms, but rather according to the notion that everything is repetition—
even material environments. This is the reason why it is more accurate to 
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talk about simulacra, and why, as has been extensively explained, 
Deleuze proposes to read everything in terms of simulacra, because there 
is no reason to ascribe a higher ontological level to something that can be 
touched as opposed to something that cannot be touched, seen or smelled. 
Everything according to this line of critical inquiry is understood in terms 
of ontological repetition. There is no first time, or second time, in which 
something is repeated. The first time is already a repetition. 
Furthermore, conceiving of these processes in terms of différance, of 
constant deferral has been useful to further build and ground the 
conception of complex environments. The illusion of an origin, and of an 
original, the presence/absence dichotomy, grounded and gave the 
individual humanist subject the security and stability of knowing that 
there actually was an origin (Hayles 1999: 285). In this new model, 
which can be already called posthumanist, this idea is taken over by the 
assertion and the instability of an absence, of the certainty that an origin 
is not possible, or better, that it doesn’t exist. This new model, which is 
based on the idea of a constant deferral, of a slippage of meaning that 
cannot be grasped, as Hayles shows, has substituted the certainty of a 
presence (the origin) in the (un)certainty of an absence (the lack of 
origin) (285). As Sini also suggested, Derrida was well aware that a 
complete escape from metaphysics was not possible (2011). However, he 
did believe a deconstruction of logocentrism was attainable, as well as of 
the predominance of the signifier, that is to say, of presence. In this 
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sense, this model offers a coherent and useful means to understand new 
dynamics—namely the intertwining of digital and non-digital 
environments—because it understands each significant process as a net, 
as a web in constant creation and mutation. Hence, an artwork as 
Lonegran’s LONELY LOS ANGELES can be better comprehended in 
these terms. It explains a way of navigating the spaces and places of 
contemporaneity that could not be understood without deferring to a 
dichotomist conception: an artwork that arose from the need of the artist 
to “drive” around the city before learning to drive. This also happens, for 
example, when one searches for an unknown address on Google Street 
View before visiting the place or decides to visit a digital rendering of a 
museum or any other site. Derrida’s conception of différance as constant 
deferral highlights the importance of the body. However, it does so 
without intending to establish any kind of hierarchisation. His interest in 
writing—particularly his refusal to understand writing as mere 
transcription of the voice—seeks to overcome the prevalence of the 
voice, of the signified over the signifier, of the concept over the body. 
This line of thinking thus returns writing to its place in the body. 
Considering the intertwining of complex environments in terms of 
différance therefore allows one to understand the complexity of 
navigating digital and analog environments while avoiding the trap of 
dematerialisation and disembodiment. Moreover, as the text in this 
context is understood as an event that undergoes constant re-writing, the 
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origin of which is not an origin but an absence (Vergani 2000: 50), the 
writer (the author of the text) is also constructed, written and modified by 
the text. Therefore, it is not possible to separate subject and object 
anymore, they are both engaged in the event: this notion provides yet 
another means to conceive, frame and understand both complex 
environments, and embodied subjects. 
Peirce’s triadic model proposes a complementary approach to the concept 
of simulacra, which also avoids connotations of positive or negative 
value. As previously mentioned, the fact that Peirce considers any 
signification process in triadic rather than dyadic terms is one of its 
points of interest. According to his conception, signification processes 
are generated by the relationships among three terms. Peirce contends 
that not every element in a sign “signifies”, both world and signs have an 
exceed one another. In the (potentially) infinite semiosis, his model 
places material, non-material, human and non-human elements into 
relationship without establishing any kind of hierarchical or ontological 
differences. All of the aforementioned elements can work as signs, 
objects or interpretants in turn. An object is not necessarily material for 
Peirce. It is instead anything that can be thought. Moreover, signs do not 
imply representation. This model therefore contemplates the production 
of sense both by human or non-human actors, because, although the 
production of sense is by definition contemplated in a semiotic process, 
sense does not necessarily involve communication (for Peirce). This 
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element of Peirce’s thinking provides another way of thinking of the 
production of sense in complex terms. A concrete example of the 
applicability of these concepts was proposed when thinking about screens 
in terms of simulacra and of the evolution of the interface from symbolic 
to iconic.  
Within this context, a set of questions has been formulated regarding 
simulacra specifically, including their potential power to further subvert 
some of these issues. The question of whether it makes sense to separate 
digital and analog, or virtual and material realities, can be restated as 
follows: Can certain (artistic) simulacra put actors in a feedback loop that 
erases the limits of digital and material? A further question connected 
with the general line of thinking would be: Does the conscious exploiting 
of simulacra in certain artistic practices, most often developed within the 
limits of digital and analog offer a further extension of the aesthetic 
limits? And finally: can there be an aesthetic effect in the use of 
simulacra as an artistic apparatus? 
Therefore, it has been proposed to consider simulacra as a new aesthetic, 
and thus ethical, limit in contemporaneity. Also understood as historical 
paradigms or epistemes89 (Foucault 1966), the aesthetic limit has 
                                                
89
 In The Order of Things, Foucault defined the episteme as follows: ‘I am not 
concerned, therefore, to describe the progress of knowledge towards an objectivity in 
which today’s science can finally be recognized; what I am attempting to bring to light 
is the epistemological field, the episteme in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all 
criteria having reference to its rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its 
positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but 
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expanded the acceptance of otherness in that which can be considered 
capable of aesthetic fruition: from perfect and measured beauty, to the 
slow inclusion of the idea of the infinite, and subsequently the sublime 
and the uncanny as limits and conditions of aesthetic fruition. Following 
Kristeva’s and Foster’s theorisations of the abject and of abject art from 
the Eighties there was a further acceptance of what could be considered 
as falling under the label of aesthetic and artistic including abject art 
implied presenting the viewer something that she would normally 
consider repugnant and intolerable, the Real in itself. Daniël Ploeger’s 
project Abject Digital Performance: Engaging the politics of electronic 
waste (2015) offers compelling, updated research on this topic.90 Ploeger 
studies how the aesthetics of contemporary digital technologies are 
obsessively clean and “shiny”.  There is a complete rejection of any kind 
                                                                                                                   
rather that of its conditions of possibility; in this account, what should appear are those 
configurations within the space of knowledge which have given rise to the diverse 
forms of empirical science. Such an enterprise is not so much a history, in the traditional 
meaning of that word, as an “archaeology”’ (1966 [1970]: xxiv). 
90
 Ploeger’s artwork is inscribed in the extremely pertinent research project “Bodies of 
Planned Obsolescence: Digital performance and the global politics of electronic waste”, 
a project that brings forward a crucial aspect of technology that is not often discussed in 
academic contexts, and even less in commercial or industrial ones: ‘The United 
Kingdom is one of Europe’s main producers of electronic waste (e-waste). Despite strict 
EU regulations and control programmes, a substantial part of British e-waste is exported 
to developing countries, where it is often recycled through environmentally harmful 
methods or dumped in unprotected areas, causing severe environmental damage 
accompanied by a range of socio-cultural problems. Foregrounding the problematics 
around e-waste through cultural practices and in academic discourse is a matter of 
urgency at the present moment. In addition to the adverse impact of e-waste outside 
Europe, it has in recent years become clear that European countries will now also 
increasingly need to engage with this problem on their own territory; developing 
countries are gradually introducing restrictions on imports of used electronics, whilst 
the persistence of the manufacturing logic of planned obsolescence causes the stream of 
waste to increase steadily at a yearly rate of 5-10%’. [Available from http://www.e-
waste-performance.net/project-outline.html.] 
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of waste, the dirty is not recognised and the abject side of technology is 
meticulously hidden. In parallel with Kristeva’s definition of the bodily 
abject, he defines the technologically abject as all the traces that 
technology leaves ‘outside the post-industrial cultural paradigm’ (2015). 
In this sense, his work and project e-waste.performence.net tries to bring 
to light not only the planned obsolescence of electronics, but also the fact 
that on the other side of this obsessive cleanness entire fields of detritus 
are being systematically dropped and hidden from the Western world 
through the exportation of electronic waste to countries like China and 
Nigeria. Ploeger’s performance Bodies of Planned Obsolescence consists 
in the artist inserting a piece of detritus found in one of these electronic 
dumps in Nigeria in his own body with a piercing expert. The action 
incorporates the electronically abject into the artist’s own body, a kind of 
return to electronic motherhood stage of the pre-subject. It is a dirty 
cyborg, or as Ploeger calls it a ‘waste cyborg’ (2015). This kind of work 
clearly illustrates another level of accepting otherness within the abject 
limit itself, this time considering digital technologies and a further 
expansion of threshold, as well as the political and ethical dimension of 
the fact that Western countries hide their practice of relegating abject e-
waste to emerging countries behind the shiny aesthetic of digital 
technology. 
However, there is even a further limit in the presented hypothesis, that of 
simulacra: in current times of digital connectivity and complex 
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environments, the new threshold and aesthetic limit resides in the 
conscious use of simulacra as strategy. It is a strategy that not only 
searches for an aesthetic effect, or an extension of what can cause an 
aesthetic effect, but also includes in its framework another way of erasing 
the (at this point illusory) separation between subject and object, as was 
exemplified with Amalia Ulman’s Instagram project. In this sense, the 
use of artistic simulacrum allows for an overlapping and interweaving of 
both digital and non-digital simulacra. If the strategy is revealed or 
uncovered, it can promote a further acknowledgment on complex 
subjectivities and environments—in brief, on the posthuman. The 
slippage of the threshold as an aesthetic limit correlates to that of the 
possibility of conceptualising and accepting the posthuman: the 
overcoming of the boundaries of the humanist liberal subject in the 
posthuman coincides with a further expansion of the threshold of the 
aesthetic limit to include the simulacrum, which is its proper aesthetic 
and ethical category. 
At this point, it became evident that this research must also think about 
the archive. Although the topic of the archive in digital theory became 
almost a cliché, my text intended to present it in wider perspective while 
avoiding the conceptual separation of digital and non-digital archives. In 
this sense, Foucault’s definition of the archive, which clearly had nothing 
to do with digital theory was especially relevant: the archive is not a 
place in which to keep things as records, but is for him the object of an 
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archaeology as a methodology. In this sense, and as already extensively 
explained, the archive is a set of rules that at a certain historical moment, 
allows certain statements (enoncés) to arise, and not others. Why is this 
theorisation of the archive so relevant in this context? Because it not only 
considers that the archive can only have certain characteristics at a 
certain time, and is thus not transcendental but deeply anchored to a here 
and now, but also because discursive practices are considered as practices 
that construct the objects that they talk about, subjectivities included. 
These fundamental characteristics result in the fact that one is not more 
relevant than the other: the discursive practices that set the rules that 
make the archive possible at a certain time are not transcendent, but 
historically bound. As such, they are unique and unrepeatable—they are 
events. Moreover, it is worth remembering that these discursive practices 
are always linked to a particular subjectivity, and thus are always linked 
to a materiality, that is to say, embodied. Even though Foucault was 
evidently not thinking of digitalisation processes when he wrote the 
Archaeology of Knowledge in 1969 this research considers that the 
continuity of all this theorisation is not only valid but also fundamental to 
the consideration of any kind of archive.  
In close relationship with the aforementioned theories, it was necessary 
to further define other central concepts, for which Deleuze’s theorisations 
were fundamental: his consideration of memory as a repetition rather 
than representation and the notion that an event can only be actualised in 
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the subject. The coherence of his thinking with the aforementioned 
concepts is evident: they all foreground the importance of the subject in 
all these processes and underscore their intertwining in the construction 
of subjectivities. 
However, following Derrida, it is also necessary to understand that the 
archive, whether digital or not, is not only a question of memory and 
conservation, but also a projection to the future. Similar to what the 
unconscious produces in the subject, the archive builds its very 
conditions of possibility, as well as its reading and interpretation. The 
archive is not only an exteriorisation of memory—and in this sense, 
every archive is virtual if one follows Pierre Lévy—but it is a memory in 
constant re-writing: a Wunderblock, a mystic pad, re-written constantly 
but conserving the traces of what has been previously saved. In doing so, 
it modifies not only what is going to be read, but also how it will be read 
in the future. The archive is thus not only a prosthetic memory, but it is 
memory in the hypomnesic sense. It is a notebook—something that 
implies creation, dynamism and dialogue—not just a fossilised storage. 
Derrida understood that every time one presses “save” on the computer 
one creates one’s own private archive. It is one’s way of avoiding 
oblivion, of escaping the mal d’archive, and also one’s own modest 
contribution to the creation of what is yet to come. 
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This analysis does not remain speculation. Its interest today is that digital 
technologies have fostered a proliferation of archives, of apparatuses that 
work as archives, and it is thus of utmost importance to understand what 
kind of archives we deal with on a daily basis because they contribute to 
the construction of subjectivities, and of the future. In this sense, as some 
of the case studies have shown, it is necessary to be aware of the fact that 
some contemporary apparatuses working as archives may partially, or 
completely, block its creative power—Facebook’s algorithm provides a 
clear example. However, others may be more conducive to creativity and 
for stimulating experimentation, and thus potentially create new 
knowledge. A truly interesting example in this sense is the website Open 
Culture,91 which works as an exclusively online archive of very different, 
an often curious, cultural productions. Its content includes films, video, 
photography, pop and classical music. It is also an archive of archives, 
because it often links to databases of digitised books, films or art and 
documents collections—all of them strictly legal and copyright free.92 
The archive has a certain curatorial profile that searches for not very well 
known—because difficult to access—works, documents, texts, letters, 
photographs related or authored by famous artists, writers, cinema 
directors, musicians and other protagonists of culture to feature on the 
                                                
91
 http://www.openculture.com 
92
 For example, under the section “Essentials” the main film, audio books, digitised 
paper books, language lessons, educational courses of all types and philosophy books 
can be accessed and downloaded for free. 
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homepage daily. It is also a permanent archive of all the above-
mentioned materials. As it is evident, any curatorial profile implies a 
certain choice, a certain underlying reading or taxonomy, and this is 
unavoidable. However, the curated section on Open Culture evidently 
proposes a new angle to access a famous author’s works, and by 
extension the possibility of going through the more “traditional” archive. 
The conditions of its own reading are thus also renewed.  
The relevance of the intertwining and constant feedback loops between 
digital and non-digital environments and subjects, and their central role 
in the constitution of subjectivities and apparatuses has been clearly 
explained by this point. However, it was necessary to explain and 
advance the existence of a technological unconscious that works as a 
plane of immanence in which sense is produced by both human and non-
human entities. In this process, my research has identified the role of the 
floating signifier as being of great relevance. The technological 
unconscious comprises a partially inaccessible, unknown dimension in 
terms of how technological apparatuses work. Although independent of 
the subject’s intention, the technological unconscious is nonetheless 
symbolically structured, which doesn’t mean that machines have the 
capacity of symbolisation, but rather that some of the symbolical human 
capacities that built and programmed them have been distributed within 
their structure (Vaccari 1979; Hayles 1999). Moreover, the technological 
unconscious is also collectively structured. It constitutes a collective 
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dimension, in which there is the possibility for a collective imaginary to 
emerge. The reason for this is simple: the structuring, construction and 
use of machines involved in feedback loops with human agents is never 
one-to-one, the collective and collaborative dimension of their formation 
leaves sediments and traces. 
Caronia theorised an overabundance of floating signifiers thanks to the 
proliferation of technological apparatuses in the contemporary world, 
specifically since the massive distribution of digital technologies (2006). 
What are these floating signifiers? The semiotic definition has already 
been abundantly explained as the empty signifier. This notion can be 
filled with any signified, with any content, which usually serves to cover 
the unfitness—or exceedence—between signs and the world. More 
concretely in this context, they have been identified in the proliferation of 
new signifiers in the digital that don’t necessarily have a correspondence, 
or referent, in the “material” world. Examples are abundant, but it can be 
advanced that any profile in any social network can be considered as a 
floating signifier.  
Nonetheless, this research has proposed to bring this analysis further and 
advance that the floating signifier constitutes the point of view for the 
constitution of the subject. What this means is that what constitutes the 
subject is its coming to the point of view, its inhabiting the point of view, 
as Deleuze proposes (1988 [1993]). In the Baroque and perspectivism 
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this is quite clear and concrete: there is a particular point of view that 
offers the proper perspective to contemplate a certain composition, like 
the colonnata in Piazza San Pietro, or in anamorphoses. From any other 
point of view the composition would be deformed. In this sense, Deleuze 
is clear: there is not relativism, it is not that truth changes with the 
different points of view, but it is the subject that has to come to the point 
of view to contemplate truth. And in coming to the point of view, in 
inhabiting the point of view and in making it its dwelling, the subject is 
constituted as subject: the subject needs to change, to move, to take a 
different position to be, precisely, constituted as subject. This is the 
relevance and power of this conception. Deleuze talks about the 
constitution of subjectivities through the assumption of a point of view. 
In electronic spaces, in which there is no actual space in the sense of a 
three-dimensional Euclidean space, the floating signifier constitutes the 
point of view for the constitution of a (digital) subject. This means that 
the subject has to assume a point of view, but that this point of view is 
always different and ever changing—it is not “the correct” point of view 
of anamorphoses and the Baroque. The technological unconscious was 
then assimilated to a plane of immanence because they are both not 
concepts, but as Deleuze and Guattari defined it, ‘the image of thought’. 
It is the abstract machine in which meaning can potentially be generated. 
Concepts arise, but they do not arise alone. This is why it is fundamental, 
not only for the theorisation of complex subjectivities (of a digital 
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embodied subject), but also to better understand how meaning unfolds in 
the actions and interactions between complex subjectivities and complex 
environments, between humans and machines, in the interaction of agents 
and machinic processes. 
Considering the information summarised above, a complex subjectivity 
has been defined as a digital subject who is embodied in the digital. The 
subject is constituted by her point of view, to which she can come 
through the process of change. This constitution is coherent with the 
conception of the subject as process, a subject that changes and needs to 
change in order to come to the point of view—an essential process in 
becoming a subject. This neither implies that machines have agency, nor 
that they can somehow understand sense. The digital subject is not some 
kind of digital agent. On the contrary, the constitution of a complex 
subjectivity results from the necessary change that the subject undergoes 
to come to the point of view. The subject chooses a position to inhabit as 
the point of view constituted by the floating signifier. This point of view 
is not fixed, but can always be different. The Camera Restricta case study 
was clear in this sense: its technological unconscious is constituted, at 
least as far as we know, by the millions of photographs that are taken in 
all the possible places that the apparatus can detect through its algorithm. 
Within this plane of immanence, each user can come to the floating 
signifier, which will be different each time, and assume a point of view 
from which to act in the plane of immanence. Recognising that the photo 
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that she would have liked to take might be a cliché, she comes to know 
something about this unconscious, which is collective, and can choose to 
offer something new to it to generate new meanings and make them 
circulate. In doing this, she is/becomes a complex subjectivity, a digital 
subject embodied in the digital. This is one of the ways in which this 
works concretely.  
This is what embodiment in the digital also means: not that the subject 
has been digitised and downloaded to a hard disk,93 but that assuming a 
point of view in the digital means assuming it also with the body. It has 
consequences in the body, and at the same time the body operates and 
has consequences in the digital. As it has been shown, digitalisation 
processes, the virtual archive included (and any virtuality for that matter) 
need to be actualised in the monads, in the body. This is what being 
posthuman also means. 
This research began by introducing a fundamental separation between the 
mainstream art world and the new media art world. Both of these realms 
include their corresponding theories and theoretical developments and 
                                                
93
 ‘Writing nearly four decades after Turing, Hans Moravec proposed that human 
identity is essentially an informational pattern rather than an embodied enaction. The 
proposition can be demonstrated, he suggested, by downloading human consciousness 
into a computer, and he imagined a scenario designed to show that this was in principle 
possible. The Moravec test, if I may call it that, is the logical successor to the Turing 
test. Whereas the Turing test was designed to show that machines can perform the 
thinking previously considered to be an exclusive capacity of the human mind, the 
Moravec test was designed to show that machines can become the repository of human 
consciousness-that machines can, for all practical purposes, become human beings. You 
are the cyborg, and the cyborg is you’ (Hayles 1999: xii). 
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critiques, yet this separation was not “originary” and instead came about 
at a certain point. One of the primary hypotheses advanced here deals 
with two diametrically opposed conceptualisations of the medium: 
completely disembodied in Clement Greenberg and completely embodied 
in Marcel Duchamp. This relates to another primary aim of this text, my 
contention that the readymade must be reconsidered as a medium 
because it offers a key element that can enable reconstructing the broken 
feedback loop between theories of cybernetics (specifically new media 
art) and mainstream, classical art theories. Moreover, these hypotheses 
are closely related with another one, which comes almost as its logical 
conclusion: the actual overcoming of modernism does not come about 
with postmodernism, but with the posthuman, with a conception of 
posthumanism that accepts the contradictions of the production of sense 
as a process shared by humans and machines in their interactions. The 
production of sense is always fully embodied, whether it unfolds in the 
digital, the non-digital or both.  
To be able to understand the continuity between modernism and the 
posthuman it was necessary to tackle a range of topics in the first five 
chapters that aimed to explain, often from different angles, the 
specificities of what is called posthuman in this context.94 Putting these 
                                                
94
 Personally, I would have preferred a label for what has been explained that wouldn’t 
also include the prefix “post”, a prefix that implies the idea of something that has been 
overcome but that it is not yet at the level of developing its own name: given the 
considerations and developed critique here on the postmodern, this would have been 
avoided if possible, but it is not of course within the possibilities of this research to 
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theories back into contact with the art theories of modernism and 
postmodernism gestures towards the points of fracture in order to find 
continuity—mainly in the readymade as medium—that will hopefully 
allow reconstructing the loop between them. The final chapter brings this 
dialogue back to a here and now, to the actualisation of all the previous 
theorisation. 
The analysis of the different acceptations of the term medium showed, 
following Krauss in this sense, how Greenberg first identified medium 
exclusively with the material characteristics of the work—the theory of 
opacity, in Danto’s words. He then took, possibly unintentionally, the 
exact opposite posture and considered opticality as a completely 
disembodied phenomenological relationship, a kind of vision between the 
viewer and the work. It has been shown how, on one hand this was a 
completely antagonistic conception of vision comparing to Duchamp’s, 
for whom vision is always and above everything embodied and, as carnal 
vision, full of desire. On the other hand, Greenberg’s aseptic conception 
of disembodied vision was profoundly coherent with the equally aseptic 
conception of disembodied information that was being put forth within 
the development of cybernetics during approximately the same time at 
the Macy Conferences. Nonetheless, the issue was that within the artistic 
field, Marcel Duchamp and his readymades introduced the machinic, 
                                                                                                                   
decide that, only to try to contribute to the discussion with some ideas and points of 
view. 
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industrial, mechanical dimension—and even a proto-idea of what we 
now call the cyborg. Furthermore, Duchamp’s fully embodied conception 
of the medium and of vision took place many years before the Macy 
Conferences.95  
Therefore, it can be said that the conception of what has been extensively 
defined as the posthuman was already present in Duchamp’s artistic 
practice. Of course this doesn’t mean that the posthuman is to be 
considered only in artistic terms. Nor does this mean that Duchamp 
developed theories of the posthuman, yet elements of the posthuman 
were nonetheless present in his work and thought. As Hayles puts 
forward regarding science fiction literature, influence of course goes both 
ways: technological and scientific developments enter the imaginary and 
crystallise in many works, but also futurist ideas conveyed in some 
artworks somehow arrive at influencing the paths of a number of 
researches. Hayles claims:  
I have selected literary texts that were clearly influenced by 
the development of cybernetics. Nevertheless, I want to resist 
the idea that influence flows from science into literature. The 
cross-currents are considerably more complex than a one-way 
model of influence would allow. In the Neuromancer trilogy, 
for example, William Gibson's vision of cyberspace had a 
considerable effect on the development of three-dimensional 
virtual reality imaging software (1999: 21).96 
                                                
95
 As already mentioned, the date that de Duve gives for the invention of the readymade 
is 1912, the Macy Conferences took place between 1943 and 1954, so thirty-one years 
before, if one is to consider the date of the first conference. 
96
 It is interesting also to remember McLuhan’s consideration on the role of the artist:  
‘because inherent in the artist’s creative inspiration is the process of subliminally 
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However, one cannot place all of the blame on Greenberg. If it is true 
that he deeply rejected Duchamp’s practice and by extension everything 
that the artist’s work and interests gravitated towards—namely embodied 
vision and, furthermore, the mechanisation, serialisation and 
automatisation of the artistic practice—he was for sure not the only one. 
As it has been shown, there were many among the artists, but also, 
among the theorists who followed, most notably among them, 
Greenberg’s student and fierce critic, Rosalind Krauss. It is not that 
Krauss despised Duchamp and conceptual art, or art in general, but most 
likely the fact that she completely disregarded available links between art 
theory, particularly modernist theory, and cybernetics and the posthuman. 
Krauss was not alone in this regard, as the rest of the mainstream art 
theorists dealing with these topics also ignored these potential theoretical 
links.  There are two main bonds emphasised in this dissertation: the first 
is Duchamp’s artistic practice—particularly considering the readymade 
as an embodied medium—and the second is Lacan’s direct theorisation 
of the imaginary register as a universal Turing machine, as well as his 
explicit reference to cybernetics in the title and theorisation of his 1955 
seminar. Although there were likely numerous reasons that cannot be 
exhausted here to account for why this link was theoretically overlooked, 
                                                                                                                   
sniffing out environmental change. It’s always been the artist who perceives the 
alterations in man caused by a new medium, who recognizes that the future is the 
present, and uses his work to prepare the ground for it’ (1969). 
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the most salient possibilities have already been mentioned in this text: 
Firstly, Bijvoet’s hypothesis that critics and theorists with a traditional art 
historical formation did not have the tools for understanding more 
process-oriented pieces partly explains the often-negative reception of 
collaborations between art and technology, as it was illustrated in the last 
chapter. However, it’s nonetheless curious that a theorist as deeply 
immersed and interested in Lacanian theory as Rosalind Krauss did not 
pay any attention to his theorisation of the unconscious as a Universal 
Turing Machine and its relationship with cybernetics. Thus here the 
second and complementary reason I suggested in the sixth chapter can be 
recalled: As it was the case of Ulman and Prince, also in this case the 
impossibility to fully grasp the meaning and implication of works, artists 
and theories which are part of and address issues of the posthuman must 
be related to the aforementioned misalignment in the change of paradigm 
in the construction of subjectivities. Despite all the wonderful texts 
dedicated by Krauss to criticising Greenberg’s work, and to the 
deconstruction of the modernist paradigm in general, she is still tied to 
and part of it. And this, of course, is valid not only for Krauss. 
The unfortunate results of this oversight for art theory still reverberate in 
both lands. Whilst artists working in the new media art world often fall in 
love with technology and potentially disregard the aesthetic aspects of an 
artwork, it is also easy to detect a lack of consistency in the other 
direction. When artists and theorists with a traditional art historical 
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education intend to deal with Turing land concepts like information, 
systems and cybernetics the superficiality and imprecision is often 
appalling. Consider, for example, Boris Groys’ article ‘Entering the 
Flow: Museum between Archive and Gesamtkunstwerk’ (2013). Many of 
the ideas exposed in his text could be debated, but one short paragraph 
will suffice to make a point about the lack of consistency in the work of 
many well-considered theorists regarding new media theory:  
In a world in which the goal of stopping the flow of time is 
taken over by the internet, the function of the museum 
becomes one of staging the flow—staging events that are 
synchronized with the lifetimes of the spectators. (n/d) 
 
In the first part of the sentence, Groys refers to his argument that the 
Internet is taking over the role of the museum in documenting and 
registering artworks, as well as the creative process in general. However, 
stating that the role of the Internet is ‘stopping the flow of time’, which 
was previously the museum’s role, is inaccurate to say the least. Groys’ 
assertion reveals his lack of understanding of the true nature of the 
archive, whether virtual or material, be it the Internet, a museum, or a 
library. It implies thinking of the archive, firstly, as a fossilised apparatus 
that has the function of ‘stopping the flow of time’, when in fact is has 
the function not only to keep time alive, but also, it generates the creative 
power to interpret and build up the future. As has already been shown, 
this idea of the archive is not exactly new (Derrida 1967b, 1996). 
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Secondly, Groys insists on separating what happens on the Internet from 
what happens in the material space of the museum. Again, dichotomies 
like real/virtual, digital/material are conveyed in this division, this time 
suggesting that the digital is taking over the “old role” of 
decontextualising and archiving the works, and that the museum becomes 
an “alive” Gesamtkunstwerk because there are many events of which 
people can participate, making the museum part of their lives. I contend, 
on the other hand, that what actually happens is that one builds upon the 
other. There is no “taking over” of one realm over the other. 
Moreover, Groys expresses the idea that the flow of time must be 
‘staged’, and that to be ‘staged’ the archive, in this case, the museum, 
does it by ‘staging events’ in which spectators get involved: lectures, 
visits, conferences, readings, screenings, etc. Leaving aside potential 
opinions for and against staging events in museums, artistic objects (as 
well as the museum) are not actualised by live events. Therefore, one can 
assume that the rest are dead—but in the flow of time and creative 
possibilities that actualisation in the subject allows, the artwork and the 
museum are turned into events, whether they are performances or staged 
events, digitised or not. The idea that an event is merely the performance 
because it implies time, and that the museum is now updated because it 
becomes a stage for performance while the Internet ‘stops the flow time’ 
because it now works as an archive is puzzling. These assertions not only 
show limited knowledge of media and digital theory, but also of the main 
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theoretical frameworks that relate to them.97 
More recently, while these conclusions were still being written, 
Domenico Quaranta presented a keynote on Post-Media, Post-Internet 
and Post-Digital art98 at the Renewable Futures Conference in Riga 
(October 2015) in which he took care to make abundantly clear that the 
medium he was referring to was not medium in the sense of the artistic 
medium—and thus in the sense Greenberg, or Krauss or Danto referred 
to—but in the sense of media in communication or media art: a kind of 
art in which the storage and delivery vehicles are different. One cannot 
help but ask if making this kind of distinction, especially by a theorist 
that who addresses, and supports, Postmedia art, makes any sense today. 
Moreover, it leaves the door open to suggesting that making precisely 
                                                
97
 This passage is also highly problematic: ‘To borrow Marshall McLuhan’s vocabulary, 
the medium of installation is a cool medium—unlike the internet, which is obviously a 
hot medium, because it requires users to be spatially separated and to concentrate their 
attention on a screen’ (Groys 2013). It shows only a superficial knowledge of 
McLuhan’s concepts. If one takes into account his definition of a hot medium as a high-
definition medium, which gives a great deal of information to the user, and thus it 
requires only a low level of participation from her, whilst a cold medium is low in 
definition, it provides little information and thus requires more participation and 
involvement, precisely, to complete the missing information. Therefore, it seems 
hazardous to assert that a certain medium is definitively cold or hot. As it is well 
known, McLuhan defined the TV as a cold medium, but he was talking about TV in 
1964, which was black and white, low definition. Anyway, the Internet as a medium, by 
definition, needs involvement, input, and interaction. It cannot be said to provide high-
definition information, it can potentially provide a lot of information, but an active 
participation from the user is required, firstly to search for it, then to discern what 
among the information is valid or useful. Why would it be just a hot medium? And also, 
can it be defined as hot just ‘because it requires users to be spatially separated and to 
concentrate their attention on a screen’? Without the user’s intervention the screen does 
nothing. 
98
 This dissertation’s opinion on the “post” prefix has already been expressed, together 
with the choice of refereeing to every artistic practice that is not media specific as art in 
general, or art at large. 
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this kind of distinction not only allows one to suspect a superficial 
knowledge on what art at large is after Duchamp, but most importantly, 
that it is especially this kind of (forced) distinction that is one of the 
issues that continues to promote the separation between both lands.  
In fact, this dissertation has proposed to consider the readymade as 
medium to be able to understand the continuity between art at large and 
new media art, as well as to show that the real overcoming of modernism 
is not postmodernism, but the posthuman.  
As I demonstrated, the readymade conveyed both the possibility of 
detaching art production—in Duchamp’s case specifically painting—
from craftsmanship through industrialisation, namely through the 
presentation of an object produced by industrial means as an artwork. 
The inclusion of mechanisation in the artistic practice had the advantage 
of definitely excluding “good taste” from the equation for Duchamp. As 
Sturtevant said ‘The grand contradiction is that giving up creativity made 
him a great creator’ (quoted in Malcom 2015: 53). At the same time, 
mechanisation brought back, or kept, embodiment in the medium itself. 
The readymade as a fully embodied medium reconstructs by itself the 
feedback loop between an industrial and mechanised artistic practice that 
excludes taste and craftsmanship, whilst at the same time it includes the 
cosa mentale: namely, a strong conceptual dimension that is, nonetheless, 
always linked to a concrete materiality. This is why making a distinction 
between an artistic medium that can only be identified with the 
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materiality of an artwork and a communicational medium that implies the 
mediation of some electronic device, as well as the distinction between 
storage and delivery supports, not only doesn’t make sense, but can be 
considered as one of the factors fostering the separation between the 
artistic field and that of the new media. In other words, art is art at large 
and the readymade as medium is a blank medium. It is a blank medium 
that can be emptied of whatever materiality might be necessary to an 
artist at anytime, because any medium can be considered as already 
readymade, as was painting for Duchamp, and it brings together both 
mechanical and non-mechanical materialities, plus, a conceptual 
dimension: the act of choosing among all the possibilities that an artist 
may consider necessary for her practice. 
It is at this point that posthumanism’s link to modernism and its 
definitive break with it becomes clear. To talk about the end of 
narratives, about the definitive erasing of styles, of the appropriation of 
the styles of the past has shown to be not enough.  
In Duchamp, in fact, and more specifically in the readymade, one can 
find most of the elements that will later characterise new media art and 
art directly related with cybernetic theory: mechanisation, 
industrialisation, process-oriented works, concept-oriented works, the 
undermining of taste and the category of the beautiful and machinic 
elements intertwined with human ones, that is to say, overcoming of the 
boundaries of the body. If Duchamp’s legacy, which is generally 
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identified with, but not limited to, the label of Conceptual and Post-
Conceptual Art was absorbed by what was to become the mainstream art 
world, it was mainly due to the critique and theory surrounding it. A 
critique that could have perhaps built a link between both, had it not 
ignored the theorisation that the unconscious works as a Universal Turing 
Machine, as well as the importance of cybernetic theory. 
The reconstruction of the feedback loop between both lands began with 
the theorisation of the posthuman proposed by Hayles (1999, 2005), 
whose works have already convincingly explained the impossibility of 
information of being disembodied, and the unavoidable need of a 
material base to sustain it.  
This research aimed to contribute to this reconstruction. In the first five 
chapters, it presented, and in some cases updated, some concepts, 
analysis and theories that are part of the posthuman condition: simulacra, 
the archive, the technological unconscious, the floating signifier and 
embodiment in the digital. In doing so, I intended to make clear in each 
example the importance of definitely bypassing the dichotomist 
ontologies of material/virtual and embodied/disembodied, in order to 
accept that current environments and subjectivities are complex: they are 
the result of the interactions and intermediations (Hayles 1999) of, 
always embodied, machinic and human processes. From this basis, I was 
able to clearly propose and explain the continuity between Duchamp and 
the readymade as medium and new media art in the last chapter. This 
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example was proffered as a means to understand that the artistic field 
functions independently of the materiality of the chosen medium, 
because ever since Duchamp’s art is art at large: This is how Duchamp 
meets Turing. Because this discourse, as Jameson proposed for 
postmodernism, needs a historical dimension, it is not a transcendental 
and un-anchored theory, but an embodied and historical one. The 
temporal dimension was introduced in this research through the 
understanding of digitalisation processes, and more generally of the 
archive as event, events that need to be actualised continuously, every 
time; and through bringing all these theories together to a concrete 
moment of art theory—which also needs to become art theory at large. 
This actualisation, and this theorisation of complex environments and 
posthuman subjectivities can be put into discussion and eventually 
overcome at any time—in a state of perpetual revision.  
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SIGNIFICANTE FLUTTUANTE,  
INCONSCIO TECNOLOGICO  
E SOGGETTO DIGITALE
Questo testo si propone di delineare quello che è stato identificato come 
un rapporto ineludibile per un’assenza di idoneità di base tra il linguaggio 
e il mondo, o più precisamente, in questo contesto, tra il digitale e il “mate-
riale”: ovvero il rapporto tra significante fluttuante e inconscio tecnologico. 
Come concettualizzato da Charles S. Peirce,1 vi è un nucleo duro del segno 
che non significa, e allo stesso tempo, c’è una dimensione non simbolica 
del mondo che, appunto, non può essere tradotta nel linguaggio. Il signifi-
cante fluttuante mira a coprire questa assenza. Delineare quindi allo stesso 
tempo lo sviluppo della concettualizzazione di un inconscio tecnologico 
sembra un percorso valido per superare dicotomie inutili nello studio dei 
processi di digitalizzazione, per arrivare alla conclusione del testo con la 
teorizzazione dell’inconscio tecnologico come campo d’immanenza.
Nel suo saggio Il disagio della civiltà2 Sigmund Freud è forse il primo 
a parlare di innovazioni tecnologiche come protesi che l’umanità ha svi-
luppato per operare nel mondo al fine di allargare i propri poteri. Freud 
teorizzò che ogni strumento creato dal genere umano fin dalle sue origini 
ha lo scopo di estenderne i poteri nel mondo. Così, si “prevede” come la 
civiltà abbia portato le capacità dell’uomo ancora più vicine a quelli di un 
dio – cosa che può essere vista, per esempio, nell’ubiquità degli avatar e 
delle proiezioni del corpo permessa dalle tecnologie digitali –, ma ha anche 
aperto il percorso per la teorizzazione di un inconscio tecnologico.
A questo proposito, Walter Benjamin riprende l’affermazione di Freud 
e osserva che la fotografia, allargando il potere della vista, ha creato una 
sorta di “inconscio ottico” che permette di vedere ciò che l’occhio non è 
1 C. S. Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, a cura di C. Hartshorne 
e P. Weiss, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), pp. 5.287. 
2 S. Freud, Il disagio della civiltà (1930), Bollati Boringhieri, Torino 2001, pp. 
227-228.
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in grado di percepire; l’occhio umano non può percepire, per esempio, che 
quando un cavallo sta correndo tutto il suo corpo è sospeso in aria in un 
certo momento. Quel momento può essere catturato e rivelato all’occhio 
umano dalla fotocamera: le possibilità di visione umana allargate a quelle 
di dio da parte del dispositivo fotografico. Ma l’analogia con la teoria di 
Freud non finisce qui: l’inconscio ottico è simile all’inconscio del sog-
getto perché evidenzia un nucleo, in questo caso nelle capacità dell’oc-
chio, che non è accessibile al soggetto.3 La teorizzazione dell’inconscio 
di Freud è il primo passo nel processo di sgretolamento del “soggetto 
umanista liberale”,4 dato che secondo la teoria dell’inconscio il soggetto è 
guidato nella maggior parte delle sue azioni da forze che non può control-
lare; allo stesso modo l’inconscio ottico è quella parte del senso della vista 
alla quale il soggetto non può accedere senza l’aiuto di una macchina. In 
aggiunta a questo, il confronto proposto da Benjamin tra l’inconscio ottico 
e l’inconscio del soggetto è cruciale, e ha condotto il teorico dei media, 
matematico e filosofo Antonio Caronia a parlare di un “inconscio digita-
le” e a chiedersi se, di conseguenza, le tecnologie digitali, in particolare 
il computer, non possano rivelare qualcosa, se non tutto, all’umanità su 
come funziona l’inconscio.5
Inoltre, più recentemente, John Johnston ha dimostrato in modo convin-
cente come la teoria cibernetica sia stata fondamentale per Jacques Lacan 
nella sua teorizzazione dei tre registri del Io: il simbolico, l’immaginario 
e il reale. Nel suo libro The Allure of the Machinic: Cybernetics, Artifi-
cial Life and the New AI,6 Johnston dedica un intero capitolo a spiegare la 
(non abbastanza conosciuta) rilevanza della teoria cibernetica e la macchi-
na universale di Turing nella teoria lacaniana, e più specificamente come 
Lacan teorizzò il funzionamento dell’ordine simbolico come una macchina 
universale di Turing. La tesi di Turing afferma che ogni compito che può 
essere espresso come un algoritmo o qualsiasi processo che può essere for-
malmente (matematicamente) descritto ha un equivalente in una macchina 
di Turing. Di conseguenza, la macchina universale di Turing è una mac-
3 W. Benjamin, L’opera d’arte nell’epoca della sua riproducibilità tecnica. Arte e 
società di massa (1935), Einaudi, Torino 1998.
4 K. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman. Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature 
and Informatics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1999, p. 2 ssg [T.d.A].
5 A. Caronia, L’inconscio della macchina ovvero: come catturare il significante 
fluttuante, in A. Caronia, E. Livraghi, S. Pezzano (a cura di), L’arte nell’era della 
producibilità digitale, Mimesis, Sesto San Giovanni (MI) 2006. p. 4.
6 J. Johnston, The Allure of the Machinic: Cybernetics, Artificial Life and the New 
AI, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2008. [T.d.A].
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china che può modellare il funzionamento di qualsiasi macchina di Turing, 
perché può svolgere compiti o eseguire calcoli molto diversi che possono 
essere eseguiti da ciascuna di queste macchine; in breve, ciò significa che è 
programmabile. Come sostiene Johnston, questo genere di macchina è una 
macchina astratta: consiste in una certa forma logica che può funzionare 
indipendentemente da qualsiasi instantiation materiale.7
Ciò che Lacan trovò interessante nella teoria cibernetica e, soprattutto, 
nella macchina universale di Turing è la possibilità di una nuova compren-
sione dell’autonomia dei processi simbolici, per cui il linguaggio è una 
sorta di programma che gira sulla macchina universale di Turing dell’in-
conscio, un inconscio che funziona indipendentemente dalla volontà del 
soggetto.8 L’inconscio, o più precisamente l’ordine simbolico, funziona 
quindi come una macchina eseguendo certe operazioni, operazioni logi-
che, che non sono controllate in alcun modo dalla decisione umana: “Lacan 
comprese la funzione simbolica come un particolare tipo di assemblaggio 
computazionale che ha reso il comportamento umano significativo”.9
Tuttavia, è anche interessante ricordare l’analisi di Derrida sul rappor-
to tra macchine e apparato psichico, che era già stato notato da Freud in 
una lettera a Wilhem Fliess.10 Già allora, Freud aveva l’impressione, nel 
descrivere la rappresentazione dell’apparato psichico, di affrontare una 
macchina che potrebbe funzionare da sola, cioè indipendentemente dalle 
intenzioni del soggetto. Tuttavia, anche se in termini della sua logica e in 
quanto meccanismo la macchina può lavorare autonomamente, non ha in 
alcun modo un’energia propria; il che significa che è morta. Pertanto, ciò 
che ha un modo autonomo di lavorare è l’apparato psichico e non la sua 
rappresentazione, la macchina, visto che macchina e rappresentazione, 
nelle parole di Derrida, sono entrambe sinonimi di morte.11 La macchina 
in questo senso è pura rappresentazione perché una macchina non può, al-
meno fino a oggi, mai lavorare da sola: essa necessita sempre di una fonte 
esterna di energia. E, come osserva Derrida, questa è la prima obiezione 
che Freud ha trovato nel confronto da lui sviluppato tra Wunderblock, 
“notes magico”, e il modo in cui funziona l’apparato psichico: “L’analo-
gia di un simile apparato di soccorso deve trovare un limite da qualche 
parte. II notes magico non può ‘riprodurre’ dall’interno lo scritto una vol-
ta cancellato; sarebbe davvero un notes magico se lo potesse fare come 
7 Ivi, p. 71.
8 Ivi, p. 78.
9 Ivi, p. 67.
10 J. Derrida, La scrittura e la differenza (1967), Einaudi, Torino 1990, pp. 292-294.
11 Ivi, p. 293.
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la nostra memoria”.12 A questo punto Derrida comincia a considerare le 
domande che Freud non ha posto. In primo luogo, se la macchina non è, 
evidentemente, l’apparato psichico, ma solo la sua rappresentazione, per-
ché ha cominciato a somigliare sempre di più alla memoria?13 La seconda 
questione fondamentale riguarda le metafore - definite come “l’analogia 
tra due apparati e la possibilità di quel rapporto rappresentativo”14 - e la 
necessità, che era evidentemente emersa, di creare un apparato psichico 
protesico aggiuntivo e rappresentativo, la macchina, al fine di supplire la 
finitezza “della organizzazione psichica”.15
Così le basi per la teorizzazione, da un lato, di un inconscio ottico, e 
più tardi di un inconscio tecnologico, erano già state stabilite nel 1925 
da Freud e nel 1955 da Lacan. Inoltre, come è stato dimostrato, anche 
Derrida aveva già scritto nel 1967 circa la concettualizzazione dell’ap-
parato psichico come macchina in termini di metafora: una metafora non 
necessaria, ma comunque una metafora. Così, in un certo modo, tutta 
la confusione e la successiva discussione su l’attribuzione di “human 
agency” alle macchine avrebbe potuto essere evitata, come dimostra Ka-
therine Hayles.
Hayles illustra che non solo Lacan, ma anche in seguito Deleuze e 
Guattari, hanno concepito la cognizione umana e la psicologia come in-
trecciate con processi macchinici.16 In questo senso, Hayles spiega bril-
lantemente la linea di pensiero con cui Lacan, Deleuze e Guattari sfidano 
l’idea di human agency nella misura in cui una parte dell’inconscio lavo-
ra come un processore macchinico. Di questa questione Lacan era mol-
to consapevole, come Johnston mostra citando la definizione di Lacan 
dell’ordine simbolico: “Il mondo simbolico è il mondo della macchina. 
Poi abbiamo il problema di ciò che, in questo mondo, costituisce l’essere 
del soggetto”.17 Quello che non è così convincente è la ipotesi di Hayles 
che, per una sorte di analogia inversa, propone che lo stesso modo di ra-
gionare ma in senso opposto sia stato così facilmente accettato: “Infine, 
12 S. Freud, Nota sul notes magico (1925), Bollati Boringhieri, Torino 2000, p. 
65-66.
13 J. Derrida, La scrittura e la differenza, cit., p. 294.
14 Ibidem.
15 Ibidem.
16 K. Hayles, My Mother Was a Computer (2005), Mimesis, Sesto San Giovanni 
(MI) 2014.
17 J. Lacan, Psychoanalysis and cybernetics, or on the nature of language, 1955, 
citato in J. Johnston, The Allure of the Machinic: Cybernetics, Artificial Life and 
the New AI, cit., p. 72.
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se il desiderio e l’autonomia di azione (agency) che scaturiscono da esso 
in fondo non sono nient’altro che esecuzione di codice binario, allora i 
computer possono avere una autonomia d’azione autentica quanto quella 
degli esseri umani. Attraverso queste reconfigurazioni Deleuze, Guattari 
e Lacan utilizzano gli automi per sfidare l’autonomia d’azione umana e 
nel processo configurano gli automi come agenti”.18 Se è vero che con 
la teoria psicoanalitica comincia la decostruzione e la sfida del soggetto 
come “soggetto individuale umanista” iniziata alla fine del XIX seco-
lo, con tutte le conseguenze che essa ha avuto, tra cui la considerazione 
degli esseri umani come macchine intelligenti, non è possibile dare per 
scontato che l’applicazione di questo modo di ragionare sulle macchine 
dia come risultato l’attribuzione di agency e desiderio a esse. Detto in 
altre parole, attribuire alle macchine agency e desiderio non è un risulta-
to automatico dell’inversione della linea di pensiero derivante dalla teo-
ria lacaniana e deleuziana. L’affermazione sopracitata di Hayles implica 
piuttosto confondere la macchina con il programma; una differenza che, 
come dimostrato da Derrida, Freud aveva già ben chiara. È più probabile, 
come anche menziona Hayles, che l’attribuzione di agency alle macchine 
sia il risultato della antropomorfizzazione della macchina, e della cogni-
zione distribuita (del programmatore, per esempio) lungo il sistema. In 
realtà, ciò che è più interessante nella teoria Hayles è l’affermazione che 
una metafora usata per spiegare un comportamento che è simile a quello 
di un umano - come spiegare l’emergere di stringhe di codice come la 
parola “riproduzione”, per esempio – abbia iniziato a essere inteso in 
senso letterale, vale a dire, che una certa narrazione divenne trasparente 
per molti degli attori in questo contesto.
Nel suo libro L’inconscio ottico19 Rosalind Krauss utilizzò la concet-
tualizzazione di Benjamin sull’inconscio ottico come spiegato sopra come 
punto di partenza per poi dare alla parola “inconscio” il senso lacaniano, 
ignorando, tuttavia, tutte le teorizzazione di Lacan sul rapporto tra l’incon-
scio, la macchina universale di Turing e la cibernetica. Come in molti altri 
suoi scritti, Krauss cerca di superare la teorizzazione di Clement Greenberg 
sul Modernismo utilizzando il quadrato semiotico strutturalista e la teoria 
lacaniana per cercare di leggerla in termini topografici anziché narrativi.20 
L’inconscio ottico è quindi, secondo Krauss, una specie di anti-visione. 
Se l’opticality, intesa come una sorta di visione pura, è la coscienza (o si 
18 K. Hayles, My Mother Was a Computer, cit., p. 254.
19 R. Krauss, L’inconscio ottico (1993), Bruno Mondadori, Milano, 2008.
20 Ivi, p. 13.
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potrebbe dire il sintomo?) del Modernismo, allora l’inconscio ottico è la lo-
gica che mina la logica modernista dall’interno, proprio come l’inconscio 
fa con la mente cosciente:
L’inconscio ottico richiamerà per sé questa dimensione di opacità, di ripe-
tizione, di tempo. Mapperà la logica modernista solo per tagliare attraverso la 
sua densità, per annullarla, per configurarla altrimenti. [...] Lacan si raffigura 
la relazione inconscia della ragione con la mente cosciente, non come qualcosa 
di diverso dalla coscienza, qualcosa al di fuori di essa. Se la immagina come 
dentro la coscienza, minandola dall’interno, ingannando la sua logica, eroden-
do la sua struttura, pur apparendo di lasciare i termini di tale logica e di tale 
struttura al suo posto.21
Gli artisti dell’inconscio ottico erano, secondo Krauss, Max Ernst, al-
cuni altri artisti vicini al gruppo Dada, e soprattutto Marcel Duchamp. 
Quindi, nella teorizzazione di Krauss, l’opera e il discorso di questi artisti 
funzionavano come l’inconscio ottico - inconscio nel senso freudiano/la-
caniano del rimosso - del Modernismo e la sua corrispondente opticality 
“che lo erode dall’interno”. L’opticality consiste nel rapporto ottico stabi-
lito tra lo spettatore e l’opera, è un tipo di visione puramente disincarnata 
che sarebbe diventata, secondo Krauss, il nuovo medium del Modernismo. 
Ad esempio, il gesto di segnalare operato da Max Ernst è il più readymade 
dei suoi topoi. Ernst lo ripete in diverse sue opere come se fosse un motivo 
prefabbricato, e Krauss lo analizza con molti esempi. In seguito, Krauss 
mette in rapporto questo gesto readymade col rimosso che ritorna come 
ripetizione, per finire dicendo che, di conseguenza, la mano che segnala è 
l’oggetto a di Ernst.22
Il problema principale con la posizione di Krauss è che forza la teoria 
lacaniana e presuppone l’esistenza di un inconscio nella Modernità come 
se si trattasse di un soggetto; e, allo stesso tempo, “analizza” gli artisti 
attraverso le loro opere d’arte: parlare di certi topoi ripetuti nell’opera di 
un artista come dei readymade ha indubbiamente senso, forzare le cose 
ulteriormente per identificare l’oggetto a di Ernst sembra sì forzato, ma 
soprattutto inutile .
In termini differenti anche Vilém Flusser aveva teorizzato qualcosa di 
paragonabile all’inconscio ottico di Benjamin in funzione nell’apparato 
21 Ivi, p. 24.
22 Ivi, p. 82.
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fotografico. Nella sua opera Per una filosofia della fotografia,23 Flusser 
propone in primo luogo che in origine le immagini mirassero a spiegare il 
mondo, che erano mediazioni tra l’uomo e il mondo che avrebbero dovuto 
rendere questo rapporto più chiaro e comprensibile. Tuttavia, invece di uti-
lizzare le immagini per navigare la realtà, gli esseri umani ora interagisco-
no con il mondo attraverso esse. Di conseguenza, le immagini ”diventano 
schermi”24 che non gettano mai luce sul mondo, ma lo oscurano, e s’inter-
pongono tra gli uomini ed esso. 
In aggiunta a ciò, l’immagine fotografica non solo sfugge le intenzioni 
del fotografo, ma il dispositivo fotografico rende il fotografo una funzione 
della macchina: “L’apparecchio fotografico è programmato per generare 
fotografie, e ogni fotografia realizza una delle possibilità contenute nel pro-
gramma dell’apparecchio. Il numero di queste possibilità è elevato, ma 
comunque finito: è il numero di tutte quelle fotografie che possono essere 
scattate da un apparecchio”.25
Ciò significa che la macchina esegue sempre il proprio programma, che 
mira a perpetuare e migliorare indefinitamente: “Il programma dell’appa-
recchio prevede di realizzare le proprie possibilità e di utilizzare la società 
come feedback per il proprio progressivo miglioramento”.26 Pertanto, non 
solo le intenzioni del fotografo non contano, ma anche i fotografi, scattan-
do le loro immagini, diventano una funzione della macchina fotografica, 
che svolge in eterno il proprio programma. Questa è la scatola nera, il 
nucleo duro dell’apparecchio fotografico. Anche prima di Vilém Flusser 
e Rosalind Krauss, in una serie di saggi pubblicati per la prima volta nel 
1979, il fotografo Franco Vaccari teorizzò un “inconscio tecnologico”. 
Anche se Vaccari cita esplicitamente la teoria lacaniana, non precisa quale 
opera stia citando, ma molto probabilmente conosceva l’articolo di La-
can del 1955.27 Vaccari ritiene che c’è un inconscio tecnologico all’opera 
nell’apparato fotografico il quale è indipendente dalla volontà del foto-
grafo, e che, allo stesso tempo, esso è simbolicamente strutturato: “L’in-
conscio tecnologico non deve essere interpretato come pura estensione e 
potenziamento di facoltà umane, ma bisogna vedere nello strumento una 
23 V. Flusser, Per una filosofia della fotografia (1983), Bruno Mondadori, Milano 
2006, pp. 6-8.
24 Ivi, p. 6.
25 Ivi, p. 28-29.
26 Ivi, 58.
27 J. Lacan, Psychoanalysis and cybernetics, or on the nature of language, 1955, 
citato in J. Johnston, The Allure of the Machinic: Cybernetics, Artificial Life and 
the New AI, cit.
202 Mondi altri
capacità di azione autonoma; tutto avviene come se la macchina fosse un 
frammento di inconscio in attività. La struttura della macchina è analoga 
alla struttura dell’inconscio, non ha profondità ed è estranea ai flussi che 
l’attraversano”.28
In questo senso, la cosa più interessante che fa la macchina non è neces-
sariamente artistica, e non è guidata dalle intenzioni del fotografo. La parte 
più interessante per Vaccari è ciò che la macchina fa da sé, in cui non vi è 
alcuna intenzione umana, ma solo azione. In questo modo l’inconscio tec-
nologico diventa direttamente collegato con il readymade, o meglio, con le 
immagini readymade. Il fotografo solo sceglie le immagini, che sono già 
lì, e le mette in un contesto, come fa l’artista concettuale. Al contrario di 
Krauss, Vaccari usa la teoria lacaniana come strumento per capire meglio 
la tecnologia, o meglio, certe produzioni artistiche come le fotografie in 
quanto prodotte da una certa tecnologia.
Vaccari chiama “inconscio tecnologico” quello che Flusser chiama “sca-
tola nera” e “il programma del dispositivo”: quello che la macchina può 
realizzare senza l’intenzione consapevole del fotografo; di conseguenza, 
per entrambi l’apparato fotografico esegue un’azione o un programma, al 
di là della volontà del fotografo. Per Vaccari questo accade in termini di 
inconscio lacaniano, che è simbolicamente strutturato; per Flusser, suc-
cede in termini di un programma, di una perpetuazione intenzionale, un 
miglioramento della volontà della macchina. In questo senso, Flusser è 
ancora più apocalittico nella concezione della macchina che sta eseguendo 
la realizzazione del programma della fotocamera utilizzando il fotografo 
per migliorare e perpetuare se stessa.
Inoltre, Vaccari fa due mosse importanti e fondamentali che rendono 
l’inconscio tecnologico uno strumento teorico e un approccio estrema-
mente valido e interessante. La prima prende in considerazione l’incon-
scio tecnologico e la sua struttura simbolica come qualcosa che, anche se 
non completamente decodificato da un soggetto umano, ha comunque una 
chiave di decodifica che è collettiva. L’inconscio tecnologico non è desti-
nato a essere analizzato come appartenente a un soggetto ma può dare la 
chiave per scoprire alcune, ma non tutte, le tracce simboliche collettive. 
Esso quindi può essere un modo di accesso, almeno parziale, a un imma-
ginario collettivo: “l’altra [strada per fare emergere il significato del segno 
fotografico] è quella di interpretare le foto come segno appartenente a un 
linguaggio solo in parte riducibile all’uomo, un segno che è sintomo, un 
28 F. Vaccari, Fotografia e inconscio tecnologico, Einaudi, Torino 1979, p. 5.
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segno che funziona da spia di un rimosso che invece di essere individuale 
è collettivo”.29
La seconda mossa fondamentale che Vaccari fa è il movimento dal sog-
getto, il fotografo, al dispositivo. Egli non sta analizzando un soggetto, o 
prendendo in considerazione un movimento artistico come se si trattasse 
di un soggetto; ma si concentra invece sull’apparato fotografico teoriz-
zando che ha “una capacità autonoma di organizzazione dell’immagine 
in forme che sono già simbolicamente strutturate, indipendentemente 
dall’azione del soggetto”.30 Così si passa dall’inconscio ottico di Benja-
min con particolare attenzione all’espansione delle capacità del soggetto, 
al suo inconscio tecnologico con particolare attenzione all’azione auto-
noma del dispositivo. Tuttavia, è opportuno portare all’attenzione l’affer-
mazione che nell’inconscio tecnologico le immagini sono simbolicamen-
te strutturate indipendentemente dall’intervento di qualsiasi soggetto: 
significa che la dimensione simbolica è stata incorporata nel dispositivo 
(inconscio) e che essa è al lavoro anche senza un ulteriore intervento 
umano. Un esempio interessante a questo proposito è l’algoritmo nelle 
camere sugli smartphone: l’algoritmo è stato evidentemente creato da un 
programmatore umano per migliorare la qualità delle fotografie e svolge-
re alcune operazioni, che includono sbirciare nella libreria di immagini 
dell’utente e sulle reti sociali per “capire”: a. l’aspetto di alcuni soggetti, 
b. come l’utente vorrebbe che apparissero alcuni soggetti (considerando, 
ad esempio, le foto “likate” di questi soggetti), e modificare l’immagine 
di conseguenza.31 In questo senso, l’algoritmo si comporta non solo indi-
pendentemente dalla volontà dell’utente, ma anche limitando la potenza 
che lo stesso inconscio tecnologico possa avere di rivelare eventi, cose, 
immagini che potrebbero essere sconosciute per l’utente fino a quel pun-
to, e quindi limitando anche qualsiasi potere creativo.
Questa osservazione è fondamentale per capire il rapporto tra signifi-
cante fluttuante e inconscio tecnologico - com’è stato sviluppato finora, e 
quindi: come possibilità della macchina di svelare alcune parti dell’incon-
29 Ivi, p. 14.
30 Ivi, p. 18.
31 H. Steyerl, Politics of Postrepresentation, DYS Magazine, 2014, http://
dismagazine.com/disillusioned-2/62143/hito-steyerl-politics-of-post-
representation/ [internet] (consultato il 30 ottobre 2014).
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scio del soggetto,32 come macchina che può rivelare il proprio inconscio,33 
che è comunque simbolicamente strutturato e collettivamente costruito.34 
Nella sua Introduction à l’oeuvre de Marcel Mauss35 Lévi-Strauss definì 
con il termine mana la sostanza magica mistica da cui si forma la magia, 
e che ha “una quantità indeterminata di significazione, di per sé privo di 
senso e in tal modo atto a ricevere qualsiasi significato”. Il termine mana ha 
dato origine in semiotica al concetto di “significante fluttuante” per parlare 
di un significante senza referente, un significante vuoto che può potenzial-
mente essere riempito con qualsiasi significato.
Jeffrey Mehlman spiega chiaramente36 che il significante è la struttura 
del linguaggio stesso, mentre il significato è quello che è conosciuto. Il 
mondo “significa” fin dall’inizio, e l’umanità spera di “sapere” e conosce-
re, e questa inidoneità tra la dimensione sincronica (struttura del mondo), 
e quella diacronica (quello che l’umanità può conoscere del mondo) è co-
perta dal significante fluttuante: questo ha una funzione semantica, quella 
di superare la sovrabbondanza di significazione tra il linguaggio e il mondo 
permettendo al pensiero simbolico di operare in esso. Nella cultura occi-
dentale moderna questa funzione è stata ripresa dalla scienza; mentre in an-
tiche culture tribali, come quelle che Lévi-Strauss stava studiando, questa è 
stata la missione della magia.37
Pertanto, il significante fluttuante sembra un concetto adatto anche a 
spiegare la corrispondente sovrabbondanza nei processi di digitalizzazio-
ne, da una parte, e nel regno digitale in generale, coerente con quanto espo-
sto finora come ulteriore strumento per superare dicotomie quali digitali / 
materiale. È possibile riscontrare nel digitale un’ontologia propria in cui 
non si trova nessun referente materiale, in cui può essere rilevata un’ab-
bondanza di significanti fluttuanti, significanti senza alcun valore simboli-
co che possono essere riempiti con una miriade di significati: basti pensare 
a social network e la quasi infinità di profili e avatar che ogni individuo 
32 W. Benjamin, L’opera d’arte nell’epoca della sua riproducibilità tecnica, cit.; 
A. Caronia, L’inconscio della macchina ovvero: come catturare il significante 
fluttuante, cit.
33 F. Vaccari, Fotografia e inconscio tecnologico, cit.; V. Flusser, Per una filosofia 
della fotografia, cit.
34 F. Vaccari, Fotografia e inconscio tecnologico, cit.
35 C. Lévi-Strauss, Introduzione all’opera di Marcel Mauss (1950), in Teoria 
generale della magia e altri saggi , Torino, Einaudi 1965, pp. XLVII-XLVIII. 
36 J. Mehlman, The “Floating Signifier”: From Lévi-Strauss to Lacan, in “Yale 
French Studies”, 48, 1972, pp. 10-37.
37 A. Caronia, L’inconscio della macchina ovvero: come catturare il significante 
fluttuante, cit. 
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può aprire in qualsiasi momento, che può essere riempita con qualsiasi 
contenuto. Tuttavia, profili e avatar sono forse gli esempi più evidenti, ma 
non sono certo gli unici; anche dispositivi, apparecchi e schermi possono 
funzionare nello stesso modo.38
È possibile quindi mettere in relazione il significante fluttuante con l’in-
conscio tecnologico come la dimensione in cui le condizioni di possibilità 
di un’etica /estetica digitale risiedono? Il presente lavoro ipotizza la na-
scita di un soggetto digitale con l’emergere dei nuovi media, un soggetto 
incarnato (embodied) nel digitale. In questo senso, se si accetta seguendo 
Deleuze che il soggetto è costituito dal “punto di vista” e dalla costruzione 
della sua dimora39 e considerando che nel cyberspazio non esiste un punto 
di vista, perché non c’è un vero spazio,40 allora l’inconscio tecnologico può 
essere assimilato a un campo di immanenza in cui il senso circola attraver-
so il significante fluttuante: il significante fluttuante è il sito, il luogo, che 
costituisce ogni volta un diverso punto di vista per la configurazione del 
soggetto digitale.
Di conseguenza è necessario spiegare quello che il termine spazio si-
gnifica in questo contesto, e ciò che cosa è il cyberspazio, o come verrà 
chiamato, lo spazio elettronico. Nel suo libro Digital Sensations. Space, 
Identity, and Embodiment in Virtual Reality,41 scritto con l’obiettivo di in-
dagare le possibilità dello sguardo e dell’embodiement in ambienti e realtà 
virtuale, Ken Hillis introduce un’interessante differenziazione tra spazio, 
luogo e paesaggio. Per definire lo spazio, Hillis introduce la differenza tra 
la concezione occidentale moderna di comunicazione come “la trasmis-
sione di messaggi attraverso lo spazio”42 e spiega una concezione di co-
municazione più vecchia e rituale legata a “un posto con le sue forme di 
linguaggio e interazioni sociali abituali”.43 Analizzando le concezioni di 
spazio in Aristotele, Euclide, Newton, Cartesio, e Einstein, Hillis definisce 
lo spazio assoluto, relativo e relazionale:
38 Vedi G. Galati-A. Bianchi, A screen is a screen is a screen: A screen is not an 
image, in AA.VV., Techno-Ecologies II. Acoustic Space #12, RIXC, Riga 2014, 
pp. 236-242.
39 G. Deleuze, La piega. Leibniz e il Barocco (1988), Einaudi, Torino 2004, p. 32.
40 L. Manovich, Il linguaggio dei nuovi media (2001), Edizioni Olivares, Milano 
2002, p. 220.
41 K. Hillis, Digital Sensations. Space, Identity, and Embodiment in Virtual Reality, 
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis 1999. 
42 Ivi, p. 62. [T.d.A.]
43 Ibidem.
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Lo spazio assoluto suggerisce una realtà a livello macro o in termini di qua-
dro generale (big picture). A livello esperienziale, lo spazio relativo è più stret-
tamente legato al significato individuale, e lo spazio relazionale può suggerire 
una capacità di immaginare un continuum o almeno collegamenti tra i signi-
ficati di spazio assoluto e relativo. Tuttavia i VE sono basati sulla geometria 
euclidea e su una griglia cartesiana di spazio assoluto (insieme con la distanza 
e il movimento) e gli oggetti vengono rappresentati e in relazione tra loro “là 
dentro”.44
Quindi Hillis dimostra che mentre lo spazio assoluto è spesso un concet-
to atto a essere formalmente descritto nel contesto della fisica, matematica 
e filosofia, lo spazio relativo e relazionale hanno una carica più simboli-
ca e rituale che può essere assimilata alla definizione di luogo (“place”): 
“Il luogo stesso è una base comune che riunisce i diversi elementi nel-
la comunicazione”;45 in questo senso, un luogo, o una concezione rituale 
dello spazio è “una possibilità che stabilisce il terreno comune (common 
ground) per stare insieme”.46 È evidente che in questo caso la concezione 
di luogo coincide con la dimensione relazionale, e con il senso e l’intenzio-
nalità che gli attori condividono in quella dimensione.
Tuttavia, mentre la realtà virtuale e gli ambienti immersivi digitali im-
plicano una rappresentazione dello spazio assoluto, questo lavoro non sta 
considerando esclusivamente ambienti virtuali ma il digitale nel suo com-
plesso, sia rappresentativo di uno spazio assoluto o no. Quindi in questo 
contesto, il digitale e le sue possibilità tendono sempre a creare una di-
mensione di luogo, il digitale si presenta in termini della dimensione re-
lazionale precedentemente menzionata, in cui la prossimità è più spesso 
relazionale, e simbolicamente carica, che fisica, e in cui un’idea di agorà, 
o di terreno comune può essere vissuta in ambienti sia rappresentativi che 
non-rappresentativi. Ora è importante precisare che il concetto di rappre-
sentazione in questo contesto preciso e in rapporto allo spazio è utilizzato 
come sinonimo di rappresentazione prospettica, vale a dire, del metodo 
matematico e concettuale utilizzato per rappresentare lo spazio assoluto 
e tridimensionale su una superficie bidimensionale, che può essere quella 
della tela o della carta, ma anche dello schermo del computer.
Allora cos’è il cyberspazio? L’Oxford Dictionary lo definisce come 
“l’ambiente teorico in cui si verifica la comunicazione su reti di computer”; 
tuttavia, come è ben noto, il termine è diventato popolare grazie al racconto 
44 Ivi, p. 73.
45 Ibidem.
46 Ibidem.
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di William Gibson Burning Chrome,47 e soprattutto, poco più tardi , attra-
verso il suo romanzo Neuromante, in cui è definito come segue:
Cyberspazio. Un’allucinazione vissuta consensualmente ogni giorno da mi-
liardi di operatori legali, in ogni nazione, da parte dei bambini viene insegnato 
concetti matematici ... Una rappresentazione grafica di dati ricavati dai banchi 
di ogni computer del sistema umano. Impensabile complessità. Linee di luce 
allineate nel non-spazio della mente, ammassi e costellazioni di dati. Come le 
luci della città, che si allontanano.48
È interessante notare che Gibson, diversi anni più tardi, in un documen-
tario indipendente sul suo lavoro disse che “[la parola cyberspazio] sem-
brava suggestiva e sostanzialmente priva di significato. Era suggestiva, ma 
non aveva nessun vero significato semantico, neanche per me, così come 
l’ho vista emergere mentre la stavo scrivendo sulla pagina”.49 Essa è stata 
dunque un significante fluttuante. Naturalmente, Gibson intende che ciò 
che gli piaceva era come suonava la parola non essendo sicuro di cosa si-
gnificasse; tuttavia, come si sosterrà a breve, il cyberspazio è strettamente 
legato al significante fluttuante. A ogni modo, in qualche maniera la fumosa 
definizione di Gibson del cyberspazio dà l’idea di “representational data”, 
ma non necessariamente di “spazio”, nel senso di spazio tridimensionale, 
assoluto. Come dimostra Manovich, anche se il cyberspazio può spesso 
comportare l’idea di rappresentazione, la verità è che “non c’è spazio nel 
cyberspazio”.50 Anche in un ambiente digitale rappresentativo, non c’è né 
la continuità, né la estensività di qualcosa di simile allo spazio, ma solo un 
“insieme di oggetti separati” in un “vuoto” prodotto da un programma di 
computer grafica per la modellazione di un ambiente 3D.51
Invece di esplorare nozioni filosofiche e/o matematiche di spazio nel 
modo proposto da Hillis, Manovich esplora le definizioni di spazio nella 
storia dell’arte. La storia classica dell’arte iniziata con Heinrich Wölfflin, 
Alois Riegl e Erwin Panofsky all’inizio del XX secolo, e continuata da 
Ernst Gombrich al Warburg Institute, ha ritenuto che l’oggetto di studio 
della storia dell’arte sia lo studio dell’evoluzione dello stile;52 all’interno 
di questo studio, come sottolinea Manovich, si sviluppa anche lo studio 
della “evoluzione” della rappresentazione dello spazio. In questo senso, 
47 W. Gibson, La notte che bruciammo Chrome (1982), Mondadori, Milano 1999.
48 W. Gibson, Neuromante (1984), Casa Editrice Nord, Milano 1986/2000, p. 52.
49 M. Neale, No Maps for These Territories, Docurama, New York 2000.
50 L. Manovich, Il linguaggio dei nuovi media (2001), cit., p. 219.
51 Ibidem.
52 C. Ginzburg, Miti, emblemi, spie, Einaudi, Torino 1986.
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Panofsky mette in rapporto la rappresentazione sistematica dello spazio 
nel Rinascimento con lo sviluppo del pensiero scolastico e astratto. Anche 
se noi percepiamo lo spazio virtuale rappresentativo come descritto da Pa-
nofsky - omogeneo e continuo – lo spazio generato al computer è in realtà 
un aggregato di oggetti sparsi in un “vuoto”: “Ciò che manca dallo spazio 
del computer è lo spazio nel senso di medium: l’ambiente in cui gli oggetti 
sono distribuiti e l’effetto reciproco di questi oggetti”.53 Il presente lavoro 
si propone di sostituire la parola “cyberspazio” con “spazio elettronico”, 
perché veicola meglio la comprensione del digitale indipendentemente dal-
le questioni della rappresentazione. Di conseguenza, lo spazio elettronico è 
una sorta di luogo, di spazio pubblico in cui la prossimità è spesso concet-
tuale, o psicologica, sempre mediata, e non necessariamente, anzi di rado, 
fisica. Ci sono luoghi digitali che sono rappresentativi, come i videogiochi, 
come l’agonizzante Second Life, come gli ambienti di realtà virtuale; ci 
sono altri, non meno simbolicamente carichi, dove interazione, incontro, 
dimensioni sociali si evolvono, e tuttavia non possono essere riconosciuti 
come rappresentazioni di qualsiasi realtà “fisica”. Tra questi, si possono 
trovare, naturalmente, tutti i social network, chat, molte applicazioni, e 
simili. Questi spazi elettronici funzionano infatti come luoghi di agency 
e di generazione di senso nella stessa misura di una agorà fisica. In que-
sto senso, si propone che l’inconscio tecnologico funziona come un piano 
d’immanenza in cui il significato è generato e diffuso.
Deleuze e Guattari hanno definito la filosofia come “un costruttivismo” 
che ha due principali aspetti qualitativi, contemporaneamente costitutivi e 
complementari: il primo è la creazione di concetti; il secondo, è la dispo-
sizione di un piano di immanenza.54 Se i concetti sono “concatenamenti 
concreti in quanto configurazioni di una macchina”, il piano di immanenza 
è “la macchina astratta”, di cui quindi i concetti sono gli ingranaggi.55 Gli 
autori ritengono che i concetti siano eventi, il che significa che una sog-
gettività è necessaria per attualizzarli, mentre il piano è “l’orizzonte degli 
eventi”, e questo è indipendente da qualsiasi osservatore.
Non è difficile trovare ancora una volta un punto di coincidenza con 
Lacan. Per Lacan il registro simbolico dell’inconscio funziona come una 
macchina universale di Turing, indipendentemente dalla volontà del sog-
getto. Deleuze e Guattari considerano i processi macchinici non solo legati 
alla soggettività umana, all’agency e alla cognizione, ma anche, come in 
53 L. Manovich, Il linguaggio dei nuovi media, cit., p. 219.
54 G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, Che cos’è la filosofia (1991), Einaudi, Torino 2002, p. 25.
55 Ivi, p. 26.
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questo caso, al modo in cui funziona il piano d’immanenza. Seguendo la 
stessa linea di ragionamento, e considerando l’inconscio tecnologico come 
una dimensione che funziona in maniera indipendente dell’agire umano, 
anche se è simbolicamente strutturata, non è difficile accettare che l’in-
conscio tecnologico possa essere assimilato a un piano di immanenza. Le 
loro parole possono rendere ancora più chiaro questo nesso: “Il piano di 
immanenza non è un concetto, né pensato né pensabile, ma l’immagine 
del pensiero, l’immagine che esso si dà di cosa significhi pensare, usare il 
pensiero, orientarsi nel pensiero…”.56 Pertanto se, come intuito da Caronia, 
l’inconscio tecnologico può aiutare a rivelare qualcosa su come funziona 
la parte inconscia della mente umana, lo stesso si può dire del piano di 
immanenza, perché esso è “l’immagine che il pensiero da a se stesso di ciò 
che significa pensare”.
Se l’inconscio tecnologico è il piano di immanenza, qual è quindi il 
legame tra l’inconscio tecnologico come piano di immanenza e il signi-
ficante fluttuante? Nel piano d’immanenza, il significante fluttuante ha il 
ruolo di costruire un punto di vista. Come spiega Deleuze57, il soggetto è 
costituito dal punto di vista, ma questo punto non è esattamente un punto 
ma un luogo, una posizione, un sito.58 Il soggetto abita un punto di vista.
Il punto di vista è un punto di vista in una variazione, in un cambiamen-
to, in una metamorfosi, ma non cambia con il soggetto: è il soggetto che 
deve venire al punto di vista. Questo è il fondamento del prospettivismo, 
e più in particolare della prospettiva barocca. Questo prospettivismo può 
essere molto evidente, ad esempio, nella Colonnata di Gian Lorenzo Ber-
nini in Piazza San Pietro in Vaticano in cui il Bernini concepì due punti, 
che sono chiaramente segnalati sulla pavimentazione della piazza, da cui 
lo spettatore ha il punto di vista “giusto” per cui tutte le file di colonne 
sembrano allineate ed è possibile vedere solo una singola colonna in ogni 
fila. Nella pittura barocca, le decorazioni dei soffitti sono ulteriori esempi 
dell’importanza del punto di vista. Con questi esempi in mente, le parole di 
Deleuze diventano più chiare:
[...] In un mondo infinito, o della curvatura variabile, che ha perduto ogni 
centro, l’importanza di sostituire il punto di vista al centro mancante; il nuovo 
modello ottico della percezione, e della geometria nella percezione, che rifiuta 
le nozioni tattili - contatto e figura – optando invece per una “architettura della 
visione”; lo statuto dell’oggetto, che esiste soltanto attraverso le sue metamor-
56 Ivi, p. 27.
57 G. Deleuze, La piega. Leibniz e il Barocco, cit.
58 Ivi, p. 31-33.
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fosi o nella declinazione dei suoi profili; il prospettivismo come verità della 
relatività (e non relatività del vero).59
Tuttavia, queste affermazioni non devono essere confuse con un pro-
spettivismo rappresentativo, in quanto è chiaro ora che Deleuze non par-
la della rappresentazione dello spazio, ma della possibilità di costituzione 
della soggettività attraverso l’assunzione di un punto di vista. È in questo 
senso che, nel non-spazio dello spazio elettronico e più specificamente 
dell’inconscio tecnologico, il punto di vista deve essere costruito dal signi-
ficante fluttuante per la costituzione di un soggetto (digitale). Il soggetto ha 
bisogno di un punto di vista per agire e interagire nello spazio elettronico 
come soggetto: ma nello spazio elettronico non c’è spazio, ci sono solo 
alcuni luoghi virtuali. È quindi funzione del significante fluttuante la co-
struzione di questo punto di vista, di volta in volta diverso.
Nel caso dei videogiochi first-person-shooter eseguiti, ad esempio, su un 
set OculusRift al fine di raggiungere un livello più elevato di realismo e di 
immersione è il punto di vista che cambia con l’utente.60 
Che cosa succede allora con gli ambienti digitali non-realistici, vale a 
dire quelli che non presentano uno spazio prospetticamente rappresentato? 
In questi ambienti vi è anche un punto di vista, naturalmente, il punto di 
vista costituito dal significante fluttuante, anche se questo punto di vista 
non è il punto di vista del prospettivismo, nel senso di una configurazione 
perfetta che può essere contemplata solo da un punto preciso. Nel caso di 
una rete sociale c’è una proliferazione di significanti fluttuanti che possono 
generare diversi punti di vista - di significanti, cioè, che potrebbero essere 
spazi elettronici, da riempire con qualsiasi contenuto. Il più ovvio è il pro-
filo utente: riempire un profilo è la creazione di uno spazio elettronico (per 
l’utente), un punto di vista da abitare come la sua “dimora” da cui vedere 
il feed, la bacheca di altri utenti, i profili, inviare messaggi, insomma, di 
abitare questo spazio elettronico. Così questo è uno dei modi in cui il signi-
ficante fluttuante funziona creando il punto di vista per il soggetto digitale. 
Un altro interessante dispositivo, diverso in questo senso, è HoloLens 
di Microsoft. Questa tecnologia consiste in occhiali che utilizza principal-
mente la computer graphics per creare quello che viene solitamente co-
nosciuto come realtà aumentata, o come Microsoft lo chiama nel suo sito 
web, “mixed reality”. Gli HoloLens sono una realtà aumentata che sovrap-
pone grafica digitale costituita da ologrammi alla percezione dell’utente 
59 Ivi, p. 34-35.
60 J. Bolter-R. Grusin, Remediation. Competizione e integrazione tra media vecchi e 
nuovi (1999), Guerini e Associati, Milano 2003. 
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della realtà materiale. In questo senso, gli HoloLens funzionano come un 
apparato che attraverso la tecnologia summenzionata aggiunge oggetti pro-
iettati alla realtà materiale dell’utente; il che significa che, anche se non è la 
creazione di un ambiente coinvolgente completo, deve comunque seguire 
il punto di vista prospettico dell’utente nello stesso modo in cui un ambien-
te virtuale potrebbe farlo, pena la perdita dell’“effetto realistico”. Un punto 
interessante a questo proposito è che, così come la proiezione di un’ap-
plicazione non-rappresentativa come Skype sullo spazio fisico dell’utente 
suggerisce, potrebbe accadere una sorta di sovrapposizione tra significanti 
fluttuanti: tra quelli che generano un punto di vista soggettivo, e quelli che 
generano una disposizione fisica nello spazio, che non era necessaria, o che 
non poteva accadere prima. È come se questa tecnologia potesse generare 
un referente, quasi fisico, o meglio proiettato, per “oggetti”, realtà virtuali, 
che, come molte applicazioni Web 2.0, non hanno un antecedente, o un re-
ferente nell’ambiente materiale, e che su Internet non ne hanno il bisogno. 
Quello che una tecnologia come gli HoloLens può produrre, se arriva a 
essere effettivamente sviluppata e commercializzata in maniera massiccia, 
è favorire una percezione più forte della virtualità corrispondente alla terza 
ondata della cibernetica come concettualizzato da Hayles.61 Hayles iden-
tificò tre concetti che corrispondono ciascuno ai tre stadi nello sviluppo 
della teoria cibernetica: il primo dal 1945 a 1960 in cui il concetto centrale 
era l’omeostasi, il secondo dal 1960 al 1980 corrispondente alla riflessivi-
tà, e l’ultimo, dal 1980 fino a oggi, in cui siamo immersi nella virtualità. 
La virtualità è, secondo Hayles, “associata con simulazioni che mettono il 
corpo in un feedback loop con immagini generate al computer”.62 Quello 
che questo stato di virtualità produce è la sensazione che ci sia un mondo 
di informazioni in funzionamento in parallelo con il nostro e che possiamo 
spesso in qualche modo “entrare” in questo mondo, e che allo stesso tem-
po, il nostro mondo fisico è permeato da pattern di informazioni, i nostri 
corpi inclusi, come è il caso, per esempio, del DNA. 
Tornando al caso HoloLens, questa virtualità e questa percezione par-
zialmente fittizia della virtualità come definita da Hayles possono essere 
ulteriormente complicate dal fatto che il dispositivo sta creando la sensa-
zione non solo che possiamo “entrare”, o almeno interagire con il mondo 
parallelo che si trova “dietro” lo schermo del computer, o semplicemente 
nella nostra idea, più o meno condivisa del cyberspazio; ma crea l’effetto 
opposto: l’idea che gli oggetti che abitavano fino a questo punto esclusi-
61 K. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, cit.
62 Ivi, p. 14. 
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vamente il cyberspazio sono ora tra di noi, occupando il nostro stesso am-
biente vitale. Poiché questa tecnologia è ancora molto nuova, fare specu-
lazioni può essere rischioso. Tuttavia il fatto che evidentemente le ricerche 
stiano andando in quella direzione rende pertinente cominciare a riflettere 
su di essa. 
Sembra quindi legittimo chiedersi che tipo di soggettività, di soggetto 
digitale, stanno generando questo tipo di interazioni, di dispositivi. È attra-
verso la generazione di questi diversi punti di vista che il senso può essere 
generato, può circolare, nell’inconscio tecnologico/piano d’immanenza, 
che, è importante non dimenticare, funziona indipendentemente dalla vo-
lontà del soggetto, proprio come la dimensione simbolica dell’inconscio 
lacaniano. In questo caso, il significante fluttuante non deve essere erro-
neamente considerato come immagine, o come una sorta di miraggio. Il 
soggetto non sta proiettando in esso alcun desiderio, ma egli effettivamente 
vi abita, occupandolo, perché solo un soggetto può fare del punto di vista 
la sua dimora.
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My present work focuses on the new relationship generated by 
electronic information between the virtual archive (the Web in 
a broad sense, certain specialized archives in particular) and its 
referent (material reality in general, museums, inter-art practices, 
and artworks in particular). What Nam June Paik conceived as a 
shift from the telecommunications network to a “multilevel digital 
communication network,” is now taking place at a highly accelerated 
pace; with vast unexpected consequences and possibilities for the 
artistic field. Moreover, it also has a close relationship to what Manu-
el Castells defined as the “space of flows” or “real virtuality.” 2
“The space of flows” is the abstraction of time and space and their 
dynamic interactions within digital age society. Castells developed 
this idea to “re-conceptualize new forms of spatial arrangements 
under the new technological paradigm”; a new type of space that 
allows for distant, synchronous, real-time interaction.
“The space of flows” can be experienced right now, as a “multilevel 
electronic communication network,” which anyone can access from 
home. This network is composed not only of websites, but also 
the 3D photographic representations of place: the street view of 
one’s house, of a friend’s house, of a possible place to rent, or of a 
museum. This access can also, in a certain way, make the distance 
between remote places seem non-existent. 
This concept opens up several questions, for example: how is this 
representation presented? How is this possibility of accessing a 
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cannot deny that high-tech is progress. We need it for jobs. Yet if you make 
only high-tech, you make war. So we must have a strong human element to 
keep modesty and natural life.” — Nam June Paik 1 
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physically distant place in all its details, without actually being physi-
cally there, affecting the ways in which this space is perceived?
In this regard, the electronic elaboration of the representation of 
information suggests following new paths; not only to deal with mas-
sive amounts of data, but also to better penetrate the domain of 
knowledge that every person should possess. 3
Moreover, the forms this representation of information takes are 
closely related to the ways in which its perception is structured and 
shaped. As Lev Manovich puts it, “by organizing computer data in dif-
ferent ways, the interface provides different visions of the world.” 4 
Therefore, the relationship between information, its representation, 
and the referent (or in other words, the relation between reality and 
the conceptual construction of reality) has to be re-thought.
As many theorists have advanced, this representation does not need 
to be-in-the-place-of a ‘physically existent’ entity, and that is why the 
referent is only ‘possible.’ Postman (1985) defines ‘virtual’ as being so 
in practice though not strictly or in name; and ‘real’ as actually exist-
ing, and advances that:
We don't see reality as it is but as our languages are. Our lan-
guages are our media. Our media are metaphors. Our metaphors 
create the content of our culture. [...] There is no separation be-
tween ‘reality’ and symbolic representation. In a way, all reality is 
virtually perceived. 5
Virtual or real, this digitization is changing the status of digitized 
works; at the same time influencing our perception of them. In the 
same way language and metaphors build our ‘reality’ or structure our 
perception of the world, the Net as a text influences our perception 
of material reality; in this respect the ambiguous nature of language 
has to be taken into account.
Thus reality, as experienced, has always been virtual because it is 
always perceived through symbols that frame practice with some 
meaning that escapes their strict semantic definition. 
A system that generates real virtuality is a system where reality 
itself (people's material/symbolic existence) is entirely captured, 
fully immersed in a virtual image setting [...] in which appearances 
are not just on the screen through which experience is communi-
cated, but they become the experience. 6
In this sense, a virtual presence is no less real than a material one, so 
where does the difference reside?
Following Levi-Strauss's statement that the inadequacy between 
the signifier and the signified is the cause of every mythic and aes-
thetic invention that aimed to cover this flaw, or this unfitness; 7 it is 
possible to think about the inadequacy between the virtual archive 
and its (possible) referent in these terms. It is necessary to try to 
understand what is happening with this non-fit, or over-spill, and ac-
cordingly, what is happening in the gap: in the ‘inadequacy’ between 
the virtual archive and the physical museum. This over-spill can be 
considered the intrinsic ambiguity of symbolic production. Moreover, 
the very well known impossibility to ‘translate’ symbolic productions 
is what generates the change in ontological status of digitized work.
In his article The Archive Without Museums, Hal Foster 8 advances 
the hypothesis that photographic reproduction allowed a new “dia-
(Top left) screenshot: http://www.metmuseum.org/works_of_art/collection_database/ , (top right) screenshot: http://archive.newmuseum.org/index.php/Detail/
Occurrence/Show/occurrence_id/930 , (bottom) screenshot: http://www.googleartproject.com/museums/reinasofia .
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lectics of seeing,” represented by the positions of Walter Benjamin: 
namely, that photographic reproduction strips art of context and 
aura, and therefore its cult value and exhibition value are lost forever. 
In contrast, André Malraux claims that the museum guarantees art 
as such, and photographic reproduction offers the means to put to-
gether “the bits and pieces” into the meta-tradition of “style.” 9
If the museum guarantees the status of art and photographic repro-
duction permits stylistic affinities, what might a digital reordering 
encourage? 
It is possible then that electronic information and digitalization es-
tablish new dialectics in which a museum's legitimatizing function is 
replaced by the virtual archive and/or museum/gallery websites?
Could it also then be said that some artworks are being produced 
to exist solely for the virtual archive? Moreover, has the time come 
when on-line documentation of exhibitions that never happened are 
created and presented?
At the same time, the influence goes in both directions – as Bolter 
and Grusin 10 described the process of “remediation” – from the 
digital to the material, in the ways artworks are documented, affect-
ing the processes of legitimization (and probably also of production); 
and from the material to the digital, when the virtual is anchored 
to reality in the imitation, or realistic representation of it (especially 
three-dimensional space).
Without falling into modernist positions about the intrinsic possibili-
ties of each medium, could we find a way in which the new archive 
can deal with art without imitating physical reality in the display? By 
exploiting the logic of the hyperlink – and thus of the “over-spill” and 
of ambiguity – can we create a non-linear, more experimental and 
open archive which each user could, ideally, build her/his own path 
through? The question of whether this ‘freedom of choice’ provided 
by hyperlink logic and the virtual database is only an illusion or a uto-
pian realization of the medium has been widely discussed. However, 
even if not unlimited, the possibility exists and the medium undoubt-
edly offers a considerable degree of ‘personalization’ in the paths to 
follow through a database or archive.
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The shift Foster talks about is from the perception of the world as 
an image, to the codification of the world (these images included), 
resulting in pure information:
[…] the humanism of the world-become-picture may reverse into 
the inhumanism of the world-become-information. For in the 
virtuality of the archive […] what is real is not what appears at 
any moment, but what is conserved in memory […] 11
In the same way the object is digitized in the archive, the medium 
loses its original materiality to be converted into a pure image. By 
being absorbed and re-generated in the virtual database, its status 
changes to the one of an “image-text,” or of an “info-pixel.” 12
This is the reason why the virtual archive no longer needs a physical 
referent. It doesn't mean that it has been removed from all physical 
support, only that the support of the information (memory and data-
base), which constitutes the object’s new materiality, does not coin-
cide with the support that presents it to be seen and understood (a 
screen). Therefore, referential relation is not completely preserved, 
but it becomes weaker and fragmental. 13 The iconic sign, in Peirce’s 
terms, 14 however, still maintains its relationship of resemblance 
with the object, but the medium has been converted into an image-
text, and info-pixel; its materiality has been ‘translated’ into informa-
tion, into a code.
This new database is generating a dematerialization of memory and 
its record. However, this dematerialization is not the same proposed 
by the Conceptual Art of the 60s, this is a ‘new’ dematerialization, 
which does not imply an annihilation of the object, but a change in 
its ontological status. ■
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abstract
In the same way that humans have always had the need for inventing fictional and 
virtual worlds, they have also experimented an attraction for the threatening and 
fascinating ideas of the doppelgänger, automata, and by the related phenomena of 
desembodiment, ubiquity, remote viewing, bilocation, splitting personalities. 
The phenomenon of bilocation, for instance, has been widely mentioned in differ-
ent philosophical and religious systems such as Shamanism, Christian mysticism, 
Hinduism, Paganism and others as the ability that some individuals (often saints, 
monks or mystics) would have of being in two, or more, places at the same time. 
The advent of the Internet, new technologies and social networks has opened up new 
and unexpected possibilities in this respect, enabling one to expand oneself. If not 
long ago, these experiences had to be ‘lived’ through cinema and literature; today, 
it is possible to undergo them in first person: everyone is allowed to create other 
selves, other profiles, avatars, entities or doppelgängers that can operate in the world 
(remotely) as extensions of him or her. Consequently, the image has also undergone 
a change in function and status, opening new possibilities through its digitalization. 
The present work intends to explore the relationship between presence, telepresence, 
images and the self.
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From the beginning of its history, Christianity has used symbolism to present 
and transmit its doctrine to its followers, whether they were literate in theol-
ogy or not. One of the best examples of this is the representation of saints 
with their corresponding attributes: Saint Peter is represented with the keys, 
Saint Jerome in his desk with a skull and an angel. In the case of martyrs, the 
iconography usually included the representation of the instrument, or object, 
of their torment as a way of easy recognition: Saint Sebastian with the arrows, 
Saint Stephan with stones, Saint Lawrence with the gridiron, Saint Lucile 
with the eyes on a plate and so on. 
On its part, the cult of relics was considered a way of being closer and 
to reinforce the bonds with God. The physical contact with the ‘sacred’ was 
considered of great importance, and each part of the holy person was consid-
ered to have exactly the same value, the same sacred characteristics as the 
ensemble; all the remains were said to have power derived from the saint. 
The remains of martyrs and saints were scattered in shrines among different 
churches, cathedrals and places of cult, and since the Middle Ages the pilgrim-
ages to these places became widely spread among Christians. Acquiring a relic 
became for many the possibility of being closer to the sacred at home, and of 
avoiding the need to make long trips for getting in contact with it. 
Finally, the phenomena of disembodiment, ubiquity, remote viewing, bilo-
cation have been widely mentioned in different philosophical and religious 
systems such as Shamanism, Christian mysticism, Hinduism, Paganism and 
others as the ability that some individuals (often saints, monks or mystics) 
would have of being in two or more places at the same time. In the Christian 
tradition, for example, many saints were said to be capable of bilocation: Saint 
Anthony of Padua, Saint Ambrose of Milan and Saint Martin de Porres are 
among the most relevant examples. 
The advent of the Internet, of new technologies and of social networks has 
opened up new and unexpected possibilities, enabling one to expand oneself. 
Not long ago, these experiences were prerogatives of holy individuals with 
some kind of ‘supernatural’ ability; otherwise, they had to be ‘experienced’ 
through cinema and literature. Currently, it is possible to undergo them in first 
person: everyone is allowed to create other selves, other profiles, avatars, enti-
ties or doppelgängers that can operate in the world (remotely) as extensions 
of him or her. A similar logic to the use of symbolism in the iconography of 
the saints and martyrs in the Christian tradition, for instance, can be detected 
in the construction of avatar identities in the digital world; from the ones on 
Second Life to the South Park website, it basically consists of the selection 
of the most characteristic features of the person, for him or her to be easily 
recognized in the corresponding online avatar.
The present work intends to explore the relationship between presence, 
telepresence, images and the self.
As quoted by Rosalind Krauss in The Optical Unconscious (1996: 178–79), 
Walter Bejamin refers to technological advances as prosthetic limbs that human-
kind have developed to operate in the world enlarging its powers, alluding in 
turn to Freud’s article Civilization and its Discontents ([1930] 1962). 
Freud advanced that every tool humankind has created since its origins 
has been meant to extend its powers over the world.
[…] Long ago he formed an ideal conception of omnipotence and 
omniscience which he embodied in his gods. To these gods he attrib-
uted everything that seemed unattainable to his wishes, or that was 
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forbidden to him. One may say, therefore, that these gods were cultural 
ideals. To-day he has come very close to the attainment of this ideal, he 
has almost become god for himself. With every tool man is perfecting 
his own organs, whether motor or sensory, or is removing the limits to 
their functioning. […] 
Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God. When he puts on 
all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but those organs have 
not grown on to him and they still give him much trouble at times. […] 
Future ages will bring with them new and probably unimaginably great 
advances in his field of civilization and will increase likeness to God still 
more. 
([1930] 1962: 37–39)
In this regard, Benjamin observes that photography, enlarging the power of 
sight, has created a sort of ‘optical unconscious’ that permits to see what the eye 
is not capable of; the human eye cannot perceive, for instance, that when a horse 
is running, at a certain point, all its body is suspended in the air. That moment 
can be captured and revealed to the human eye by the camera: The possibilities 
of human vision enlarged to the ones of God by the photographic device.
Benjamin’s article was written in 1931. Currently, technologies in general, 
and especially the Internet, have enlarged the possibilities of the self. Ubiquity, 
remote viewing, even attributes, used to be reserved to saints, shamans, or 
people with supernatural abilities. Social networks have made possible for each 
individual the multiplication of his or her persona. Skype and web cams make 
possible a version of remote viewing, and bilocation. The same can be said of 
sites like Second Life, which allows the building of a virtual and parallel reality. 
In this sense, it is possible to say that Freud was right. Technology, and 
especially the Web, is giving humans possibilities that were previously reserved 
to gods. So would it be possible to talk about prosthetic selves as artificial exten-
sions of the self that make humans able of exhibiting godlike capacities?
Considering bilocation, or multilocation, previously mentioned as the 
alleged ability that some people would have of being physically present in two 
or more places at the same time, it could be hardly regarded as exactly the same 
case of virtual avatars, social networks’ profiles or virtual communication.
As Flusser had explained when talking about the photographic apparatus 
and its programme, there is ‘a reversal in the vector of significance’ in which 
information, the signifier, is what becomes ‘real’:
To this extent, the traditional distinction between realism and idealism is 
overturned in the case of photography: It is not the world out there that 
is real, nor is the concept within the camera’s program – only the photo-
graph is real. The program of the world and the camera are only precon-
ditions for the image, possibilities to be realized. We are dealing here 
with a reversal of the vector of significance: It is not the significance that 
is real but the signifier, the information, the symbol, and this reversal of 
the vector of significance is characteristic of everything to do with appa-
ratus and characteristic of the post-industrial world in general.
(1983: 37)
So what is happening with presence, with the body? The fact is that one gets 
in touch with a projected presence; this projected presence does not have the 
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same qualities, nor the possibilities, of the actual body, of the referent. In his 
article ‘Image, medium, body: A new approach to iconology’ (2005), Hans 
Belting advanced that
The digital media reintroduce the body analogy via denial. The loss of 
the body has already haunted the mirror fantasies of the nineteenth 
century, when the doppelganger no longer obeyed the spectator but 
abandoned the mimesis of the reflecting body. Digital images usually 
address our bodies’ imagination and cross the borderline between visual 
images and virtual images, images seen and images projected. In this 
sense, digital technology pursues the mimesis of our own imagination. 
(2005: 309)
Accordingly, even if the information provided by a Facebook profile, or by 
a communication via web cam, is more complex, and in a certain sense 
more complete than, for instance, the one provided by a letter or a telephone 
conversation there is no actual presence, there are no living bodies sharing 
the same space, to put it in Belting’s terms. In this sense, both presences, the 
virtual and the physical, are situated in different ontological levels; and the 
logic of the relics is not equivalent in this case: the self and its virtual exten-
sions do not share exactly the same powers, as the remains of saints do.
Belting considers negative, or even mistaken, to give artificial bodies, or 
prosthetic selves, the same status as a living body:
But the uncertain notion of the body, whose ongoing crisis is evident, 
has led us to extrapolate the expectation of life and to invest artificial 
bodies, as against living bodies, with a superior life of their own. This 
tendency has caused a lot of confusion, turning the very function of 
visual media upside down. Thus, contemporary media have become 
invested with a paradoxical power over our bodies, which feel defeated 
in their presence. 
(2005: 312)
Therefore, the tendency to consider the visible in the same ontological level 
as the presence would have to do with the tendency to relate an iconic presence 
with physical presence, a kind of ‘if I can see it, it is there’. Images replace the 
absence of the body with a different kind of presence, which is the image of 
that body, and thus the iconic presence implies a visible absence. In this way, 
‘[images] perform the presence of an absence’ (Belting 2005), and this is also 
valid to contemporary media and telepresence (Belting 2005: 312). But when 
an absence, an absent body, becomes present through images, this is a surro-
gate presence/visibility; and instead of making the world more accessible, 
they can be said to work as ‘screens’ that come between men and the world, 
obscuring their relationship with it, ‘until human beings’ lives finally become 
a function of the images they create’ (Flusser 1983: 10).
Is Flusser’s statement too apocalyptic? Are extensions of the self (social 
networks, avatars, virtual worlds, surrogates, etc.) obstructing the experi-
ence of the world? The point is that they are already part of the world and 
not opposed to it; so yes, the relationship between human beings and the 
world has changed, but this does not mean that it is being ‘obstructed’, or 
‘screened’. The powers of the self have been expanded, at least in terms of 
communication. The fact that the extended possibilities of the self through 
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new media do not equal the presence of the body does not mean that they 
are not expanding, or at least changing (and not necessarily only in a nega-
tive way) the possibilities of experiencing the world, and of creating different 
and new worlds, real, virtual, imaginary, and innovative ways of exploring and 
living them.
Brian McHale explains in these terms the recursive structure typical of the 
non-chronological and fragmented postmodernist narrative, which can be 
easily related to the mentioned logic:
Each change of narrative level in a recursive structure also involves a 
change of ontological level, a change of world. These embedded or 
nested worlds may be more or less continuous with the world of the 
primary diegesis, as in such Chinese-box novels […] In other words, 
although there is always an ontological discontinuity between the 
primary diegesis and hypodiegetic worlds, this discontinuity need not 
always be foregrounded. […] It is rather the epistemological dimension 
of this structure which is foregrounded, each narrative level functioning 
as a link in a chain of narrative transmission. […]
So if recursive structure is to function in a postmodernist poetics of 
ontology, strategies obviously must be brought to bear on it which fore-
ground its ontological dimension. 
(McHale 1987: 113)
In this sense, the new possibilities of the self could make it more likely to 
experience reality in its fragmented and heterogeneous quality in differ-
ent ontological levels, coherent as they are with the logic of new media. 
And in an analogous fashion, in the same way the recursive structure 
serves as a tool for investigating certain topics in narrative, such as ‘author-
ity, reliability and unreliability, the circulation of knowledge, and so forth’ 
(McHale 1987: 113), the possibilities opened by new media and by the multi-
plication of selves can be useful to explore and expand knowledge and the 
chances for operating on similar subjects not only in the fictional, or virtual, 
but also in physical realm.
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“The Digitalisation and Uploading of the Ar-
tistic Event” (Digitalizzazione e uploading 
dell’evento artistico) si focalizza sull’influenza 
delle nuove tecnologie, in particolare Internet, 
rispetto ai modi di circolazione, legittimazione 
e produzione di eventi artistici, sui problemi 
della documentazione digitale delle pratiche 
artistiche, e il suo rapporto con la demateria-
lizzazione e la memoria. L’interesse si concen-
tra sul comprendere se esista effettivamente 
una tendenza alla dematerializzazione favorita 
dalle nuove tecnologie, e in caso di risposta 
positiva, quale potrebbe essere il rapporto 
con i modi di documentazione e conser-
vazione digitali delle pratiche artistiche. La 
ricerca non verte necessariamente su artisti 
che lavorano con le nuove tecnologie e i new 
media, ma soprattutto su opere, artisti, critici, 
curatori che sono in qualche modo influen-
zati dalla specificità di queste, e sui modi in 
cui gli eventi artistici e le produzioni artistiche 
contemporanee sono prodotti e/o percepiti. 
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Si pone così particolare attenzione ai modi in 
cui i nuovi media sono utilizzati per riprodur-
re, documentare, legittimare e fare circolare 
eventi artistici e opere.
Una delle ipotesi che si intende verificare è la 
possibilità che l’informazione elettronica e la 
digitalizzazione stabiliscano una nuova dialet-
tica secondo la quale la funzione legittimante 
del museo sia sostituita dall’archivio virtuale, 
dal sito del museo, oppure dalla galleria d’ar-
te, sino ad affermare la condizione limite della 
produzione di alcune opere finalizzate esclusi-
vamente all’archivio virtuale.  Per questo moti-
vo fanno parte integrale del progetto la ricerca 
su archivi virtuali e i loro rapporti col referente 
materiale, ovvero tra i siti web, specialmente 
dei musei, e le loro collezioni. 
La digitalizzazione e il caricamento sui siti web 
cambia lo status dell’opera digitalizzata, e allo 
stesso tempo influenza la percezione di essa. 
Poiché il web, inteso come testo, influenza la 
percezione della realtà materiale, nello stesso 
modo in cui i linguaggi e le metafore costru-
iscono la “realtà” o strutturano la percezione 
del mondo,  è necessario prendere in conside-
razione anche la natura ambigua del linguag-
gio. Seguendo l’affermazione di Levi-Strauss1 
che l’inadeguatezza tra significato e significan-
te è causa di ogni invenzione estetica e artisti-
ca, le quali puntano a colmare questo difetto, 
diviene possibile pensare l’inadeguatezza tra 
l’archivio virtuale e il suo referente in termini 
simili. Se la sovrabbondanza di significato può 
essere considerata come l’ambiguità intrinse-
ca di ogni produzione simbolica, è necessario 
capire cosa comporti questa sovrabbondanza, 
e, di conseguenza, cosa possa derivare  dall’i-
nadeguatezza tra l’archivio virtuale e il museo 
fisico. Inoltre, la ben conosciuta impossibilità 
di tradurre le produzioni simboliche è ciò che 
genera il mutamento nello status ontologico 
dell’opera digitalizzata.
In maniera analoga all’oggetto che viene digi-
talizzato nell’archivio, il medium perde la sua 
materialità originale per essere convertito in 
pura immagine. In seguito all’assorbimento 
[1] Levi-Strauss, C; (1950); “Introduction à l’oeuvre de Marcel Mauss” in Marcel Mauss, 1968; Sociologie et anthropo-
logie (1902-1938); Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France
[2] Foster, Hal; “The Archive without Museums” in October, Vol. 77 (Summer 1996), pp.97-119, Cambridge (MA): The 
MIT Press
[3] Capucci, P. L.; 2010; PhD Tutorial
[4] Peirce, C. S.;1998; The Essential Peirce. Volume 2. Eds. Peirce Edition Project; Bloomington; I.N.: Indiana University 
Press
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e alla rigenerazione nel database, lo status 
diviene “immagine-testo”, o “info-pixel”2. Per 
questa ragione l’archivio virtuale non ha più 
bisogno di un referente materiale: esso non 
è stato rimosso totalmente dal sostrato fisico, 
ma il supporto dell’informazione (memoria e 
database), che costituisce la nuova materiali-
tà dell’oggetto, non coincide con il supporto 
finalizzato alla fruizione (uno schermo). Di 
conseguenza, anche se la relazione referenzia-
le non è stata completamente annullata, essa 
diventa più debole e frammentaria3. Il segno 
iconico mantiene ancora  la sua somiglianza 
con l’oggetto (vedi Peirce), ma il medium è 
diventato una immagine-testo e un info-pixel4; 
la sua materialità è stata “tradotta” in informa-
zione, in un codice.
Il nuovo database genera così una demate-
rializzazione della memoria e del registro, la 
quale però non implica un annientamento 
dell’oggetto artistico, ma solo un cambiamen-
to nel suo status ontologico.
Capella SiStina, navigabile in 3D 
Sul Sito uffiCiale Del vatiCano:
http://www.vatican.va/various/cappelle/
sistina_vr/index.html
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Nuevas tecnologías y las extensiones prostéticas del 
«yo» 
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Resumen:  Del mismo modo en que el ser humano ha sentido la necesidad de inventar mundos ficticios 
y virtuales, también siempre experimentó una atracción por las ideas amenazadoras y 
fascinantes del doble (doppelgänger), de los autómatas, y por fenómenos tales como la 
ubicuidad, incorporeidad (disembodiement), la visión a distancia, la bilocación y las 
personalidades múltiples. El fenómeno de la bi-locación, por ejemplo, ha sido mencionado 
extensamente en diferentes sistemas religiosos y filosóficos como el chamanismo, el 
hinduismo, el misticismo cristiano, el paganismo y otros, como la habilidad que tendrían 
ciertos individuos (generalmente santos, monjes o místicos) de encontrarse en dos o más 
lugares al mismo tiempo. El advenimiento de Internet, las nuevas tecnologías y las redes 
sociales han abierto nuevas posibilidades respecto a esto, permitiendo la expansión del «yo» 
en cuerpos virtuales teledirigidos. Si no mucho tiempo atrás, experiencias de este tipo 
debían ser vividas a través del cine o la literatura, hoy es posible atravesarlas en primera 
persona: todo el mundo es capaz de crearse extensiones virtuales del «yo», otros perfiles, 
avatares, entidades o doppelgängers que pueden operar (controlados de manera remota) 
como extensiones de uno mismo. Como consecuencia, la imagen ha sufrido un cambio en su 
función y estatus, al mismo tiempo que se abren nuevas posibilidades a través de los 
procesos de digitalización. El presente trabajo intenta explorar la actual relación entre la 
presencia, la tele-presencia, las imágenes y las extensiones del yo. 
Palabras clave:  Telepresencia – Multiplicidad – Imágenes – Presencia. 
 
[Short communication] 
New Technologies and the Prosthetic Extesions of the “Self” 
Summary: In the same way that humans have always had the need for inventing fictional and virtual 
worlds, they have also experimented an attraction for the threatening and fascinating ideas 
of the doppelgänger, automata, and by the related phenomena of desembodiment, ubiquity, 
remote viewing, bilocation, splitting personalities. The phenomenon of bilocation, for instance, 
has been widely mentioned in different philosophical and religious systems such as 
Shamanism, Christian mysticism, Hinduism, Paganism and others as the ability that some 
individuals (often saints, monks or mystics) would have of being in two, or more, places at 
the same time. The advent of the Internet, new technologies and social networks has opened 
up new and unexpected possibilities in this respect, enabling one to expand oneself. If not 
long ago, these experiences had to be ‘lived’ through cinema and literature; today, it is 
possible to undergo them in first person: everyone is allowed to create other selves, other 
profiles, avatars, entities or doppelgängers that can operate in the world (remotely) as 
extensions of him or her. Consequently, the image has also undergone a change in function 
and status, opening new possibilities through its digitalization. The present work intends to 
explore the relationship between presence, telepresence, images and the extensions of the 
self. 
Key words:  Telepresence – Multiplicity – Images – Presence. 
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Introducción 
Desde sus inicios, la cristiandad ha usado el simbolismo para presentar y 
transmitir su doctrina a sus fieles, fueran o no letrados en teología. Uno de los 
mejores ejemplos de esto es la representación de los santos con sus respectivos 
atributos: San Pedro con las llaves, San Jerónimo en su escritorio con la calavera 
y un ángel. En el caso de los mártires, la iconografía incluye la representación del 
instrumento u objeto del tormento para facilitar su reconocimiento: San 
Sebastián atravesado por las flechas, San Esteban con las piedras, San Lorenzo 
sobre la parrilla o Santa Lucía con sus ojos sobre un plato. 
Por su parte, el culto a las reliquias era un modo de sentirse más cerca y reforzar 
los lazos con Dios. El contacto físico con lo sagrado era considerado de altísima 
importancia y se consideraba que cada parte del santo tenía el mismo nivel de 
sacralidad, las mismas características sagradas que el conjunto; todas las partes 
del cuerpo poseían el poder que derivaba de la santa persona. Los restos 
mortales de mártires y santos eran dispersos en santuarios en diversas iglesias, 
catedrales y lugares de culto y desde la Edad Media los peregrinajes a estos 
lugares fueron muy populares en el mundo cristiano. La posibilidad de comprar 
una reliquia, por ejemplo, era para quienes podían permitírselo, la de llevar una 
dimensión de sacralidad al propio hogar evitando así la necesidad de hacer 
largos y penosos viajes para entrar en contacto con ésta. 
Finalmente, los fenómenos de incorporeidad, ubicuidad, visualización remota, 
bilocación, han sido mencionados extensamente en diferentes sistemas religiosos 
y filosóficos como el chamanismo, el hinduismo, el misticismo cristiano, el 
paganismo y otros, como la habilidad que tendrían ciertos individuos 
(generalmente santos, monjes o místicos) de encontrarse en dos o más lugares al 
mismo tiempo. En la tradición cristiana, por ejemplo, diversos santos fueron 
considerados capaces de bilocación, entre los más famosos: San Antonio de 
Padua, San Ambrosio de Milán y San Martín de Porres. 
Todos estos temas han siempre generado un inmenso interés y una gran 
fascinación en la cultura occidental y, en consecuencia, han sido tratados en 
profundidad y repetidas veces en la literatura, el cine, la pintura y otras 
disciplinas artísticas. Podríamos decir que distintos períodos históricos y 
corrientes artísticas fueron particularmente afines a topoi específicos; sólo por dar 
un ejemplo, el tema del doppelgänger ha sido especialmente caro al 
Romanticismo. 
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Desde aproximadamente mediados de la década de 1990, el advenimiento de 
Internet, las nuevas tecnologías y las redes sociales abrió nuevas posibilidades 
respecto a estos tópicos. Si hasta hace poco tiempo este tipo de experiencia era 
prerrogativa de individuos con algún tipo de habilidad «sobrenatural», o de otro 
modo, debían ser experimentadas a través del cine, la literatura, o la televisión; 
actualmente, es posible atravesarlas en primera persona: potencialmente, 
cualquier individuo puede «multiplicarse» creando avatares, perfiles en redes 
sociales, entidades virtuales o doppelgängers que pueden operar (controlados de 
manera remota) como extensiones del «yo». Otro ejemplo de la continuidad 
cultural de la lógica correspondiente al uso del simbolismo en la iconografía de 
los santos y los mártires en la tradición cristiana, se puede detectar en la creación 
de avatares en el mundo digital: desde aquellos en Second Life a la página de 
South Park, pasando por la Nintendo Wii, el proceso consiste básicamente en la 
selección de los rasgos sobresalientes y más pregnantes de la persona de modo 
de hacer fácil el reconocimiento. 
Es indagando en esta lógica, en el modo en que se desarrolla actualmente en la 
dimensión que podríamos llamar conectiva y digital, que este trabajo propone 
explorar la relación entre la presencia, la telepresencia, las imágenes, el yo, y sus 
proyecciones (o extensiones) virtuales. 
 
Extensiones prostéticas del «yo» 
En su ya canónico texto «La obra de arte en la época de su reproductibilidad 
técnica», Walter Benjamin (1936), inspirándose en el artículo de Sigmund Freud 
«El malestar en la cultura» (1930 [1962]), habla de los avances tecnológicos como 
prótesis que la humanidad ha desarrollado para ampliar su capacidad de 
operatividad en el mundo. Freud propuso la idea de que cada herramienta que la 
humanidad ha creado desde sus orígenes tenía como objetivo aumentar su 
poder sobre el mundo: 
Desde hace mucho tiempo [el hombre] se había forjado un ideal de omnipotencia y 
omnisapiencia que encarnó en sus dioses, atribuyéndoles cuanto parecía inaccesible 
a sus deseos o le estaba vedado, de modo que bien podemos considerar a estos 
dioses como ideales de la cultura. Ahora que se encuentra muy cerca de alcanzar 
este ideal casi ha llegado a convertirse él mismo en un dios, aunque por cierto sólo 
en la medida en que el común juicio humano estima factible un ideal: nunca por 
completo; en unas cosas, para nada; en otras, sólo a medias. El hombre ha llegado a 
ser por así decirlo, un dios con prótesis: bastante magnífico cuando se coloca todos 
sus artefactos; pero éstos no crecen de su cuerpo y a veces aun le procuran muchos 
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sinsabores. (…) Tiempos futuros traerán nuevos y quizá inconcebibles progresos en 
este terreno de la cultura, exaltando aún más la deificación del hombre. Pero no 
olvidemos, en interés de nuestro estudio, que tampoco el hombre de hoy se siente 
feliz en su semejanza con Dios (1930 [1962]:37–39). 
Al respecto, Benjamin observa que la fotografía, ampliando el poder de la vista, 
ha creado una suerte de «inconsciente óptico» que permite al ojo humano ver 
aquello que no sería capaz de percibir, como por ejemplo que cuando un caballo 
corre, en un cierto punto todo su cuerpo está suspendido en el aire. Ese 
momento puede ser capturado y revelado al ojo humano por la cámara: las 
posibilidades de la visión son ampliadas a aquellas de un dios omnisciente por el 
dispositivo fotográfico. 
El artículo de Benjamin fue escrito en 1931 y publicado en 1936. En la actualidad, 
las tecnologías en general, y en especial Internet, han extendido las posibilidades 
del yo proyectando, por así decirlo, un cuerpo físico, material, en una infinidad de 
cuerpos virtuales. La ubicuidad, la visión remota, incluso la representación de 
atributos, estaban reservados a los santos, chamanes, o a personalidades con 
habilidades sobrenaturales. Las redes sociales han hecho posible para cada 
individuo con acceso a ellas la multiplicación del propio «yo». Skype y las web-
cams han hecho posible una versión tecnológica de la visón remota y de la 
bilocación. Lo mismo se puede decir de sitios como Second Life, que consiente la 
creación de una realidad virtual paralela, incluyendo «sucursales» virtuales de 
negocios, o museos, o galerías de arte, por nombrar sólo algunos ejemplos, que 
tienen un referente en la «realidad material», como así también la creación de 
otros que tienen una existencia exclusivamente digital, imaginada y creada por 
los usuarios. En este sentido, es posible decir que Freud estaba en lo cierto. La 
tecnología, y especialmente la Web, está dando a la humanidad posibilidades 
que previamente estaban reservadas a los dioses. ¿Será entonces posible hablar 
de personalidades prostéticas como extensiones artificiales del yo, de la propia 
personalidad, que permiten a los hombres exhibir capacidades quasi divinas? 
Si se considera la bi-locación, o la multi-locación, mencionada previamente como 
la supuesta capacidad que tendrían algunas personas de estar físicamente 
presentes en dos o más lugares a la vez, difícilmente podría esto equipararse a la 
experiencia proporcionada por avatares, perfiles en redes sociales, o a través de 
la comunicación digital. 
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Tal como ha explicado Vilém Flusser al hablar del dispositivo fotográfico y su 
«programa», existe una «inversión en el vector de la significación» en el cual la 
información, el significante, deviene «real»: 
En este sentido, la distinción tradicional entre realismo e idealismo, en el caso de la 
fotografía, se derrumba: No es el mundo allá afuera que es real, como tampoco el 
concepto dentro el programa de la cámara —sólo la fotografía es real. El programa 
del mundo y la cámara son solamente precondiciones para la imagen, posibilidades 
a ser realizadas. Estamos tratando con la inversión del vector de significación: No es 
la significación que es real sino el significante, la información, el símbolo, y esta 
inversión del vector de la significación es característica de todo lo que tiene que ver 
con el dispositivo y es característica del mundo post-industrial en general (1983:37).1 
Del mismo modo, aun si la información que proporciona un perfil de Facebook, o 
una comunicación vía web-cam, es más compleja, y en cierto modo también más 
completa, que, por ejemplo, aquella que proporciona una carta o una 
conversación telefónica, de todos modos no existe una presencia real, no hay 
cuerpos vivientes compartiendo el mismo espacio. En este sentido, ambas 
presencias, la virtual y la física, se encuentran en niveles ontológicos distintos; y 
la lógica de las reliquias no es equivalente en este caso: el «yo» y sus extensiones 
virtuales no comparten exactamente los mismos poderes y atributos, como es el 
caso de los restos de los santos. 
Hans Belting considera en manera negativa, incluso equivocada, el acto de dar el 
mismo estatus de un ser viviente a cuerpos artificiales o a «personalidades 
prostéticas»: 
Pero la noción incierta del cuerpo, cuya crisis en curso es evidente, nos ha llevado a 
extrapolar la expectativa de vida y a investir cuerpos artificiales, frente a los cuerpos 
vivientes, con una vida propia superior. Esta tendencia ha causado mucha confusión, 
revirtiendo completamente la función de los medios visuales. En consecuencia, los 
medios contemporáneos han sido investidos con un poder paradójico sobre 
nuestros cuerpos, que se sienten derrotados en su presencia (2005:312). 
Entonces, la tendencia a considerar lo visible en el mismo nivel ontológico de lo 
presente tendría que ver con una tendencia a relacionar la presencia icónica con 
la presencia física, una especie de razonamiento del tipo «si puedo verlo es 
porque se encuentra allí». Las imágenes reemplazan la ausencia del cuerpo con 
un tipo de presencia diversa que es la imagen de ese cuerpo, y en consecuencia, 
                                               
1 La traducción es propia, como la de las siguientes citas en este trabajo. 
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la presencia icónica implica una ausencia visible. De este modo, «[las imágenes] 
actúan la presencia de una ausencia», y esto es válido también para los medios 
contemporáneos y la telepresencia (Belting 2005:312). Pero cuando una ausencia, 
un cuerpo ausente, deviene presente a través de imágenes, esta es una 
presencia-visibilidad subrogada; en vez de hacer el mundo más accesible, se 
puede decir que funcionan como «pantallas» que se interponen entre el hombre 
y el mundo, obscureciendo la relación con él, «hasta que las vidas de los seres 
humanos finalmente se convierten en una función de las imágenes que crean» 
(Flusser 1983:10). 
 
Recursividad y niveles ontológicos 
Posiblemente la afirmación de Flusser sea demasiado apocalíptica. El problema 
en realidad, es que las extensiones del yo (redes sociales, avatares, mundos 
virtuales, perfiles en redes sociales, etc.) no están realmente obstruyendo la 
posibilidad de experiencia del mundo porque son ya parte del mundo, y no se 
oponen a él; la dicotomía entre una realidad «real» y una «virtual» no parece 
tener más sentido. Entonces, sí, la relación entre los seres humanos y el mundo 
ha cambiado pero esta relación no está necesariamente siendo «obstruida», o 
«velada». El hecho de que las posibilidades de expansión del yo a través de las 
nuevas tecnologías no sean equivalentes a la presencia del cuerpo no significa 
que no estén amplificando, o al menos cambiando —y no necesariamente en 
sentido negativo— las posibilidades de experimentar el mundo, y de crear 
diferentes mundos, al mismo tiempo que modos de explorarlos y vivirlos, ya sean 
éstos materiales o digitales. 
Más que la mencionada contraposición entre real y virtual, o material y digital, el 
tema central en este problema es la diferencia en los niveles ontológicos. En este 
sentido, es interesante el análisis propuesto por Brian McHale de la estructura 
recursiva típica de la narrativa postmoderna, no cronológica y fragmentada, y 
que puede resultar de gran utilidad para analizar el fenómeno mencionado 
precedentemente: 
Cada cambio en el nivel narrativo de una estructura recursiva conlleva también un 
cambio en el nivel ontológico, un cambio de mundo. Estos mundos incorporados o 
anidados uno dentro el otro pueden ser más o menos continuos con el mundo de la 
diégesis primaria, como es el caso de las novelas de tipo caja china (…) En otras 
palabras, aun si existe siempre una discontinuidad ontológica entre la diégesis 
primaria y los mundos hipodiegéticos, dicha discontinuidad no necesita ser siempre 
subrayada. (…) Es más bien la dimensión epistemológica de esta estructura que es 
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destacada, cada nivel narrativo funcionando como un nexo en la cadena de 
transmisión narrativa (McHale 1987:113). 
Como subraya McHale con respecto a la narrativa postmoderna, en este tipo de 
narrativa del tipo «caja china» o «matrioska», en la cual de una diégesis primaria 
—correspondiente a la «realidad»— se desprenden mundos «anidados», o 
incluidos uno dentro de otros, no es relevante el valor ontológico de cada 
narrativa o mundo dentro de la estructura diegética, sino el valor hermenéutico y 
epistemológico que deriva de ella. En este sentido, parece importante entender 
estas nuevas extensiones prostéticas del yo como instrumentos conceptuales que 
ayuden a experimentar la realidad en su cualidad fragmentaria y heterogénea y 
en sus distintos niveles ontológicos, coherentes como son con la lógica de las 
nuevas tecnologías. Análogamente, así como las estructuras recursivas sirven 
como instrumento de investigación de ciertos topoi en la narrativa, como «la 
autoridad, confiabilidad y desconfianza en la circulación del conocimiento» 
(McHale 1987:113), las posibilidades abiertas por los nuevos medios digitales y 
por las extensiones prostéticas del yo pueden ser útiles para explorar y expandir 
el conocimiento y las oportunidades de analizar —y actuar en consecuencia 
respecto de— temas similares, no solo en el ámbito virtual y digital, sino también 
en eso que por el momento se conoce como mundo material.  
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Resumen:  La Idea del Theatro era fundamentalmente una estructura conceptual de relaciones más 
que un edificio real que Giulio Camillo entendía como una representación espacial de la 
cronología. 
El Atlas Mnemosyne de Aby Warburg era a su vez un proyecto centrado en las 
imágenes: su objetivo era el de crear relaciones y despertar recuerdos en relación 
recíproca. 
Ambos modelos comparten similitudes sorprendentes y casi predictivas con la actual 
World Wide Web, en la cual las posibilidades de acceso al conocimiento tienen una 
estructura análoga aunque la materialidad del soporte es diversa por razones obvias. En 
relación a lo anterior, el interés del concepto de ambigüedad radica en la libertad que 
podría permitir para una lectura potencial que permitiese al mismo tiempo la posibilidad 
de disparar nuevas relaciones y asociaciones creativas, abriendo recorridos 
conceptuales que no hubieran sido considerados hasta el momento. La apertura y la 
simultaneidad de modelos no unilaterales para el pensamiento (creativo) puede permitir 
la reconstrucción del Theatro, o del Atlas, no como una ilusión tridimensional, pero como 
una arquitectura o estructura conceptual para el pensamiento y la teoría del arte, de la 
historia y teoría de los nuevos medios; y para la transmisión del conocimiento en 
general. 
Palabras claves: Aby Warburg − Hyperlink −  Giulio Camillo. 
 
Non-Linear Models for Thinking and Writing on New Media Art History 
Summary: The Idea of the Theatre was fundamentally a structure of conceptual relationships rather 
than an actual building that Camillo understood as a spatial representation of 
chronology.  
  Warburg’s Mnemosyne Atlas project is centered on images: It is aimed at creating 
relations and bringing memories in rapport with each other.  
  Both models share stunning and almost predictive similarities with the actual Web, where 
the possibility of accessing knowledge has an analogous structure even if the materiality 
of the support is different for obvious reasons. The interest in the concept of ambiguity in 
this regard lays in the freedom it could open for a potential lecture that at the same time 
allows the possibility of triggering new relations and creative associations, opening 
conceptual paths that have not yet been considered; the aperture and simultaneity of 
non-unilateral models for (creative) thought allows the reconstruction of the Theater, or 
the Atlas, not as a 3D illusion, but as the conceptual architecture or structure when 
thinking about the history of art, on the history and theory of new media, and on the 
transmission, conservation and archiving of new media works and of knowledge in 
general. 
Key words:  Aby Warburg − Hyperlink − Giulio Camillo. 
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Es su libro ¿Que es el cine? (1958) André Bazin comenta de la siguiente 
manera la búsqueda de «transparencia» en el uso del montaje en la clásicos de 
la pre-guerra del cine americano: 
 
El uso del montaje puede ser «invisible» y este era generalmente el caso 
en los clásicos de la pre-guerra de la pantalla americana. Las escenas 
eran divididas con un solo propósito, el de analizar cada episodio de acuer-
do con el material o con la lógica dramática de la escena. En esta lógica, 
que esconde el hecho del análisis, la mente del espectador muy natural-
mente aceptaba los puntos de vista del director, que eran justificados por la 
geografía de la acción o por el énfasis cambiante del interés dramático. 
Pero la cualidad neutral de este montaje «invisible» no logra hacer uso de 
todo el potencial del montaje (Bazin 1958 (1971): 23-4).1
 
Es más, Bazin explica las implicancias del uso del montaje, del uso del close-
up y del abandono de la profundidad de campo como una elección estética con 
ulterior significación: El director comenzó a elegir y a decidir por el espectador 
qué era lo importante, a qué se debía prestar atención: «a través de los con-
tenidos de la imágenes y de los recursos del montaje, el cine tiene a su dispo-
sición un entero arsenal de medios a través de los cuales imponer al espec-
tador su interpretación de un evento» (Ibíd.1971:26). Entonces, el espectador 
no tiene más necesidad de pensar, porque lo que es relevante y lo que amerita 
atención en una cierta historia es elegido para él/ella. 
El hecho de que la profundidad de campo ponga al espectador en una relación 
más cercana con la imagen de la que tiene en realidad hace la experiencia aún 
más realista, según Bazin. Esto implica la necesidad de una actitud mental más 
activa de parte del espectador y, consecuentemente, ella/él debe poner en 
práctica al menos un mínimo de elección personal; el significado de un film es, 
de esta manera, completado por el espectador, y no presentado a éste como 
ya cerrado. 
 
Es por esto que la profundidad de campo (…) es una ganancia capital en el 
campo de la dirección cinematográfica - un dialéctico paso adelante en la 
historia del lenguaje cinematográfico. (…) Además de afectar la estructura 
del lenguaje del film, también afecta la relación de la mente del espectador 
con la imagen y en consecuencia influencia la interpretación del espec-
táculo. (…) En resumen, el montaje, por su misma naturaleza, regula la 
ambigüedad de la expresión. 
Por otro lado, la profundidad de campo reintrodujo la ambigüedad dentro 
de la estructura de la imagen (...) (Bazin  1958 (1971):35-6). 
                                                 
1 La traducción  (como también de todos los textos citados) es propia de la autora. 
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La importancia de la ambigüedad como parte de un nuevo modelo para pensar 
modelos de la teoría de los nuevos medios radica en la libertad que puede 
aportar para interpretaciones diversas, y para la apertura que al mismo tiempo 
permite la posibilidad de disparar nuevas relaciones y asociaciones creativas, 
abriendo recorridos que no habían sido considerados hasta el momento, un 
pensamiento no linear. 
 
 
Espacios navegables 
La predominancia de un paradigma temporal, linear, cronológico que coincide 
con el advenimiento de la historia como disciplina en el siglo XIX está, desde 
algún tiempo a esta parte, siendo parcialmente erosionada por la resurrección 
de un paradigma espacial, simultáneo, no linear favorecido por la lógica digital. 
Los antecedentes de este paradigma pueden ser rastreados en la historia del 
arte en distintos ejemplos, como algunos ciclos de frescos en iglesias, pero 
especialmente en algunas capillas, y en algunos otros modelos espaciales 
inmersivos, algunos nunca realizados como el Projet de Cénotaphe à Newton 
de Etienne-Louis Boullée (1784). 
 
Una secuencia narrativa se presentó como particularmente incompatible 
con una narrativa espacial que había tenido un rol tan prominente en la cul-
tura visual europea durante siglos. Del ciclo de frescos de Giotto en la Ca-
pella degli Scrovegni en Padova a Un enterrement à Ornans de Courbet, 
los artistas presentaban una multitud de eventos separados en un mismo 
espacio, fuera éste el espacio ficcional de una pintura o el espacio físico 
que puede ser captado por el espectador en un mismo momento. En el 
caso del ciclo de frescos de Giotto y de muchos otros ciclos de íconos, 
cada narrativa es enmarcada singularmente pero todas pueden ser cap-
tadas en su conjunto simultáneamente. En otros casos, eventos diferentes 
son representados como si tuvieran lugar dentro de un mismo espacio pic-
tórico. A veces, eventos que formaban una misma narrativa pero estaban 
separados en el tiempo también eran representados en una misma pintura. 
Más frecuentemente, el asunto de la pintura se convertía en el pretexto 
para mostrar una cantidad de «micro-narrativas» separadas (por ejemplo, 
obras de Hiëronymous Bosch y Peter Bruegel). En su conjunto, en contras-
te con la secuencia narrativa del cine, en la narrativa espacial todas las 
«tomas» eran accesibles al espectador de inmediato. Como la animación 
en el siglo XIX, la narrativa espacial no desapareció completamente en el 
siglo XX; pero del mismo modo que la animación, fue relegada a una forma 
menor de la cultura occidental − el comic (Manovich 2001: 270). 
 
Un representación espacial y no linear, como la Capella Sistina, no puede ser 
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considerada exactamente en el mismo sentido que un espacio inmersivo, como 
por ejemplo la Villa dei Misteri en Pompeii. En un caso, las distintas narrativas-
conceptos son accesibles de manera simultánea, pero cada escena 
representada conserva una lógica narrativa interna; mientras que la pretensión 
de inmersión (virtual) en un cierto medio conlleva la intención de «disminuir la 
distancia crítica en lo que es mostrado y aumentar la participación emocional 
en lo que está sucediendo (…) La intención es la de instalar un mundo artificial 
que convierta la imagen espacio en una totalidad o al menos que llene 
completamente el campo visivo del observador» (Grau 2003:13). 
La Capella Sistina es un perfecto ejemplo del primer caso. Los muros y el techo 
están cubiertos por un conjunto de frescos en los cuales diversas escenas del 
Antiguo y del Nuevo Testamento se pueden apreciar simultáneamente. Aún 
cuando cada escena tiene una lógica y una narrativa internas, su distribución 
en el espacio da al espectador la posibilidad de elegir el orden y el modo en el 
cual seguir las distintas historias, cada fresco tiene una narrativa individual, 
pero toda la secuencia puede ser apreciada al mismo tiempo sin un orden 
privilegiado. Actualmente, también existe la posibilidad de hacer una visita 
virtual a la Capilla en el sitio del Vaticano. La página web es un rendering 
tridimensional del espacio físico a través del cual es posible hacer un tour de 
360 grados alrededor de la Sistina, efectuando close-ups y accediendo a 
ángulos y detalles a los cuales sería realmente muy difícil para el visitante 
acercarse en el espacio físico.2
Como propuso Flusser, mientras la función original del texto era aquella de 
librar a las imágenes de su poder mágico para promover el pensamiento 
conceptual; 
 
(…) la función de las imágenes tecnológicas es [aquella] de liberar a los 
receptores por medio de la magia de la necesidad de pensar 
conceptualmente, al mismo tiempo reemplazando la conciencia histórica 
con una conciencia mágica de segundo grado y reemplazando la habilidad 
para pensar conceptualmente con una imaginación de segundo orden. 
Esto es lo que queremos decir cuando decimos que las imágenes 
desplazan a los textos (Flusser 1983: 11-12). 
 
De este modo, la imágenes tecnológicas reintrodujeron las imágenes en la vida 
cotidiana e hicieron los textos comprensibles otra vez para la sociedad; 
teniendo así una especie de efecto amalgamador entre los textos, las imágenes 
tradicionales y la tecnología. 
Por lo tanto, el espacio navegable tridimensional de la Capella Sistina al cual se 
puede acceder online se convierte en un espacio virtual inmersivo en el cual un 
                                                 
2 Ver:  http://www.vatican.va/various/cappelle/index_sistina_en.htm 
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conjunto no linear de imágenes fue desplegado para una lectura 
potencialmente no linear es accesible de manera remota para ser navegado, al 
mismo tiempo que es mediatizado por la imagen tecnológica. 
Un ejemplo notable del segundo caso −de una arquitectura de espacio 
inmersivo− es el Proyecto para el cenotafio de Newton de Etienne-Louis 
Boullée, actualmente en la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris. El proyecto para la 
tumba del matemático, físico y astrónomo Isaac Newton reproduce el sistema 
heliocéntrico de Copérnico. El edificio debía contener una esfera, símbolo al 
mismo tiempo de la Tierra y del infinito, en cuyo centro gravitacional se ubicaría 
la tumba de Newton, aludiendo a la vez al sistema solar y a la posición de la 
humanidad en el centro de la naturaleza. Dentro del Cenotafio, los efectos del 
día y de la noche serían recreados de la siguiente manera: el día, con la 
creación de un brillo luminoso producido por una especie de astrolabio que 
irradiaría a todo el volumen desde su centro; la noche, con pequeños orificios 
perforados en la esfera, que al penetrar la luz, crearían un firmamento de 
estrellas. Un cosmos medido, un espacio inmersivo y creado en forma 
geométrica gracias a los axiomas de Newton y en su honor. 
En el panorama de los nuevo medios, la concepción del espacio representado 
pasó de ser un conjunto continuo y coherente en el cual los objetos eran 
distribuidos dentro de la tela o del fresco, a una representación de un espacio 
discontinuo como sumatoria de objetos «new media». O dicho de otro modo, en 
palabras de Manovich, «no existe el espacio en el cyber-espacio» (Manovich 
2011:219). Esta discontinuidad del espacio euclidiano es una de las 
características de los nuevos medios, e implica un desplazamiento desde una 
concepción coherente, geométrica y antropocéntrica del espacio con un punto 
de vista único y privilegiado hacia un espacio fragmentario, agregado, sin 
puntos de vista privilegiados, como es el caso, por ejemplo, de los ambientes 
de realidad virtual en los cuales el punto de vista cambia constantemente con el 
usuario 
Por lo tanto, en el modelo espacial, el punto de vista privilegiado de la 
perspectiva tradicional es puesto en cuestión a través de la posibilidad de tener 
puntos de vista diversos, siempre cambiantes. La coherencia de este espacio 
no es unívoca: diferentes niveles semánticos y ontológicos pueden ser 
superpuestos y entrelazados. 
 
 
Modelos no lineares 
Existen dos proyectos que, aunque muy distantes en el tiempo, comparten 
sorprendentes y predictivas similitudes en relación a la actual World Wide Web: 
el Teatro de la Memoria de Giulio Camillo [1480-1544)] y el Atlas Mnemosyne’ 
de Aby Warburg [1866-1929]. 
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Giulio Camillo fue un filosófo italiano, y según Frances Yates, «era uno de los 
hombres más famosos del siglo XVI» (1966:145). Yates cita a Viglius 
Zuichemus, quien en 1532 escribió en una carta a Erasmo que todo el mundo 
estaba hablando de un cierto Giulio Camillo. 
 
Dicen que este hombre ha construido un cierto Anfiteatro, una obra de 
habilidad maravillosa, en el cual quien sea admitido como espectador será 
capaz de hablar sobre cualquier tema de manera no menos elocuente que 
Cicerón (Yates 1966:130-1). 
 
Camillo dedicó gran parte de su vida a la planificación y construcción del 
Theatro que permitiría a quienes entraran en él el acceso al conocimiento sobre 
todo el universo. La idea del Theatro era fundamentalmente una estructura 
conceptual de relaciones más que un edificio real que Camillo concibió como 
una representación espacial de la cronología. En el sistema de Camillo, los 
«usuarios» del mismo se convierten en espectadores. Más que nada, concibió 
el Theatro como el ideal de la pedagogía: las ideas y recuerdos que éste 
dispararía serían para la educación de espíritu ante todo. 
Camillo planeó el Theatro organizándolo en siete secciones que conforman un 
mapa de la creación del mundo. Siete pilares que son los de la Casa de 
Salomón, simbolizan la eternidad. En el sistema de Camillo los «académicos», 
los usuarios del teatro, se convierten en espectadores. 
 
El Teatro se eleva en siete gradas o escalones, divididas por siete 
pasarelas que representan los siete planetas. El estudiante se ubica como 
un espectador delante del cual se ubican las siete medidas del mundo «in 
spettaculo», o en un teatro. Y como en los teatros antiguos las personas 
mas distinguidas se sentaban en los asientos más bajos, así en el Theatro 
las cosas mas grandiosas e importantes se encontrarán en el nivel inferior 
(Camillo 1554). 
 
Camillo adaptó el modelo del verdadero teatro clásico de Vitruvio con 
propósitos mnemónicos. 
 
El Teatro es entonces una visión del mundo y de la naturaleza de las cosas 
vistas desde  las alturas, desde las estrellas mismas y desde las fuentes 
supracelestes de sabiduría más allá de éstas. 
Aún así esta visión es proyectada deliberadamente dentro del marco del 
arte de la memoria clásico, usando la terminología mnemónica tradicional. 
El Teatro es un sistema de lugares de memoria, aunque de «alta e 
215
AdVersuS, VIII, 21, diciembre 2011:210-219                                                                                                                   GABRIELA GALATI 
 
 
 
 
 
incomparable» ubicación; actúa como un sistema de memoria clásico para 
los oradores ‘conservando para nosotros las cosas, las palabras, y las 
artes que le confiamos’. Los antiguos oradores confiaban las distintas 
partes de los discursos que deseaban recordar a los «lugares frágiles», 
mientras Camillo ‘deseando almacenar eternamente la naturaleza eterna 
de todas las cosas que pueden ser expresadas en el discurso’ las asigna a 
«ugares eternos» (Yates 1966:144). 
 
El uso de «loci» entonces de las técnicas mnemónicas clásicas fue 
reemplazado en el teatro de Camillo por «lugares eternos», que son las figuras 
ubicadas en cada uno de sus niveles. Este teatro se basaba en los principios 
del clásico arte de la memoria, pero en este edificio Camillo quería reproducir el 
orden de la verdad eterna; «en él, el universo será recordado a través la 
asociación orgánica de todas las partes con su orden eterno esencial» (Yates 
1966:147). Pensó además que todo aquello que la mente humana pudiera 
concebir, aunque no necesariamente dentro del campo de la percepción física, 
podría ser reunido y organizado a través de la meditación y expresado «quizá 
(…) a través de ciertos signos corpóreos de modo que el espectador pueda a la 
vez percibir con los ojos aquello que de otro modo se encuentra escondido en 
las profundidades de la mente humana. Y es a causa de esta mirada corpórea 
que lo llama teatro» (Yates 1966:147). 
El proyecto de Camillo no es un modelo narrativo, es un modelo en el cual el 
acceso al conocimiento, y lo que es aún más importante, el generar nuevas 
ideas en el usuario, pueden suceder desde distintos ángulos y perspectivas sin 
la obligación de seguir un camino único. El Teatro de Camillo conlleva la idea 
de «especialización»: La lógica/representación cronológica y sintagmática del 
la historia (del arte) cambia por una lógica/representación (espacial) simultánea 
y paradigmática, similar a la lógica informática. Esto no significa 
necesariamente proponer un modelo para un programa de representación 
tridimensional del espacio en gráficos por computadora, pero sí sugiere que 
estos modelos son útiles para la concepción de modelos para la teoría de los 
nuevos medios. 
En su conferencia «Aby Warburg (1966-1929). The Survival of an Idea» 
Mathias Bruhn habla del Atlas Mnemosyne de Warburg y observa: 
 
Warburg era un tecnófilo. Estaba interesado en la telecomunicación, en la 
prensa y en viajar; todas estas nuevas tecnologías permitían nuevas 
formas de viajar, pero también prolongaban la  vieja idea de migración que 
conectó las civilizaciones desde el comienzo. La tecnología, por ejemplo 
en la forma de impresión, era también un nexo directo entre los grabados 
de Durero y los 28 teléfonos en el edificio avant-garde de su biblioteca. 
[Warburg] ya había escrito un artículo titulado «Aeronaves y submarinos en 
la imaginación medieval» que sugería que las sociedades antiguas habían 
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anticipado lo que él llamaba «vehículos del pensamiento» y la imaginación 
de los que disponemos hoy. Las imágenes eran sus vehículos (Bruhn n.d). 
 
Es notable que en el mismo modo en el que Warburg interpretó algunas 
imágenes medievales como predictivas del aeroplano y del submarino, todo el 
proyecto de su biblioteca, pero especialmente el Atlas Mnemosyne, predijeron 
la lógica del hyperlink y de la Web en general. 
El Atlas Mnemosyne se basa en imágenes: un atlas figurativo compuesto por 
más de dos mil placas o pantallas; cada placa está compuesta por 
fotomontajes sobre tablas de madera que presentan reproducciones de 
distintas obras, especialmente del Renacimiento, pero también de un repertorio 
arqueológico y material visual de la vida cotidiana, como de periódicos. 
El proyecto es el resultado del pensamiento no linear propio de Warburg y por 
lo tanto, de su necesidad de presentar en manera simultánea, casi 
tridimensional, todo tipo de relaciones y diversas formas de clasificación de las 
imágenes durante sus conferencias, y mientras estudiaba y escribía. Esto 
significa que el Atlas Mnemosyne tenía como objetivo la puesta en evidencia de 
relaciones y recuerdos en manera recíproca, no en una manera linear, sino en 
modo concomitante y transversal; y esto se debía a la necesidad de Warburg 
de combinar (linking) elementos y categorías heterogéneos, y a su necesidad 
de acceder a estos elementos en manera simultánea. 
Estos modelos, tan utópicos como puedan ser considerados, comparten 
similitudes asombrosas y casi predictivas con la Web, en la cual las 
posibilidades de acceso al conocimiento tienen una estructura análoga aunque  
la materialidad del soporte es diversa por razones obvias. El retorno de una 
lógica simultánea y no linear favorece la continuidad entre la historia del arte y 
la historia del arte de los nuevos medios, en la cual el debilitamiento del modelo 
linear a través del retorno de una paradigma sincrónico permite un modo más 
experimental de pensar el entero campo. El medio en sí mismo dicta la 
metodología para aproximarse al objeto de estudio, y de este modo la lógica 
del hyperlink general el sistema apropiado para  el archivo y la difusión del 
conocimiento que contiene. 
En relación a lo anterior, el interés en el concepto de ambigüedad radica en la 
libertad que podría permitir para una lectura potencial que permitiese al mismo 
tiempo la posibilidad de disparar nuevas relaciones y asociaciones creativas, 
abriendo recorridos conceptuales que no fueron considerados hasta el 
momento. La apertura y la simultaneidad de modelos no unilaterales para el 
pensamiento (creativo) puede permitir la reconstrucción del Theatro, o del 
Atlas, no como una ilusión tridimensional, pero como una arquitectura o 
estructura conceptual para el pensamiento y la teoría del arte, de la historia y 
teoría de los nuevos medios; y para la transmisión del conocimiento en general. 
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Esto último abre la posibilidad a una propuesta de un modelo non linear para la 
teoría del arte, la historia del arte y los nuevos medios, y para la transmisión, 
conservación, documentación y archivo de obras, y del conocimiento en 
general. Podría también ser el punto de partida para una nueva concepción del 
museo, en el cual el marco teórico de investigación y visualización tome una 
forma similar a la de su objeto de estudio.3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Este trabajo fue presentado originalmente en Rewire: Fourth International Conference on the 
Histories of Media Art, Science and Technology- John Moores University-FACT Liverpool. 
Septiembre 28-Octubre 1, 2011. 
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